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I. INTRODUCTION
NDUSTRY "custom and usage" evidence can be powerful; some-
times it will be the determinative factor in litigation.' Courts some-
times ask for custom and usage evidence.2 Litigants frequently seek
1. For example, in Energen Res. MAQ, Inc. v. Dalbosco, 23 S.W.3d 551 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied), Dalbosco assigned oil and gas leases to Energen
under an agreement, known as a "farmout," whereby Energen acquired the right to drill
wells on the leases for the parties' mutual benefit. After producing from a well for several
years, Energen decided to plug the well because of its marginal production. Dalbosco
asserted that Energen had a duty to give advance notice of Energen's intention to plug any
well drilled under their farmout agreement. The farmout agreement did not address the
issue, but Dalbosco sought to introduce evidence of a custom and usage in the oil and gas
industry to give notice of an intent to plug a well. The trial court granted Energen's motion
for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed the trial court holding that a mate-
rial issue of fact existed regarding the asserted industry custom and usage. Dalbosco v.
Total Minatome Corp., No. 01-92-00898-CV, 1994 WL 109475, (Tex. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] March 31, 1994) (not designated for publication). Following remand to the trial
court, the custom and usage evidence was presented to the jury which found such an indus-
try custom and usage existed and that Energen's failure to give the required notice was a
breach of the farmout agreement justifying an award of $216,000 in damages and $140,000
in attorney's fees. Energen Resources, 23 S.W.3d at 552-53. In the second appeal the jury
award was affirmed with the court noting: "Evidence of custom and usage is admissible to
add to a contract that is silent on a particular matter." Id. at 557. See also Oxley v. Gen.
Aft. Res., Inc., 936 P.2d 943 (Okla. 1997) (reversing summary judgment; issue of material
fact existed regarding custom and usage associated with interest owner voting practices
under joint operating agreement); Esplanade Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Templeton Energy Income
Corp., No. CIV.A. No. 86-1362 1988 WL 86856 (E.D. La. Aug. 16, 1988) (evaluating con-
flicting custom and usage testimony to conclude a drop in oil prices was an "adverse mate-
rial change" that would permit buyer to avoid closing on purchase of producing
properties).
2. E.g., Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Kirby Exploration Co. of Tex., 909 F.2d 811, 816 (5th
Cir. 1990) ("It is in the interests of justice for the district court to explore the customs and
practices in the offshore oil and gas industry dealing with the type of problem presented in
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to use custom and usage evidence to resolve interpretive and substantive
issues arising in property, contract, tort, agency, and other legal disci-
plines, including the discipline we call "oil and gas law." This article ana-
lyzes the role custom and usage evidence plays in litigation concerning
the oil and gas industry.3
Analysis of existing case law reveals that custom and usage evidence
has been employed for many different purposes-with courts employing
differing threshold procedural and substantive requirements depending
upon the context in which the evidence is offered. The goal of this article
is to identify, categorize, and analyze the various ways custom and usage
are used by litigants and managed by judges. By clearly identifying the
various contexts in which custom and usage evidence is sought to be used
by litigants, and in which it is admitted, excluded, or limited by the courts,
it should be possible to develop a principled analysis of when such evi-
dence is necessary, appropriate, and inappropriate. This will assist coun-
sel in evaluating when custom and usage evidence is essential, or
desirable. In addition to addressing the substantive law of custom and
usage, this article examines the procedural hurdles to admission of cus-
tom and usage evidence. It will also serve as a useful tool for explaining
to prospective custom and usage witnesses their role in a case. However,
before addressing the law of custom and usage, it is first necessary to
define what is meant by "custom and usage."
II. DEFINING "CUSTOM AND USAGE": THE WAY THINGS
ARE DONE
The modem definition of industry "custom and usage" is simply: the
way things are done within an industry. For example, in Energen Re-
sources MAQ, Inc. v. Dalbosco,4 the custom and usage evidence was of-
fered to prove "the way things are done" when a party to a farmout
agreement decides to plug a well.5
In the modem context, the relevant term is "usage" as opposed to "cus-
this case [maintenance of abandoned offshore platform used to support pipeline]."); Mit-
telstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 954 P.2d 1203, 1209 (Okla. 1998) ("The parties have
not shown that the actual costs at issue are, or are not, treated by the industry as produc-
tion costs or post-production costs for our purpose."). In the opinion following remand in
the Shell Offshore case, the trial court noted: "The parties agree that there is no custom in
the industry in this distinct situation, a pipeline supported by an inactive platform." Shell
Offshore, Inc. v. Kirby Exploration Co., No. Civ.A.88-1655, 1991 WL 62104 (E.D. La.
April 16, 1991), at *2. The court ultimately relied upon Shell's usage evidence regarding
leasing space on active platforms to support pipelines and implied similar terms for the
pipeline on the inactive platform. Id. at *3.
3. The same analytical observations can be made of other industries. Each industry
will have its own unique ways of doing business-their own "customs" and "usages." In
the first American treatise devoted to the topic, the author addresses custom and usage
issues by examining various businesses, such as banking, common carriers, and insurance,
as well as various relationships, such as landlord and tenant, master and servant, partner-
ship, principal and agent, and vendor and purchaser. JOHN D. LAWSON, THE LAW OF US-
AGES AND CUSTOMS ix (Bancroft-Whitney 1887) [hereinafter LAwsON].




tom."'6 Traditionally "custom" was limited to practices uniformly fol-
lowed by an industry, the origin of which cannot be identified because it
has been such a long-standing practice. 7 Today the focus is on "usage"
which is a much broader, less-demanding concept than custom. "Usages"
can be created by the parties to a transaction and they can change. Today
use of the term "custom," in tandem with the word "usage," is surplusage.
Industry "usage" therefore has the same meaning as industry "custom
and usage."
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines "usage" as "habitual or
customary practice."8 Usage as a dynamic concept, to be proven in any
particular situation, is addressed by a comment to Restatement section 219
as follows:
[U]sage is not in itself a legal rule but merely habit or practice in fact.
A particular usage may be more or less widespread. It may prevail
throughout an area, and the area may be small or large-a city, a state
or larger region. A usage may prevail among all people in the area,
or only in a special trade or other group. Usages change over time,
and persons in close association often develop temporary usages pe-
culiar to themselves. 9
The Restatement also uses the term "usage of trade" which it defines as "a
usage having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade
as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to a par-
ticular agreement." 10 As with the term "usage," the comment to the Re-
statement notes: "A usage of trade need not be 'ancient or immemorial,'
6. Frequently the term "practice" is used instead of "usage;" often the phrase "cus-
tom and practice" is used instead of "custom and usage." There does not appear to be any
intended distinction between the terms. The term "practice" is frequently encountered
when the term "usage" would sound awkward in the sentence. For example: "It was her
normal practice to give notice." vs. "It was her normal usage to give notice."
7. An early commentator described the rule as follows:
A common-law custom must have existed so long that the memory of man
runneth not to the contrary. If a usage could be shown to have commenced,
it was void as a custom. Every custom, of course, must have had a com-
mencement, but if its inception could be discovered, then the individual by
whose particular will the custom had its birth would be discovered; and it was
a maxim that no one man could be allowed to make a law, but that a custom
could only have its origin in the will of the whole. The time 'whereof the
memory of man runneth not to the contrary' received a technical limitation
and was understood to refer to the commencement of the reign of King Rich-
ard I.
LAWSON, supra note 3, at 26. King Richard I was "Richard the Lion-Hearted" who reigned
as King of England from 1189-1199. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTION-
ARY 1231 (1992) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S]. Therefore, technically a common law "custom"
must have been in existence since 1189.
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 219 (1981).
9. Id. at cmt. a.
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222(1) (1981). An interesting deriva-
tion of this rule has been developed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court concerning the use
of standardized forms by the oil and gas industry. In Oxley, 936 P.2d at 946, the affidavit of
expert witness R. Dobie Langenkamp (lawyer, oil operator, law professor) stated it was the
"custom and usage in the oil industry" that when a successor operator receives a majority
of working interest votes, that party immediately becomes the operator and parties who
voted for them cannot change their vote during the 60-day election period. Noting the
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'universal,' or the like."'"
Instead of requiring an "ancient or immemorial" and "universal" stan-
dard similar to that used to prove a common law custom, the Restatement
requires the party to establish its existence, and relevance, as a matter of
fact. 12
The distinction between a "usage" and a "usage of trade" is explained
by the Restatement by characterizing "usage of trade" as a "particular
application" of the rules governing "usage.' 3 The major practical dis-
tinction between a "usage" and "usage of trade" under the Restatement is
that a party can be bound to a "usage" if they "knew or had reason to
know of the usage,' 4 while a party can be bound to a "usage of trade" if
they "know or have reason to know" of the trade usage or if the "usage of
trade" is part of the "vocation or trade in which the parties are en-
gaged . ... ,,1 When the parties to a contract are "engaged" in a "voca-
tion or trade" they are presumed to contract with regard for the usages of
the "vocation or trade.' 6 The Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") ap-
plies a similar analysis.' 7
unique utility of custom and usage when interpreting operating agreements, the court
stated:
Custom and usage should be considered when interpreting a contract....
This would especially be true when construing the JOA in the present case,
which is based upon a standard form in use in the oil and gas industry since
1956.... Thus, if on remand, the evidence shows that it is the custom and
usage that vote changes are not permitted, then the JOA should be so
interpreted.
Id. The court held that the existence of such a usage created a material issue of fact which
must be resolved at trial and reversed the trial court's order granting summary judgment.
Id. at 947.
11. Id. at cmt. b.
12. The existence and scope of a usage of trade are to be determined as questions of
fact." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 222(2) (1981).
13. Id. at cmt. a. ("This section... states a particular application of the rules stated in
§8 220 and 221.").
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 220(1) (1982) ("Usage Relevant to In-
terpretation"). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 221 ("Usage Supple-
menting an Agreement") ("each party knows or has reason to know of the usage").
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222(3) (1981) ("Unless otherwise
agreed, a usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which the parties are engaged or a usage
of trade of which they know or have reason to know gives meaning to or supplements or
qualifies their agreement.") (emphasis added).
16. Subsection VII.E. of this article addresses when a party without actual knowledge
of a usage will nevertheless be bound by the usage. See infra text accompanying notes 396-
441.
17. The U.C.C. definition of "usage of trade" includes "any practice or method of
dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an
expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question." U.C.C.§ 1-205(2) (1977). Under the 2001 revisions to Article 1 of the U.C.C., § 1-205(2) is found
at new § 1-303(c). Commenting on the significance of the "trade" aspect of this definition,
Professors White and Summers observe:
Note particularly that it is not necessary for both parties to be consciously
aware of the trade usage. It is enough if the trade usage is such as to "justify
an expectation" of its observance. Subsection 1-205(3) adds that a usage of
trade is binding if it is a usage of the vocation or trade in which the parties
are engaged or is a usage which the parties are or should be aware.
2004]
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The U.C.C. has played a major role in defining the modem concept of
"custom and usage."'1 8 The Restatement definition of "usage of trade" is
patterned off of U.C.C. § 1-205(2) 19 which states, in part:
A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such
regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an
expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in
question. The existence and scope of such a usage are to be proved
as facts .... 20
Under the U.C.C., usage is recognized as an integral part of the parties'
bargain. 21 Therefore, usage evidence can be offered to "explain" or "sup-
plement" the terms of a fully integrated agreement. 22 With a working
definition of "custom and usage" evidence, the next step is to consider
why courts even consider usage evidence.
JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 111 (5th ed. 2000)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter WHITE & SUMMERS].
18. Among the stated "purposes and policies" of the U.C.C. is "to permit the contin-
ued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the par-
ties .. " U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b) (1977). Under the 2001 revisions to article 1 of the U.C.C.
§ 1-102(2)(b) is found at new § 1-103(a)(2).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222. cmt. a (1981).
20. U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1977) (emphasis added). Under the 2001 revisions to Article 1
of the U.C.C., § 1-205(2) is found at new § 1-303(c).
21. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) defines "Agreement" to mean "the bargain of the parties in fact
as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances including course of
dealing or usage of trade or course of performance .... U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1977) (empha-
sis added). The comment explains: "[T]he word ["Agreement"] is intended to include the
full recognition of usage of trade, course of dealing, course of performance and the sur-
rounding circumstances as effective parts thereof ... ." Id. at cmt. 3. As noted by Profes-
sors White and Summers: "These sources [course of dealing, usage of trade, and course of
performance] are relevant not only to the interpretation of express contract terms, but may
themselves constitute contract terms." WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, at 111. Under
the 2001 revisions to Article 1 of the U.C.C., § 1-201(3) is found at new § 1-201(b)(3).
22. The Article 2 version of the parol evidence rule, U.C.C. section 2-202, expressly
provides that "a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement,"
even "a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement," can be "ex-
plained or supplemented by... usage of trade...." U.C.C. § 2-202 (1977). The comment
to section 2-202 explains that the role of usage evidence is to ascertain the "true under-
standing of the parties" with "the assumption that the ... usages of trade were taken for
granted when the document was phrased." Id. at cmt. 2. Professors White and Summers
observe:
Even if the writing is a "complete and exclusive" statement of the terms of
the agreement, parties may still introduce course of dealing, usage of trade,
or course of performance to explain, supplement, or add to the agreement
(but not contradict it). This is so even where the language of the agreement
is unambiguous on its face.
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, at 98-99. Under the 2003 revisions to Article 2 of the
U.C.C., section 2-202 has been modified by providing that a "final expression of their
agreement .. .may be supplemented by evidence of course of performance, course of
dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-303) .... U.C.C. § 2-202(1)(a) (2003). Although the
word "explained" has been dropped from the phrase "explained or supplemented," the
concept is picked up in new subsection (2) which makes it clear that usage evidence can be
used for interpretation, in any event, by providing that: "Terms in a record may be ex-
plained by evidence of course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade without




III. APPLICABLE USAGES PROVIDE MEANING TO THE
CONTRACT TERMS
Ideally, the goal in any dispute over the meaning of contract terms is to
ascertain the intent of the parties.2 3 The inquiry is, under the facts, what
"meaning" should be given to a particular term, phrase, clause, or agree-
ment structure?2 4 Often what may at first appear to be odd wording and
agreement structure will become readily apparent once usages associated
with the transaction are understood. Usage evidence provides informa-
tion that is often necessary for the accurate interpretation of the contract.
Problems arise, however, when the "four-corners" of the contract docu-
ment do not reveal the applicable usages and it becomes necessary to
consider evidence outside of the document: "extrinsic evidence." When-
ever a party seeks to offer extrinsic evidence to interpret an unambigu-
ous, integrated writing the other party to the contract will seek to exclude
the evidence under the parol evidence rule.
A. PAROL EVIDENCE RULE LIMITATIONS ON USAGE EVIDENCE
Technically, the parol evidence rule has nothing to do with the "inter-
pretation" of contract terms.2 5 Instead, the rule simply defines what
23. However, Professor Farnsworth warns that what courts purport to do under the
rubric of "the intentions of the parties" may not, in fact, account for their intentions:
The court does indeed carry out their intentions in those relatively rare cases
in which the parties attached the same meaning to the language in question.
But if the parties attached different meanings to that language, the court's
task is the more complex one of applying a standard of reasonableness to
determine which party's intention is to be carried out at the expense of the
other's. And if the parties attached no meaning to that language, its task is
to find by a standard of reasonableness a meaning that does not accord with
any intention at all.
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 466 (3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter FARNSWORTH]. The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts SECTION 200 states: "Interpretation of a promise or
agreement or a term thereof is the ascertainment of its meaning." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACrS § 200 (1981). See RESTATEMENT regarding "whose meaning
prevails." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 (1981).
24. The Restatement provides: "Interpretation of contracts deals with the meaning
given to language and other conduct by the parties rather than with meanings established
by law. But the relevant intention of a party is that manifested by him rather than any
different undisclosed intention." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 cmt. a
(1981). See generally E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.
J. 939 (1967).
25. The most logical rationale for the parol evidence rule is the "merger" concept that
a subsequent integrated writing of the parties will discharge all prior oral or written agree-
ments. This is the rationale adopted by the Restatement which provides, in part:
(1) A binding integrated agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent
that it is inconsistent with them.
(2) A binding completely integrated agreement discharges prior agreements
to the extent they are within its scope.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1981) (emphasis added). In comment a, it
is noted: "This Section states what is commonly known as the parol evidence rule. It is not
a rule of evidence but a rule of substantive law. Nor is it a rule of interpretation; it defines
the subject matter of interpretation." Id. at cmt. a.
The merger/discharge function of the parol evidence rule recognizes the distinct roles of
identifying the writing to be interpreted and the independent act of interpretation. Profes-
2004]
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agreements constitute the "contract" that will be interpreted.2 6 The rule
defines the evidence that can be considered in ascertaining the terms of
the contract. After identifying the universe of terms, the rule has done its
job. Determining what that universe of terms "mean" is not a task for the
parol evidence rule, but rather for the law governing contract interpreta-
tion.27 For example, in Jeanes v. Henderson,28 Jeanes asserted that when
Henderson sold certain interests to Stallworth, Henderson breached their
contract granting Jeanes an "option to purchase all of his [Henderson's]
interest should he ever decide to sell his Interest." The dispute focused
on the meaning of the term "Interest" as used in the Jeanes/Henderson
contract.29 At trial, Henderson testified that since another company,
Kewanee Oil, already had a right of first refusal on the "Lokey-Cart-
wright leases," the parties never intended Jeanes' option to attach to
those interests but was limited to future acquisitions outside the Lokey-
Cartwright leases. Jeanes objected to Henderson's testimony as "'im-
proper parol evidence' that varied and contradicted the 1971 contract. '30
On appeal, the court determined the testimony was properly admitted
because it "did not vary or contradict any terms of the 1971 contract but
sor McCormick popularized the "evidentiary" rationale for the parol evidence rule, that
tended to obscure its role, by focusing on the "spoken as against the written word .... "
Charles T. McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for Control of the
Jury, 41 YALE L. J. 365, 366 (1932). The evidentiary analysis fails to account for the rule's
application to prior written agreements and its non-application to subsequent oral agree-
ments. Other experts on evidence law have concluded the rule is not a rule designed to
ensure the reliability of the offered evidence. 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2400 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981). Instead, it is a rule of sub-
stantive law that is best explained in the context of merger and discharge. See FARNS-
WORTH, supra note 23, at § 7.2.
26. Professor Farnsworth makes the distinction between "determining the subject mat-
ter to be interpreted," which implicates the parol evidence rule, and determining the
"meaning" of the subject matter, which involves interpretation. FARNSWORTH, supra note
23 at §§ 7.2, 7.7.
27. Under the title "Interpretation of Integrated Agreement" the Restatement pro-
vides: "The interpretation of an integrated agreement is directed to the meaning of the
terms of the writing or writings in light of the circumstances, in accordance with the rules
stated in this Chapter." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212(1) (1981). Re-
garding the evidence that can be used to determine the meaning of an integrated agree-
ment, comment b to section 212 provides:
It is sometimes said that extrinsic evidence cannot change the plain meaning
of a writing, but meaning can almost never be plain except in a context. Ac-
cordingly, the rule stated in Subsection (1) is not limited to cases where it is
determined that the language used is ambiguous. Any determination of
meaning or ambiguity should only be made in the light of the relevant evi-
dence of the situation and relations of the parties, the subject matter of the
transaction, preliminary negotiations and statements made therein, usages of
trade, and the course of dealing between the parties.... But after the trans-
action has been shown in all its length and breadth, the words of an inte-
grated agreement remain the most important evidence of intention.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 cmt. b (1981) (emphasis added).
28. 703 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1983).
29. Id. at 857.
30. Id. at 861.
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explained and interpreted them."'31
Unfortunately, the parol evidence rule is sometimes improperly
pressed into service at the term interpretation stage of analysis in addition
to its legitimate term identification stage of analysis. The Restatement
makes it clear that: "Agreements and negotiations prior to or contempo-
raneous with the adoption of a writing are admissible in evidence to es-
tablish ... the meaning of the writing, whether or not integrated .... -32
However, some courts have employed the parol evidence rule to limit
extrinsic "meaning" evidence unless the court first finds the agreement is
ambiguous. 33 Other courts have carefully distinguished the interpretive
role from the identification of terms to be interpreted, 34 and have recog-
nized that usage evidence is properly classified as interpretive.35
31. Id. The court states the analysis as follows: "The term 'interest' in the third option
was not self-defining and was in this sense ambiguous. Henderson's testimony was thus
admissible to determine the meaning of the term." Id.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214(c) (1981) (emphasis added). The
existence of Kewanee Oil's right of first refusal, at the time the Jeanes/Henderson contract
was made, would also be a relevant "surrounding circumstance" the court should be able
to consider. See infra text accompanying notes 45-50.
33. 12 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS § 34:7 (4th ed. 1999). The "common law" rule is stated as follows:
As a general rule at common law, parol or extrinsic evidence is admissible to
explain or supplement terms of a contract which are ambiguous or uncertain
as used in the contract and cannot be satisfactorily explained by reference to
other portions of the contract. Under this common-law principle, usage is
admissible to explain or interpret ambiguous terms or provisions of a
contract....
The common-law parol evidence rule requires a finding that the contract is
ambiguous prior to the admission of evidence of usage....
Id. at 45-46.
34. Professor Corbin states in his treatise:
No parol evidence that is offered can be said to vary or contradict a writing
until by process of interpretation it is determined what the writing means.
The "parol evidence rule" is not, and does not purport to be, a rule of inter-
pretation or a rule as to the admission of evidence for the purpose of inter-
pretation. Even if a written document has been assented to as the complete
and accurate integration of the terms of a contract, it must still be inter-
preted; and all those factors that are of assistance in this process may be
proved by oral testimony....
Custom and usage of a particular place or trade can be proved to give to the
words of a written contract a meaning different from that which would be
given to the words by their more general usage. This is true even though the
words are ordinarily words in common use such as words of number or words
expressing a period of time.
6 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 579 at 120, 131 (interim ed. 1979).
35. Professor Kniffin observes in the Revised Edition of Corbin on Contracts:
Trade and local usage are among the varieties of extrinsic evidence most fre-
quently and most readily admitted by courts in order to discern the meaning
of contract terms, as well as the meaning of terms of offer and acceptance.
Commentary in both the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts clearly indicates that the "plain meaning rule" is inap-
plicable to evidence of trade usage. Disputed terms are therefore not re-
quired to be ambiguous before evidence of trade usage can be utilized to
interpret them.... The Restatement (Second) of Contracts explains that the
plain meaning rule is inapplicable when evidence of trade usage is proffered:
"There is no requirement that an agreement be ambiguous before evidence
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The U.C.C. best articulates the interpretive role of usage evidence by
expressly stating that even a "complete and exclusive [written] statement
of the terms of the agreement" can be "explained or supplemented" by
"usage of trade."' 36 Although the express written terms of the agreement
cannot be "contradicted" by usage evidence, another Code provision di-
rects that the "express terms of the agreement and any.., usage of trade,
shall be construed whenever reasonable as consistent with each
other . . . . ",37 The "express terms shall control ... usage of trade" only
when a consistent construction would be "unreasonable. '38 The com-
ments to U.C.C. section 2-202 describe the interpretive role of usage evi-
dence as follows:
Paragraph (a) makes admissible evidence of course of dealing, usage
of trade and course of performance to explain or supplement the
terms of any writing stating the agreement of the parties in order
that the true understanding of the parties as to the agreement may
be reached. Such writings are to be read on the assumption that the
course of prior dealings between the parties and the usages of trade
were taken for granted when the document was phrased. Unless care-
fully negated they have become an element of the meaning of the
words used.39
The "carefully negated" requirement associated with section 2-202, in
conjunction with the "unreasonable construction" test of section 2-208(2),
make it likely that most usage evidence will be admissible under the parol
evidence rule.40 Most exclusions will occur when counsel tries to add or
subtract terms to the contract under the guise of usage evidence. These
of usage of trade can be shown .... Not infrequently, however, cases are
found in which rules are laid down, as if well established, that evidence of
usage or custom is not admissible to vary or contradict the plain terms of a
written contract or to make a contract where the parties have made none.
Such statements are very misleading in form and are very likely to lead to
unjust decisions. Because trade usage supplies a particular meaning that is
used by members of a trade, this meaning will often differ from the meaning
assigned by the general public. If a court were to apply the "plain meaning
rule," the court might be obliged to refuse to admit evidence of the trade
usage. For example, the court could hold that the meaning of "dozen" is
clearly twelve, so that proffered evidence of the chefs' trade usage that a
dozen doughnuts is thirteen, "a baker's dozen," would be excluded from
consideration.
5 MARGARET N. KNWI'N, CORBIN ON CowNRAcrs § 24.13, at 109-10, 117-18 (rev. ed.
1998).
36. U.C.C. § 2-202 (1977) (Article 2 parol evidence rule).
37. U.C.C. § 2-208 (1977).
38. Id.
39. U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 2 (1977) (emphasis added).
40. The line between "explained or supplemented" and not reasonably "consistent" is
easier to draw when it is acknowledged that the "agreement" being defined is "the bargain
of the parties in fact as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances
including... usage of trade .... " U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1977). The comment to this section
states: "As used in this Act the word [Agreement] is intended to include full recognition of
usage of trade ... as effective parts thereof .... " Id. at cmt. 3. This concept is also noted
in the comment to section 1-102 which states: "'Agreement' here includes the effect given




tactics can often be revealed by identifying the purpose for which the
evidence is being offered: is it to identify the universe of terms that com-
prise the contract or is it to interpret the contract terms already found 41 to
comprise the contract?42 Even this test, however, is difficult to apply in
many cases. 43
In 2003, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and the American Law Institute approved a revised text for Article
2 of the U.C.C. With regard to usage, the primary changes were organi-
zational with the elimination of U.C.C. sections 1-205 and 2-208, and re-
placing them with new section 1-303 to make the course of performance,
course of dealing, and usage of trade provisions apply to all commercial
transactions, not merely those covered by Article 2. Regarding the role
of usage in contract interpretation, a new subsection to the Code's parol
evidence rule, section 2-202, makes it clear that such evidence can be con-
sidered even when the language is unambiguous. 44
B. PAROL EVIDENCE RULE NOT A LIMITATION ON "CONTEXT" AND
"SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES" EVIDENCE
Every contract has a context.45 Context is often described in terms of
41. Applying parol evidence principles.
42. "Interpretation" would also include omitted terms that are provided by implica-
tion from the express terms contained in the written agreement. For example, in Cheek v.
Metzer, 291 S.W. 860 (Tex. 1927), the court interpreted the contracts to require perform-
ance within a "reasonable time." To determine what is a reasonable time the court must
consider "the circumstances in evidence surrounding the situation of the parties and the
subject-matter under which the contract was executed." Id. at 863. Once an omitted term
is supplied, its meaning is determined in the same manner as though it were an express
term. "[W]hen an implied obligation is established, the contract is to be construed as a
whole, and the implied provisions are to be read into and become part of the contract as
though expressly set forth therein." Id.
43. For example, in U.S. Tex Oil Corp. v. Kynerd, 296 F. 836 (5th Cir. 1924), an assign-
ment conveyed "seven-eighths of all oil and gas produced from the leased land .... "
Usage testimony was offered to establish that "seven-eighths of the oil produced under the
terms of such a lease means seven-eighths of the oil less the fuel oil .... " Id. at 841. The
court ruled this evidence was improper noting:
The intention of the parties evidenced by their use of the words "seven-
eighths (7/8) of the oil and gas produced," was not subject to be varied or
contradicted by evidence to the effect that that language had a meaning not
expressed by it. An express written contract, embodying in clear and positive
terms the intention of the parties, cannot be varied by evidence of usage or
custom.
Id. The court essentially held 7/8ths = 7/8ths and usage evidence will not change this result.
However, the real term for interpretation is "produced" oil and gas. Does "produced"
include oil and gas that is used for fuel and not marketed? Usages in the trade would seem
relevant when the focus is on the meaning of the term "produced."
44. U.C.C. § 2-202(2) (2003) states that: "Terms in a record may be explained by evi-
dence of course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade without a preliminary
determination by the court that the language used is ambiguous."
45. As defined by WEBSTER'S, "context" means: "the parts of a written or spoken
statement that precede or follow a specific word or passage, usually influencing the mean-
ing or effect" and "the set of circumstances or facts that surround a particular event, situa-
tion, etc .. " WEBSTER'S, supra note 7, at 439. "Context" could also mean "the fleshy,
fibrous body of the pileus in mushrooms .... Id. It all depends on the "context" of the
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the "surrounding circumstances. '46 Professor Farnsworth identifies, as
one of his "Fundamental Principles of Interpretation, '47 the importance
of courts considering "all the relevant circumstances surrounding the
transaction. ' 48 The U.C.C. also alludes to the importance of surrounding
circumstance evidence by providing:
[T]he meaning of the agreement of the parties is to be determined by
the language used by them and by their action, read and interpreted
in the light of commercial practices and other surrounding circum-
stances. The measure and background for interpretation are set by
the commercial context, which may explain and supplement even the
language of a formal or final writing. 49
The Restatement (Second) of Property provides that a conveyance should
be interpreted "in light of the circumstances of its formulation." 50
Although Professor Farnsworth advocates consideration of "prior ne-
gotiations" as part of the relevant surrounding circumstances, 51 many
courts would exclude prior negotiation evidence under the "plain mean-
ing rule."'52 Under the plain meaning rule, the court will evaluate the
writing, and the relevant surrounding circumstances to determine
whether the contract is sufficiently clear 53 regarding the matter at issue. 54
If it is, it will be interpreted without regard for the prior negotiation evi-
situation which meaning is intended. Are we talking about contracts, mushrooms, or
mushroom contracts?
46. Interestingly, "context of situation" is defined as "the totality of extralinguistic
features having relevance to a communicative act." WEBSTER'S, supra note 7, at 439.
47. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, at § 7.10.
48. Professor Farnsworth observes, and contends:
The overarching principle of contract interpretation is that the court is free to
look to all the relevant circumstances surrounding the transaction. This in-
cludes the state of the world, including the state of the law, at the time. It
also includes all writings, oral statements, and other conduct by which the
parties manifested their assent, together with any prior negotiations between
them and any applicable course of dealing, course of performance, or usage.
The entire agreement, including all writings, should be read together in light
of all the circumstances. Since the purpose of this inquiry is to ascertain the
meaning to be given to the language, there should be no requirement that the
language be ambiguous, vague, or otherwise uncertain before the inquiry is
undertaken.
Id. at 467.
49. U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 1 (1977); U.C.C. § 1-303 cmt. 1 (2003).
50. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 242 (1940). See generally Laura H. Bur-
ney, Determining the Legal Ramifications of Express Oil and Gas Lease Provisions: Do the
Rules of Document Interpretation Provide Predictability? ADVANCED OIL, GAS AND MIN-
ERAL LAW COURSE 1998 D-3 to D-4 (State Bar of Texas 1998) [hereinafter BURNEY].
51. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, at § 7.10.
52. Texas Gas Exploration Corp. v. Broughton Offshore Ltd. II, 790 S.W.2d 781, 785
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ) ("[T]he record reveals that the requested
instruction was properly denied. Custom and usage of trade are not relevant where the
contract language is, like the language before this court, clear and unambiguous.").
53. Usually this level of clarity is expressed in terms of being "ambiguous" or
"unambiguous."
54. Courts differ as to whether prior negotiation evidence can be considered at this
initial stage of determining whether the agreement is ambiguous. FARNSWORTH, supra
note 23, at 478-79.
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dence. If the writing is not clear on the point, the prior negotiation evi-
dence is admissible for the purpose of interpretation.
However, some courts have extended the plain meaning rule to exclude
any extrinsic evidence. Professor Farnsworth labels this a "four corners
rule" 55 where courts purport to limit their inquiry to the four corners of
the final, completely integrated writing.56 Although many cases can be
found which reference the four corners of the contract being interpreted,
they are actually applying a plain meaning rule because they frequently
consider some form of surrounding circumstance evidence to interpret
the contract. The lack of consistency in the cases can be explained by a
basic failure to: (1) distinguish the role of the parol evidence rule from
the role of interpretation;57 (2) recognize the substantive merger/dis-
charge rationale for the parol evidence rule instead of an evidentiary ra-
tionale; 58 and (3) recognize the necessity of considering context when
interpreting a contract.59
The Texas Supreme Court describes the relationship between the parol
evidence rule and the surrounding circumstances interpretive rule in dis-
cussing whether a court could consider that the parties had struck a
clause from an oil and gas lease:60
55. There are actually two "contexts" with regard to a four-corners rule. First is a
permissive context in which a court is required to examine all language within the "four-
corners" of the document to ascertain the intent of the parties. This is an interpretive rule
designed to seek a harmonization of the total contract language instead of giving any par-
ticular type or location of a clause decisive effect. E.g., Heyen v. Hartnett, 679 P.2d 1152,
1156 (Kan. 1984) ("The fundamental rule in construing the effect of written instruments is
that the intent and purpose of the parties be determined from an examination of the entire
instrument or from its four-corners. Thus the language used anywhere in the instrument
should be taken into consideration and construed in harmony with other provisions.").
Second is the restrictive context in which it is stated as a sort of adjunct to the parol evi-
dence rule by suggesting all interpretation must focus on language within the four corners
of the document to the exclusion of anything "extrinsic" to the document. E.g., Coastal Oil
& Gas Corp. v. Roberts, 28 S.W.3d 759, 764 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000), reh'g
granted (Aug. 23, 2001), motion to dismiss granted in part (Mar. 21, 2002), judgment set
aside (Mar. 21, 2002) ("Courts apply lease clauses as written and refuse to imply terms not
found within the four corners of the document.").
56. Professor Farnsworth explains the "four corners rule" approach as follows:
At times it is misleadingly suggested that a plain meaning rule excludes more
than evidence of prior negotiations during the first stage. Such a rule, under
which the court cannot look to any circumstances outside the writing to de-
termine whether the language lacks the required degree of clarity, is often
called a "four comers rule." It is sometimes associated with a distinction,
attributed to Sir Francis Bacon, between latent and patent ambiguities. But
even under a plain meaning rule, evidence of surrounding circumstances, as
distinguished from evidence of prior negotiations, should be admitted during
the first stage.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, at 477-78.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
58. See supra note 25.
59. See supra test accompanying notes 45-50.
60. Gibson v. Turner, 294 S.W.2d 781, 785 (Tex. 1956). Arguably there should be no
problem in this case regarding the deleted clause because the deletion is clearly evidenced
on the face of the document (the "four corners") without any reference to extrinsic evi-
dence. As the court noted: "The original lease was introduced in evidence and following
the above quoted provision of the paragraph was printed a proportionate reduction of
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The Court may read a written document in the light of surrounding
circumstances, which can be proved, in order to arrive at the true
meaning and intention of the parties as expressed in the words used,
but will not hear parol evidence of language or words other than
those used by the parties themselves in the writing. No other words
are to be added to or subtracted from the written instrument ....
[I]n construing a contract a court may look to the circumstances sur-
rounding the parties at the time the contract was entered into, the
situation of the parties, and the subject matter of the instrument, re-
gardless of whether the language used in the contract be
ambiguous. 61
However, the role of surrounding circumstances evidence in Texas is still
unclear.62
For example, in Sun Oil Company v. Madeley,63 the court had to deter-
mine whether an oil and gas lease granted the lessor a net profits interest
in gas production as well as oil production. There was no dispute that the
lessor was entitled to a 1/8th royalty on oil and gas plus a 7/16ths net
profits interest in oil production. 64 The court recites the familiar Texas
interpretive inquiry: "In construing this lease, it is our task to seek the
intention of the parties as that intention is expressed in the lease."' 65 This
statement appears to incorporate the parol evidence rule by, in effect,
concluding the lease is a fully integrated agreement. Therefore, the
"terms" to be interpreted are those found in the lease. However, this
statement also has a "four-corners" connotation that suggests the "mean-
ing" of the terms must be found on the face of the instrument. The sur-
rounding circumstances rule belies a "four-corners" limitation on the
meaning of the terms. In Madeley, Sun argued: "the courts may only con-
sider extrinsic evidence after the instrument itself is found to be ambigu-
ous."'66 The lessor responded by arguing: "[W]hen the construction of a
contract is at issue, the court must first consult surrounding circumstances
to determine whether or not the contract is ambiguous. ' 67 The court re-
sponded stating:
Lessors state the proper rule. Evidence of surrounding circum-
stances may be consulted. If, in the light of surrounding circum-
stances, the language of the contract appears to be capable of only a
royalty clause, which was eliminated prior to signature by the lessors, by running typewritten
'x' through it." Id. at 782 (emphasis added). This is fundamentally different from a situa-
tion where a party seeks to offer evidence that a clause was never included in the lease and
the face of the resulting lease does not show the deletion.
61. Id. at 785 (quoting Self v. King, 28 Tex. 552, 554 (1866) and Ryan v. Kent, 36
S.W.2d 1007, 1010 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931).
62. Burney, supra note 50, at D-3 to D-4, D-10 to D-11.
63. 626 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. 1981).
64. Id. at 727 ("The principal issue is whether lessors are entitled to one-half the pro-
ceeds from the 7/8ths working interest gas, casinghead gas and condensate ....
65. Id. at 727-28 (emphasis added).




single meaning, the court can confine itself to the writing .... 68
The surrounding circumstances evidence revealed that in 1932, when
the lease was executed: (1) the lessors' land was next to a proven oil field;
(2) the lessors were in a strong bargaining position because they had
waited to lease their land; (3) the lessors were represented by an attorney
experienced in oil and gas matters; (4) there was very little gas produc-
tion; (5) gas was viewed as being of limited value; and (6) a memorandum
in Sun's files focused on oil.69 The court held that this evidence was prop-
erly considered but the court of appeals also considered evidence regard-
ing Sun's subsequent conduct "of accounting to lessors for one-half the
proceeds from working interest gas over an extended period of time. '70
The supreme court concluded that the court of appeals relied: "[M]ore
upon Sun's subsequent conduct than it does upon the unambiguous lan-
guage of the lease. '71 This was not surrounding circumstances evidence,
but rather evidence of Sun's interpretation of the contract which can be
considered only when the contract is first found to be ambiguous. 72 Lim-
iting its analysis to the express terms of the lease and surrounding circum-
stances evidence, the court held the lease was unambiguous and only
conveyed a right to a net profits in oil and not gas. 73
Usage constitutes one of the potential surrounding circumstances that
must be considered to understand the context of the contract. 74 Al-
though usage evidence is often treated as a special type of extrinsic evi-
dence, it is merely evidence of the context in which the parties were
operating when they made their contract. 75 The role of usage, and other
surrounding circumstance evidence, become more focused when the in-
terpretive process is fully defined. Although the ultimate goal is to ascer-
68. Id.
69. Id. at 732.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. The court stated: "Only where a contract is first found to be ambiguous may
the courts consider the parties' interpretation. . . . Where the meaning of the contract is
plain and unambiguous, a party's construction is immaterial." Id. Although this evidence
lacks the temporal proximity to be "surrounding circumstances" evidence, it would appear
to be "course of performance" evidence that would be useful in determining the intent of
the parties.
73. Id. ("Although the lessors urge that we examine the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding execution of the lease, this evidence does not aid their construction.").
74. The comment to Restatement section 220 notes:
[Ulsage relevant to interpretation is treated as part of the context of an
agreement in determining whether there is ambiguity or contradiction as well
as in resolving ambiguity or contradiction. There is no requirement that an
ambiguity be shown before usage can be shown, and no prohibition against
showing that language or conduct have a different meaning in the light of
usage from the meaning they might have apart from the usage. The normal
effect of a usage on a written contract is to vary its meaning from the mean-
ing it would otherwise have.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 220 cmt. d (1981).
75. The "Introductory Note" to the Restatement chapter on "The Scope of Contractual
Obligations" states: "Whether or not there is a writing, the parties' intention is read in its
context, and usages common to the parties are often an important part of the context."
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS, Chapter 9, Introductory Note.
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tain the meaning of a contract, 76 the problem is often trying to determine
"whose meaning prevails. '77
When the parties to a contract do not attach the same meaning to its
terms, courts look for the meaning attached by one party (A) when the
other party (B) either knew, or had reason to know, of the other party's
(A's) meaning. 78 Often times the context of the contract, and the sur-
rounding circumstances, including usage, will provide a factual basis for
concluding a party either "knew" or "had reason to know" of the mean-
ing attached by the other party.79 When courts find it necessary to con-
sider rules of interpretation, a primary goal will be to consider the
surrounding circumstances and attempt to identify the primary purpose
the parties seek to accomplish through their contract.80
Surrounding circumstances, particularly usage, can play a major inter-
pretive role when the parties employ technical terms. In this regard, the
Restatement provides a special rule of interpretation that "[u]nless a dif-
ferent intention is manifested, . . . technical terms and words of art are
given their technical meaning when used in a transaction within their
technical field."'81 The relationship between the "technical terms" rule
and the parol evidence rule is addressed in Mescalero Energy, Inc. v. Un-
derwriters Indemnity General Agency, Inc.,82 where the court considered
the meaning of the term "formation" in an insurance contract covering oil
and gas operations. The policy covered a blowout whenever there is an
uncontrolled flow of oil, gas, or water "between two or more separate
formations .... "83 The issue was whether a blowout in the Austin Chalk
involved "two or more separate formations. '84 The insurer offered a def-
inition found in the Williams & Meyers Manual of Oil and Gas Terms
76. "Interpretation of a promise or agreement or a term thereof is the ascertainment
of its meaning." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 200 (1981).
77. Id. at § 201.
78. Id. at § 201(2).
79. The comments to Restatement section 201 express the importance of usages and
context: "Uncertainties in the meaning of words are ordinarily greatly reduced by the con-
text in which they are used." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF COrTRACTS § 201 cmt. b (1981).
80. Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 202(1) (1981) provides: "Words and
other conduct are interpreted in the light of all the circumstances, and if the principal
purpose of the parties is ascertainable it is given great weight." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTs § 202(1) (1981). Comment a indicates: The rules [of interpretation] are
general in character, and serve merely as guides in the process of interpretation. They do
not depend upon any determination that there is an ambiguity, but are used in determining
what meanings are reasonably possible as well as in choosing among possible meanings."
Id. at cmt. a. Comment b again stresses the importance of context, stating:
The meaning of words and other symbols commonly depends on their con-
text; the meaning of other conduct is even more dependent on the circum-
stances. In interpreting the words and conduct of the parties to a contract, a
court seeks to put itself in the position they occupied at the time the contract
was made.
Id. at cmt. b.
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(3)(b) (1981).
82. 56 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
83. Id. at 316.
84. Id. at 316-17.
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supporting its position that the Austin Chalk is a single formation.8 5 The
insured offered expert testimony that the term "formation" is defined in
such a way that the Austin Chalk consists of multiple formations. 86
The insurer sought to exclude the insured's definition of formation ar-
guing it violated the parol evidence rule.87 However, the court noted that
the insurer relied upon extrinsic evidence to support its definition of for-
mation. 88 The only difference was the insurer looked to a dictionary
while the insured relied upon expert testimony for its definition. The
court stated the issue as whether the extrinsic evidence of a technical def-
inition must take any particular form, such as a dictionary as opposed to
expert testimony.89 The court approved the use of any form of extrinsic
evidence when it is offered to establish "the commonly understood mean-
ing of the term within a particular industry." 90 Even though the compet-
ing technical definitions resulted in a finding that the contract was
ambiguous, the court found: "Nevertheless, extrinsic evidence may 'be
admissible to give the words of a contract a meaning consistent with that
to which they are reasonably susceptible, i.e., to "interpret" contractual
terms.' "91
IV. SOURCES OF USAGE INFORMATION: ARGUMENT,
ANECDOTE, AND FACT
There are three ways usage information92 becomes available to a court:
(1) the parties can present evidence on the matter at trial and establish
the existence, or non-existence of the usage as a fact; (2) The parties can
argue for recognition, or non-recognition of the usage based upon case
law, law journals, treatises, and other non-evidentiary information; or (3)
85. The definition was as follows:
A succession of sedimentary beds that were deposited continuously and
under the same general conditions. It may consist of one type of rock or of
alternations of types. An individual bed or group of beds distinct in charac-
ter from the rest of the formation and persisting over a large area is called a
"member" of the formation. Formations are usually named for the town or
area in which they were first recognized and described, often at a place
where the formation outcrops. For example, the Austin chalk formation out-
crops at Austin, Texas.
Id. at 318 (quoting HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND
GAS TERMS 559 (9th ed. 1994)).
86. The insured's definition of formation was: "'[any mappable, separate, self con-
tained pressure unit within a geologic interval."' Mescalero Energy, 56 S.W.3d at 318.
87. Id. at 322.
88. Id. at 323.
89. Id. The court observed:
Appellees concede (indeed urge) that we refer to one form of extrinsic evi-
dence-the Williams & Meyers dictionary. The question for us is: "Can a
reasonable definition of an industry term be established through expert testi-
mony?" We hold that it can.
90. Mescalero Energy, 56 S.W.3d at 320.
91. Id. (quoting Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517,521 (Tex.
1995)).
92. The term "information" is used instead of "evidence" because often what the court
relies upon to accept or reject a usage is not evidence.
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the judge can unilaterally accept or reject the usage based upon his or her
own anecdotal conclusions about the industry or the world in general. To
the extent counsel fails to address the matter as one of fact at trial, they
run the risk of having the usage issue decided by argument or anecdote.
Therefore, counsel litigating any oil and gas matter 93 must carefully eval-
uate their case to identify situations where establishing the relevant us-
age, as fact, would be important. Otherwise they run the risk of an
adverse conclusion through the unrestrained processes of argument and
anecdote.
A. USAGE VIA ARGUMENT
When usage and other surrounding circumstance evidence is not estab-
lished as a matter of fact, the court is effectively unrestrained in how it
arrives at conclusions on such matters. Often the critical conclusions are
made based upon the court's acceptance or rejection of arguments made
by counsel. For example, the complexity of defining when usage evidence
can be used, and for what purpose, is illustrated by the court's interpreta-
tion of "gross proceeds at the wellhead" in Schroeder v. Terra Energy,
Ltd.94 The lessee produced natural gas which it transported thirty miles
to a treatment facility where it was sold with other gas to a pipeline com-
pany. 95 The lessee deducted from the downstream gas sales proceeds the
cost associated with moving the gas from the wellhead to the point of
sale. The lessor asserted it was entitled to the "best available market
price" which was the market price at the point of sale, not the wellhead.96
The court identifies the "principal issue" as: "whether the language 'gross
proceeds at the wellhead' used in the agreement fairly contemplates the
deduction of postproduction costs from the sales price of the gas." 97
The lessee argued on appeal98 that "industry usage of the language and
93. The same concerns exist with every other contract interpretation situation, regard-
less of the subject matter or legal discipline.
94. 565 N.W.2d 887 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). This case also demonstrates the impor-
tance of carefully identifying the usage evidence offered and the precise basis for the
court's usage analysis. Although this case at first appears to be addressing usage evidence
issues, no usage evidence was offered and the court merely responded to the lessee's appel-
late argument regarding usages.
95. Id. at 982. The court noted:
Here, the only place gas is sold is at Kalkaska, approximately thirty miles
from the wellhead. And at that point the gas sold has been altered, both by
being transported to a point at which a large buyer like Michcon is willing to
accept the production from a relatively small leasehold and by being
processed to eliminate impurities so the purchaser can put the commodity
directly to its intended end uses.
Id. at 892.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 891. The court also offered an alternative statement of the issue: "The issue
can also be put in terms of where the gas is to be valued for purposes of determining
plaintiffs' royalty payments." Id. at 891 n.3. I submit that this alternative statement of the
issue is the most accurate. David E. Pierce, The Royalty Value Theorem and the Legal
Calculus of Post-Extraction Costs, 23 ENERGY & MIN. L. INsT. 151, 155-62 (2002) ("§ 6.02.
Are Courts Addressing the Right Question?") [hereinafter Royalty Value Theorem].
98. There is no indication in the opinion that any usage evidence was offered at trial.
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custom" requires that royalty values be determined at the wellhead.99
The court rejects this argument by assuming such a usage would not be
binding upon a lessor who was unaware of the usage. 100 The correct basis
for rejecting the lessee's usage argument would appear to be a lack of
evidence to support the existence, scope, and applicability of the usage.
The court's usage analysis suffers from the same weakness as the lessee's
usage argument: it is not based upon the facts, and the lessee fails to
address the facts regarding the usage. 101 For example, how does the court
know this lessor'02 was not aware of the usage? How does the court know
this lessor, although not aware of the usage, nevertheless should have
known of its existence? How does the court know this lessor was not a
member of the trade to such an extent that knowledge of the usage will
be imputed to the lessor? Obviously these are factual issues and without
addressing the underlying facts, any generic statements by the court, or
counsel, will be just that-statements. The court noted that the lessee's
argument was as follows: since a form contract is involved, the lessor is on
notice of the industry practice. 10 3 Although the court is quick to recog-
nize the lessor's contract may vary from the norm, the court again fails to
99. Schroeder, 565 N.W.2d at 891.
100. Id. at 892. The court stated:
A general principle of contract law is that, even where such usage or custom
is well established, it is not controlling if only one party meant the usage or
custom to be operative and the other party had no reason to know of this
interpretation.... Before a usage or custom of trade, otherwise affirmatively
proved to exist, can be invoked to construe a contract, it first must be shown
that the party against whom it is asserted knew of the usage and had reason
to know that the other party assented to the words or the contract in accor-
dance with it, or that, if the party against whom it is asserted did not know of
the usage, an ordinary person in that party's position would have known of it.
Id. However, under the Restatement and U.C.C. it is possible to be bound to a trade usage
by merely participating in the trade. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222(3)
(1981) ("Unless otherwise agreed, a usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which the
parties are engaged or a usage of trade of which they know or have reason to know gives
meaning to or supplements or qualifies their agreement.") (emphasis added); U.C.C. § 1-
205(3) (1977) ("A... usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which they are engaged or of
which they are or should be aware .... ) (emphasis added); U.C.C. § 1-303(d) (2003).
101. This is a factual issue. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrs § 222(2) (1981)
("The existence and scope of a usage of trade are to be determined as questions of fact.");
U.C.C. § 1-205(2) ("The existence and scope of such usage are to be proved as facts.");
U.C.C. § 1-303(c) (2003) ("The existence and scope of such a usage must be proved as
facts.") (emphasis added). Also note that if the lessor was represented by counsel when
the lease was negotiated "it may be reasonable to hold a nonmerchant to mercantile stan-
dards if he is represented by a mercantile agent." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 221 cmt. b (1981); U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (1977) (defining "merchant" to include "a
person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as
having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or
to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker
or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge
or skill.") (emphasis added).
102. Or their attorney or other third party that may have assisted them in negotiating
the lease. Id.
103. The court stated: "The law imposes no requirement that the terms and provisions
of a contact shall be the same as, or similar to, those that neighbors and trade associations
of the contracting parties are accustomed to agree upon." Schroeder, 565 N.W.2d at 892.
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address the issue in the factual context of this lessor, and this lessor's con-
tract. 10 4 The correct response by the court should have been to simply
rule that no evidence in the record established the usage the lessee was
seeking to rely upon. 0 5
Although the court rejects the lessee's usage argument, the court seems
to acknowledge later in its opinion that the use of "standard clauses re-
flects customary practices in the industry," quoting as authority the fol-
lowing passage from the Williams & Meyers treatise:
Inasmuch as gas royalty is ordinarily payable in money rather than in
kind and is measured by value or proceeds at the wellhead, it is not
customary, as in the case of the oil royalty payable in kind, to specify
that the royalty is free of cost of production.10 6
The court also observed that another case,'10 7 "[ailso relying on trade us-
age," interpreted "gross proceeds . . . at the mouth of the well" to mean
"proceeds less the expenses to make the gas marketable because the gas
was not marketable at the wellhead .... "108 The court apparently views
these statements regarding usage as persuasive information it could con-
sider in evaluating the parties' arguments. 10 9
The court in Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. Amoco Production Co., also
considers the following information:
In this case, the use of the language "gross proceeds at the wellhead"
by the parties appears meaningless in isolation because the gas is not
sold at the wellhead and, thus, there are no proceeds at the wellhead.
However, if the term is understood to identify the location at which
gas is valued for purposes of calculating a lessor's royalties, then the
language "at the wellhead" becomes clearer and has a logical pur-
pose in the contract. In construing "wellhead" thusly-in a manner
that seeks to accord reasonable meaning to the plain language of the
contract-we believe that it necessarily follows that to determine the
royalty valuation, postproduction costs must be subtracted from the
sales price of the gas where it is subsequently marketed. 110
104. The facts recited in the opinion indicate the oil and gas lease at issue had been
negotiated. The royalty clause of the lease had been changed to increase the royalty from
12.5% to 19.375% and the lease agreement included an additional "letter agreement." Id.
at 890.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
106. Schroeder, 565 N.W.2d at 894 (quoting 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS
LAW, § 643.2, p. 529 (emphasis by the court)).
107. Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 679 F. Supp. 1435, 1439, 1445
(W.D. Mich. 1988).
108. Schroeder, 565 N.W.2d at 894.
109. This is also what the court does in the Old Kent case where it unilaterally con-
cluded: "accepted trade usage of similar, if not identical phrases, leads me to conclude that
the parties could only have intended it to refer to the proceeds less expenses method of
calculating royalties." Old Kent Bank & Trust, 679 F. Supp. at 1445. Instead of referring to
any evidence offered as part of the parties' summary judgment submissions, the court




This suggests another form of evidence may have been useful in this
case: evidence concerning the "surrounding circumstances" at the time
the parties entered into the contract. The relevant surrounding circum-
stance evidence would focus on the different ways gas is marketed and
how the "at the wellhead" and other royalty clause language developed.
Since it is not a type of usage evidence, the limitations associated with
usage would not apply.111 Unless counsel is willing to leave usage and
other surrounding circumstances issues to chance, they must focus on
these potential issues and determine whether it is possible, or desirable,
to address them factually at trial. An even more disturbing phenomenon
is when courts arrive at usage conclusions, critical to the outcome of a
case, relying upon their own anecdotally-based beliefs.
B. USAGE VIA ANECDOTE
The greatest risk of losing a case on inaccurate usage information is
when the court, often an appellate court, unilaterally decides an issue
based upon anecdotal statements derived from the legal literature, asser-
tions of counsel, or the judge's general knowledge. For example, the Col-
orado Supreme Court, in Garman v. Conoco, Inc.,112 was asked to
respond to a certified question from the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado regarding post-production costs that can be de-
ducted to calculate an overriding royalty "when the assignment creating
the overriding royalty interest is silent" on the matter.113 The lessee/as-
signee argued, in its appellate brief, that "industry practice allows propor-
tionate allocation of post-production costs .... ,"14 The court rejected
this argument 15 stating:
Before one can be bound by industry custom "he must know of it or
it must be so universal and well-established that he is presumed to
have knowledge of its existence.". .. Further, the parties must have
contracted with reference to the custom .... Custom and industry
practice may be an appropriate consideration when Conoco deals
with other oil exploration companies. Cf. Pletchas v. Von Poppen-
heim, 148 Colo. 127, 130, 365 P.2d 261, 263 (Colo. 1961) (Parties en-
gaged in same occupation are presumed to have knowledge of
111. See supra text accompanying notes 45-50.
112. 886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1994).
113. The certified question was:
Under Colorado law, is the owner of an overriding royalty interest in gas
production required to bear a proportionate share of post-production costs,
such as processing, transportation, and compression, when the assignment
creating the overriding royalty interest is silent as to how post-production
costs are to be borne?
Id. at 653. It is submitted that such a question regarding the interpretation of a written
document is meaningless without considering the question in the context of the actual doc-
ument involved and the parties to the document.
114. Id. at 660.
115. The issue is not addressed in the context of excluding offered usage evidence at
trial. As was the situation in Schroeder, 565 N.W.2d 887, the court is merely addressing the
usage issue as an argument put forth at the appellate level.
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business usage). Often, however, executing an oil and gas lease, or
assigning a lease won under the previously existing federal lottery sys-
tem is the extent of a party's contact with the oil industry.... Conoco
cannot invoke industry custom to limit the rights of royalty and over-
riding royalty owners unsophisticated in the intricacies of mineral
development.116
Contrary to the court's general statements regarding the lack of sophis-
tication of overriding royalty owners, the very interest involved in this
case was created by Monarch Oil & Uranium Co. when it reserved a
4.00% overriding royalty in leases covering 10,742 acres. 117 The facts re-
cited by the court indicate the overriding royalty owner was one of those
"other oil exploration companies" at the time the interest at issue was
created.118 It was the oil company that created the overriding royalty
when it assigned the working interest in the leases to Lee A. Adams, who
subsequently sold his interest to Conoco. 119 Therefore, a usage at the
time the assignment creating the overriding royalty was made would
come within the court's rule that: "Parties engaged in the same occupa-
tion are presumed to have knowledge of business usage."'1 20 This is an
example of where specific usage evidence may have been helpful, particu-
larly since the original creator of the overriding royalty, Monarch Oil &
Uranium Co., had entered into division orders providing for deductions
consistent with Conoco's usage theory.121
The Garman case also illustrates the importance of focusing on the
temporal nature of usage evidence. For example, it is totally irrelevant
what the plaintiff Garman knew about the oil and gas industry, or what
his intent was concerning Conoco's obligations. The only relevant inquiry
should be what Garman's predecessor in interest, Monarch Oil & Ura-
nium Co., knew about the oil and gas industry and its usages at the time it
created the overriding royalty interest at issue.122
The Colorado Supreme Court's analysis in Garman is an excellent ex-
ample of how a court's anecdotal conclusions on an issue can be totally
wrong and, totally devastating to a party's case. The court's pre-disposi-
tion to arrive at a conclusion that would benefit the overriding royalty
owner 123 was aided by the unreal context-or total lack of context-of the
116. Garman, 886 P.2d at 660 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The italicized lan-
guage represents the Colorado Supreme Court's anecdotal conclusion on a determinative
issue regarding usage. However, as will be seen, the court's very opinion reveals its anec-
dotal conclusion, regarding this overriding royalty interest, was inaccurate.
117. Id. at 654-55 n.5.
118. Id. at 660.
119. Id. at 654-55 n.5.
120. Id. at 660.
121. Id. at 655 n.7 ("In 1982, Monarch ... executed an Oil and Gas Transfer Order
prepared by Conoco which provided that: settlement for gas sold shall be based on the net
proceeds realized at the well by you [Conoco] after deducting any costs incurred in com-
pressing, treating, transporting and/or dehydrating the gas for delivery.").
122. See infra text accompanying notes 382-395.




certified question procedure. The goal of opposing counsel in this situa-
tion is to fight anecdote with fact. This can only be done effectively dur-
ing trial.
C. USAGE VIA FACT
Although there appears to be no dispute that an asserted usage must
be established as a matter of fact,124 as the discussions in the preceding
sections demonstrate, this rule may be overlooked if counsel is unable to
control usage by argument or anecdote through the presentation of fact.
Counsel may be hoping his or her client's version of argument or anec-
dote usage will be adopted by the court; or perhaps the facts do not sup-
port a usage beneficial to the client. When, however, the facts would
support a usage beneficial to the client, counsel should seek to establish
the usage as fact.125 Counsel must also be prepared to respond to any
contrary usage evidence offered by the opposing side.126
An appropriate approach to usage analysis is demonstrated by the
court's holding in Exxon Corp. V. Pluff 2 7 where landowner Pluff sued
asserting Exxon had an implied obligation to restore the surface once
operations on the leased land ceased. The 1930 oil and gas lease con-
tained an express clause stating: "[Exxon] shall have the right at any time
124. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
125. However, even when the usage is established as a matter of fact, the fact must be
relevant to resolving the disputed issue. See infra text accompanying notes 282-299. For
example, in Davis v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 338 F.2d 70 (10th Cir. 1964), the parties stipulated
that:
Where it is necessary or appropriate to file an affidavit of production, it is the
established custom and practice of the industry in the State of Kansas, that
the operator of the lease or the owner of the working interest, prepare and
file the affidavit, and the owner of an overriding royalty interest does not do
SO.
Id. at 73. In 1923, Davis had assigned 160 acres of a 1,280-acre lease to Cities with Davis
retaining a 1/32nd overriding royalty on production from the assigned interest. Although
in 1924 other portions of the 1,280-acre lease were developed, as of 1955, the 160 acres
assigned to Cities had not been developed. The developed portion had been assigned by
Davis to Sinclair, who prepared and filed an affidavit of production covering only the acre-
age described in the Davis-to Sinclair assignment. In 1955, the heirs of the original lessor
granted a lease to Adair covering the 160-acre Cities lease. Ultimately it was held that
since there was no affidavit of production covering this 160-acre portion of the original
1,280-acre lease, Adair did not have constructive notice that it had been perpetuated by
production and Adair took as a bona fide purchaser as against Cities, and Davis. Id. at 72-
73. Davis asserted Cities had a duty, arising out of the stipulated industry usage, to file an
affidavit of production that would have protected Davis' overriding royalty interest. In
rejecting Davis' usage argument, the court held:
[W]e do not think that the custom and practice relied upon by appellant has
any application in this case. Such custom and practice applies only where
production is obtained by the assignee of a lease under the lease assigned to
him. No production was ever obtained by the assignee, Cities Service, under
the lease in question and therefore any obligations that might be imposed by
custom and practice never arose.
Id. at 74.
126. This would be a two-pronged attack focusing on the "reliability" of the offered
evidence and the substance of the evidence. See infra text accompanying notes 300-318.
127. 94 S.W.3d 22 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2002, pet. denied).
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during or after the expiration of this lease to remove all property and
fixtures placed by [Exxon] on said land including the right to draw and
remove all casing.' 28 The landowner asserted this express clause also
created an implied duty on Exxon to "remove oilfield materials on the
expiration of the lease .... "129 As support for the alleged implied duty,
the landowner contended such a duty "was imposed as 'a custom and
usage of the industry."130
The court rejected the landowner's custom and usage argument be-
cause no evidence "concerning the custom and usage at the time the lease
was executed" was offered.' 3 ' Noting that the existence of a custom and
usage is "a question of fact," the court held the landowner cannot, on
appeal, rely upon custom and usage to support its proposition.132 How-
ever, with regard to Exxon's assertion of the industry practice at the time
the original well derricks were erected on the property, the court found:
"At trial, all witnesses agreed that given the technology at the time, it was
reasonable, customary, and necessary for an oil operator to use concrete
derrick corners for standard derricks."'1 33 This case illustrates the impor-
tance of offering evidence at trial to support usages essential to a party's
claim or defense.
The admission of evidence to establish a usage as fact does not mean
the court must treat the fact as determinative. It is merely evidence the
court must weigh with other evidence. In some instances, however, the
usage will be clearly established as a fact at trial but denied effect on
appeal. For example, in Bellport v. Harrison,134 the parties entered into a
contract for Harrison to sell Bellport "one-half of his royalty"' 35 using a
written memorandum stating: "Received of A. J. Bellport, $2,400.00, pay-
ment for 1/16 royalty on west 1/2 of southwest 1/4 section 33, township 26,
range 2 east, Sedgwick county, Kansas, title to be delivered as soon as
papers are completed."'1 36 Harrison's mineral interest was leased at the
time of the agreement; the lease provided for payment of a 1/8th roy-
alty.137 Harrison contended Bellport was entitled to one-half of Harri-
128. Id. at 29.
129. Id. The fixtures at issue were foundations for derricks used to drill wells on the
leased land before portable drilling equipment was available. Prior to 1984, when the wells
on the property ceased producing, Exxon removed all of the derricks, drilling equipment,
and tanks from the property, but left some of the concrete foundations, pipes, and other
materials. No further operations were conducted on the property by Exxon after 1984. On
June 1, 1984 Exxon assigned certain deep rights in the lease and in December 1991 as-
signed the balance of its rights to another operator. Pluff purchased the property for
$10,000 on June 12, 1992. Id. at 25.
130. Id. at 30.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 25 n.2.
134. 255 P. 52 (Kan. 1927).
135. Id.
136. Id. The written agreement in this situation revealed that the parties did not intend





son's 1/8th royalty, which would expire in the event the oil and gas lease
on the property expired. Bellport contended he was entitled to a one-half
mineral interest and the reference to "1/16th royalty" was intended to
convey Bellport a one-half mineral interest that would entitle him to one-
half of the 1/8th royalty.138
At trial, Bellport offered evidence "that a custom existed in the oil
fields of southern Kansas, including Wichita, by which the ordinary mean-
ing of the word 'royalty' was enlarged so as to include one-half of the oil
and gas or other mineral lying in the land in place . . . . ,,139 The jury
found that such a custom existed and found in favor of Bellport.140 After
reciting many restrictive historic "custom" concepts, the Kansas Supreme
Court reversed holding:
To enlarge the ordinary meaning of the word "royalty" by proof of a
usage or custom so as to require these additional conveyances and
obligations of the assignor is so unreasonable as not to be enter-
tained. Generally speaking, the law is not like a costume, to be put
on or taken off in conformity to the dictates of custom and usage
.... The usage and custom relied upon must not be in opposition to
well-settled principles of law, nor unreasonable. 141
The court applies a plain meaning analysis to conclude that "royalty" has
a clear meaning which cannot be altered by usage evidence. 142
The Kansas Supreme Court, in Bellport, rejected the notion that the
term "royalty" can have a usage meaning different from its "well-known
meaning." The difficulty with such an approach is revealed by the Kansas
Supreme Court's observations in later cases. For example, in Heyen v.
Hartnett,143 the court relies, in part, on its anecdotal observation of
"widespread confusion as to the fractional interest in the minerals re-
quired to produce a certain share of royalties under an oil and gas
lease .... ,,144 In Heyen, the granting clause conveyed "an undivided 1/16
interest" but a present lease clause provided for "an undivided 1/ interest
in the Royalties, Rentals and Proceeds therefrom .... -145 The court
reviews prior cases in which either the fraction at issue, or the nature of
the interest created, were at issue because the parties apparently believed
that when a landowner leases their land they no longer own the "miner-
138. Id. at 52-53.
139. Id. at 53.
140. The Supreme Court noted: "Well-informed, reliable witnesses testified to the exis-
tence of such custom; other witnesses, evidently just as well informed and as reliable,
stated that no such custom existed." Id. at 54. This would seem to be the sort of dispute
uniquely suited to resolution by the finder-of-fact, in this case the jury that heard the evi-
dence and observed the witnesses.
141. Id. at 54.
142. The court posed the question as one of law: "The first legal question presented is
whether in view of the fact that the word 'royalty' used in the written memorandum has a
well-known meaning, such meaning can be enlarged, as contended for by plaintiff, by show-
ing a custom. The answer must be in the negative." Id. at 53.
143. 679 P.2d 1152 (Kan. 1984).
144. Id. at 1158.
145. Id. at 1154.
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als," but rather own a 1/8th "royalty. 1 46 Therefore, it would be plausible
for someone wanting to convey 1/2 of their "minerals" to mistakenly con-
vey a 1/16th "royalty. '147 Whether they did or not, is an issue of fact; one
that appeared to have been established at trial in the Bellport case but
undone by the Supreme Court as being "so unreasonable as not to be
entertained."' 148 The usage must not have been too unreasonable since
the Supreme Court recognized similar concepts in Lathrop and Heyen.
V. USAGE EVIDENCE IN THE OIL & GAS CONTEXT
This section examines various oil and gas cases where courts consid-
ered usage in deciding the case. In each situation, as with the Schroeder
and Garman cases discussed in the previous section,149 the source of the
usage evidence will be identified as either argument, anecdote, or fact.
The discussion illustrates how the information was used in the case, the
source of the information, and the influence the information had on the
court's subsequent findings.
A. ROYALTY CALCULATION ISSUES
One of the most intense and enduring subjects of oil and gas litigation
is the calculation of royalty under the oil and gas lease. As I have noted
in previous writings, the customary approach to royalty compensation is a
recipe for conflict. 150 Three facts contribute to the conflict: First, the
"physical fact" that the value of extracted oil or gas generally increases as
it moves closer to its point of consumption.151 Second, the "contractual
fact" that most oil and gas leases provide for payment of a royalty to the
lessor based upon the "value" of the oil or gas measured either in terms
of the "market value" of a share of production or the "proceeds" associ-
ated with a sale of production. Third, the "human nature fact," upon
146. Id. at 1158.
147. Commenting on use of the word "royalty," the Kansas Supreme Court noted:
As we have frequently stated the term "royalty" is often rather loosely and
inaccurately used by men in the petroleum industry, those dealing in oil and
gas holdings and at times by attorneys. Some persons refer to oil and gas in
place as royalty. Others refer to royalty as the landowner's share in produc-
tion. We have, therefore, repeatedly held the true nature and character of
the instrument is not to be determined by the name or label attached thereto
but by its intent as reflected by the terms, the contents thereof.
Lathrop v. Eyestone, 227 P.2d 136, 140 (Kan. 1951).
148. Bellport, 255 P. at 54.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 94-123.
150. I have attempted to describe the essence of all royalty calculation disputes employ-
ing what I have termed "the royalty value theorem" which provides: "When compensation
under a contract is based upon a set percentage of the value of something, there will be a
tendency by each party to either minimize or maximize the value." David E. Pierce,
What's Behind the Valuation Controversy Anyway? FEDERAL & INDIAN OIL & GAS Roy-
ALTY VALUATION & MANAGEMENT III, 1-1 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. 2000) (original
statement of the theorem); Royalty Value Theorem, supra note 97 (expanded discussion of
the royalty value theorem).
151. This is because additional capital is often invested to gather, compress, dehydrate,
treat, aggregate, package, market, and otherwise get the gas where it is to be consumed.
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which the royalty value theorem is based, that lessors will seek to maxi-
mize values for royalty purposes while lessees will seek to minimize val-
ues for royalty purposes.
Assume, for illustration purposes: (1) Lessee extracts gas and then
spends $1.00/Mcf' 52 to gather, compress, dehydrate, aggregate, package,
and market the gas at a point downstream from the point of extraction;
(2) the gas, at the point of extraction, has a market value of $2.00; (3) the
downstream sales point value, after the Lessee's $1.00 of post-extraction
investment, is $3.50; and (4) the royalty clause states:
The royalties to be paid by Lessee are as follows: ... On gas, includ-
ing casinghead gas, condensate or other gaseous substances, pro-
duced from said land and sold or used off the leased premises or for
the extraction of gasoline or other products therefrom, the market
value at the well of one-eighth of the gas sold or used, provided that
on gas sold at the wells the royalty shall be one-eighth of the amount
realized from such sale.153
Under the royalty value theorem the Lessee will seek to pay the Lessor 1/
8th of $2.00 as a royalty, based upon the value of the gas at the point of
extraction. The royalty value theorem indicates the Lessor will seek a
royalty of 1/8th of $3.50. The dispute will be resolved, in most states,154
relying upon the parties' contract; typically the oil and gas lease. 155 How-
ever, as noted previously in the Schroeder and Garman cases, 156 courts
have been inclined to consider usage information that may influence the
court's interpretation of the royalty obligation.
1. Courts Seeking the Aid of Usage Evidence
Sometimes a court notes the potential value of absent usage evi-
152. The volumetric unit of measure for natural gas is "thousand cubic feet" or "Mcf;"
the heating value unit of measure is "million British thermal units" or "MMBtus." One
Mcf of gas equals one MMBtu when the Btu content of the gas is 1,000 Btu per cubic foot.
THOMAS G. JOHNSON, HANDBOOK ON GAS CONTRACTS 36 (1982).
153. EUGENE 0. KUNTZ ET AL., FORMS MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 12 (3d ed. 1998) (AAPL Form 675 Oil and Gas Lease, 3.)
[hereinafter FORMS MANUAL].
154. In Colorado the terms of the parties' contract may not determine the outcome.
See Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001); David E. Pierce, Exploring
the Jurisprudential Underpinnings of the Implied Covenant to Market, 48 ROCKY MTN. MIN.
L. INST. 10-1, 10-16 to 10-17 (2002) [hereinafter Jurisprudential Underpinnings].
155. Additional royalty calculation language may also be found in other documents,
such as a pooling agreement or division order. See David E. Pierce, From Extraction to
Enduse: The Legal Background, PRIVATE OIL & GAS ROYALTIES 3-18 to 3-19, 3-27 to 3-29
(Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. 2003).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 94-123.
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dence. 157 This was the case in Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc.158
where a majority of the Oklahoma Supreme Court observed:
The lessee has a duty to provide a marketable product available to
market at the wellhead or leased premises. Generally, custom and
usage in the industry are used in determining the scope of duties
created by the lease .... Neither the facts given us nor the legal
arguments on the certified question identify custom and usage with
respect to the individual costs at issue when the leases were
executed.159
However, the dissenting justices, remarkably, consider custom and prac-
tices purported to be followed by ancient Roman marble miners, Greek
silver miners, and 13th century English lead miners. 160
The court in Mittelstaedt was responding to a certified question posed
by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals seeking guidance on the rule
Oklahoma would apply to calculate royalty when gas is marketed down-
stream of the wellhead. 161 The court had to determine whether reasona-
ble costs associated with "transporting, blending, compression, and
dehydration" can be deducted from downstream sales values to deter-
mine an upstream value that the lessee is authorized to use to calculate
royalty. 162
In discussing the lessee's "duty to provide a marketable product availa-
157. Sometimes it is the dissenting justice that notes the need to consult usage evidence.
For example, in XAE Corp. v. SMR Prop. Mgmt. Co., 968 P.2d 1201 (Okla. 1998), the court
addressed whether gathering, compression, and treatment costs can be deducted to calcu-
late the plaintiff's overriding royalty defined as a share of "all gas ... which may be pro-
duced under the terms of the oil and gas leases ...the same to be delivered to the
Assignees herein, free and clear of all costs and expenses whatsoever, save and except
gross production taxes . I..." d. at 1202. The court held that the lessee complied with its
obligations which were to deliver the overriding royalty owner's share of gas at the well.
The court also held that no implied covenant to market exists in favor of this overriding
royalty owner. Justice Summers, dissenting, contended that under appropriate facts an
overriding royalty owner could assert an implied covenant to market. In the concurring
portion of his opinion, Justice Summers asserted that the summary judgment for the plain-
tiff overriding royalty owner would have to be reversed in any event because a material
issue of fact exists concerning the parties' intent to include: "any evidence on custom and
usage involving overriding royalty interests created as compensation to geologists for their
work involving leased mineral interests." Id. at 1211. Justice Summers would allow the
parties to explore the actual context of the transaction and offer evidence of any usage that
may be relevant to the deduction of costs issue.
158. 954 P.2d 1203 (Okla. 1998).
159. Id. at 1208.
160. Id. at 1214, n.41 (Opala, J., joined by Watt, J., dissenting in part).
161. The question was stated as follows:
In light of the facts as detailed below, is an oil and gas lessee who is obligated
to pay "3/16 of the gross proceeds received for the gas sold" entitled to de-
duct a proportional share of transportation, compression, dehydration, and
blending cost from the royalty interest paid to the lessor?
Id. at 1204-05.
162. Id. at 1210. The court held:
In sum, a royalty interest may bear post-production costs of transporting,
blending, compression, and dehydration, when the costs are associated with
transforming an already marketable product into an enhanced product, and
when the lessee meets its burden of showing these facts.
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ble to market at the wellhead or leased premises,"1163 and the value of
industry custom and usage to define the duty, the court cites the Kansas
Supreme Court case of Matzen v. Hugoton Production Co.164 In Matzen
the lease required the following: "The lessee shall pay lessor, as royalty,
one-eighth of the proceeds from the sale of the gas, as such, from wells
where gas only is found."'1 65 Discussing the lessee's royalty obligation,
the court in Matzen states:
It was as much Hugoton's duty to find a market on the leased prem-
ises without cost to the plaintiffs as it was to find and produce the
gas .... but that duty did not extend to providing a gathering system
to transport and process the gas off the leases at a large capital out-
lay with attending financial hazards in order to obtain a market at
which the gas might be sold. When plaintiffs' leases were executed it
was the established custom and practice in the field to measure, deter-
mine the price, and pay royalty at the wellhead for gas produced....
The language 'proceeds from the sale of the gas, as such,' must be
construed from the context of the leases and the custom and practice
in the field at the time they were executed .... 166
Although the Kansas Supreme Court in Matzen did not describe the
evidence relied upon to establish the usage of calculating royalty on a
wellhead basis,167 the court noted that the finding was made at the trial
court level by stating:
The trial court found, among other things, that at the time the leases
covering plaintiffs' land were executed it was the established practice
and custom in the gas production industry to measure, determine the
price, and pay gas royalty at the wellhead on all gas produced in the
field upon a pressure basis of 16.4 pounds, which was later changed
by the State Corporation Commission to a pressure basis of 14.65
pounds, and concluded that to determine proceeds at the wellhead
per M.c.f. it was necessary to subtract from gross proceeds derived
from Hugoton's total sales proper chargeable operating expenses in-
curred in procuring such proceeds, including gathering, processing
and dehydrating, and divide the net proceeds by total volume of gas
produced (M.c.f.)-the quotient being the wellhead price per M.c.f. of
gas produced. 168
In addition to usage, the Matzen court indicated that the lease must be
163. Id. at 1208.
164. 321 P.2d 576, 582 (Kan. 1958) (cited by the Oklahoma Supreme Court at 954 P.2d
at 1208).
165. Id. at 578-79.
166. Id. at 581-82 (emphasis added). The parties to this case did not dispute that
"Hugoton's royalty obligation is to be determined at the wellhead rather than at the point
of sale and delivery of the lease .. " Id. at 580.
167. If the parties had disputed this issue, the usage evidence would have assumed a
critical role because the royalty clause at issue did not tie "proceeds from the sale of the
gas" to an express location, such as "at the well" or "at the mouth of the well."
168. Id. at 580 (emphasis added). There is no indication in the opinion as to what the
trial judge considered in arriving at its finding.
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"construed from the context of the lease .... ",169 The word "context," as
used by the court, 170 would seem to mean: "the set of circumstances or
facts that surround a particular event, situation, etc. ...
It is significant that the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Mittelstaedt ex-
pressed the desire to receive and consider usage evidence. Although the
court expressly notes "[n]either the facts given us nor the legal arguments
on the certified question identify custom and usage" evidence, the court
went on to note: "it is common knowledge that raw or unprocessed gas
usually undergoes certain field processes necessary to create a marketa-
ble product. 1 72 The court seems to pull this finding from its reading of a
Court of Claims case, Exxon Corp. v. United States.173 If a party desires to
try and control this sort of unilateral recognition of a usage by argument
or anecdote they have two options: (1) offer evidence at trial on the mat-
ter; or (2) rely upon written and oral arguments to distinguish, explain, or
supplement the court's extraction of usage from other sources of informa-
tion, such as cases, treatises, and other legal, and non-legal, literature. 174
The best approach would be to do both, recognizing that evidence estab-
lishing the matter as a fact at trial will make it more difficult for the court
to ignore.
Justice Opala, dissenting in Mittelstaedt, demonstrated just how far a
court may be willing to go to use its own brand of "custom and usage"
information to resolve a contract dispute in spite of the contract. Justice
Opala, aided by the carefully researched, interesting, but inapplicable,' 75
169. Id. at 582 (emphasis added).
170. The "context" of the word "context" used by the court.
171. WEBSTER'S, supra note 7, at 439. This "surrounding circumstances" definition fits
the court's use of the term as opposed to the other meaning, which is "the parts of a
written or spoken statement that precede or follow a specific word or passage, usually
influencing its meaning or effect .. " Id.
172. Mittelstaedt, 954 P.2d at 1208 (emphasis added). Is this "common knowledge" a
usage or is it more in the nature of a universal, indisputable, fact or circumstance the court
can adopt by judicial notice? Is this surreptitious "usage" evidence or "judicial notice"
without an opportunity to be heard? Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 201 (b) states:
A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that
it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
FED. R. EVID. 201(b). More likely the court's "common knowledge" is the product of
argument or anecdote.
173. 954 P.2d at 1208 (discussing Exxon Corp. v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 250, 271
(1995)). The Exxon case dealt with the classification of "production" costs for purposes of
calculating entitlement to an income tax deduction and had nothing to do with the calcula-
tion of royalty or interpretation of the oil and gas lease.
174. Apparently counsel for the lessee pointed out, in argument, the limitations to using
a tax case such as Exxon Corp. v. United States, because the court felt constrained to cau-
tion: "However, the Exxon court was well aware that its conclusion was not necessarily the
same for calculating royalties." Mittelstaedt, 954 P.2d at 1208.
175. The findings are inapplicable because they have nothing to do with the modern
context of oil and gas development in the United States. This quintessential "American"
industry was not developed until after the Civil War and evolved to meet the special needs
of the oil and gas resource and the oil and gas industry in a modern democratic society.
Other than use of the term "royalty" to describe the landowner's compensation in the
event of production, the oil and gas industry has little connection to the Greeks, Romans,
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scholarly findings of Professor Anderson, 176 uses 13th and 19th century
English lead mining practices, ancient Greek silver royalty practices, and
Roman marble royalty practices to reject "a property-based royalty calcu-
lation. '177 Remarkably, Justice Opala concluded: "We should follow this
historically true model and refuse to apply property-law notions to deter-
mine royalty payments at the wellhead.' '178 In rejecting the existing law,
and proposing an approach suggested by Professor Anderson, Justice
Opala stated: "The model I recognize conforms to the historical interpre-
tation of royalty clauses .... ",179 The context of the term "historical" in
Justice Opala's statement is what miners were doing for the King of En-
gland in the 13th and 19th centuries, not what oil and gas lessees have
been doing in the fields of Oklahoma. 180 Perhaps the most glaring omis-
sion from his historical interpretation is that it fails to consider the ex-
press language of the documents used by the industry to develop oil and
gas, and how such language relates to the usage at issue. Instead, Justice
Opala indicated that the express terms of oil and gas leases: "[N]eedlessly
complicate royalty-clause interpretation by focusing solely on specific
terms, such as 'market value,' 'market price,' 'proceeds,' or 'amount real-
ized .'... All of these terms should be viewed as synonyms .. .181
or even the English. Instead, the usages have been those of the Pennsylvanians, Kansans,
Oklahomans, Texans, and others within the United States where oil and gas have been
found.
176. Owen L. Anderson, Royalty Valuation: Should Royalty Obligations Be Determined
Intrinsically, Theoretically, or Realistically? Part 1, Why All the Fuss? What Does History
Reveal? 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 547, 571-83 (1997) [hereinafter Anderson]. Professor An-
derson, and Justice Opala, give more significance to the historical use of the term "royalty"
than they do to express terms contained in the oil and gas lease, which, for example, direct
that "royalty" shall mean 1/8th of "the market value at the well" of the gas when produced
and saved by the lessee. Rather than giving effect to these particular terms of the modern
oil and gas lease, Professor Anderson's analysis states:
Based upon my study of available secondary sources, there is no evidence
that the established point for the remittance of royalty was ever at the mouth
of a mine or that royalty was actually remitted the instant raw ore was con-
verted from real to personal property.
Id. at 573. The problem is that Professor Anderson is seeking an answer to a 20th Century
usage question regarding oil and gas law by looking at "mining customs of ancient Greece
at the silver mines of Laurium, circa 480 b.c. following the defeat of the Persians." Id.
177. Mittelstaedt, 954 P.2d at 1214 n.41 (Opala, J., dissenting). Professor Anderson's
thesis, which was fully adopted by Justice Opala, is that the general historical notion of
"royalty" should override a "property" analysis of the royalty obligation. Anderson, supra
note 176, at 583. The basic problem with this approach is that the "property" analysis they
seek to eschew is actually a "contract" analysis. The terms of the oil and gas lease contract,
like most any contract, define the rights of the parties which give rise to their "property"
interests in oil and gas as produced.
178. Id. at 1215
179. Id. at 1216
180. After making his "historical interpretation" statement, Justice Opala cites the
reader back to footnote 41 where he walks the reader from centuries of Derbyshire lead
mining back to the beginning of civilization. Id. at 1216 n.57 (referring the reader to 954
P.2d at 1214 n.41).
181. Id. at 1216-17. Justice Opala relies upon two premises to justify ignoring the spe-
cific language of the oil and gas lease: (1) "[O]il and gas lease contracts are printed by the
lessee on standard forms and are rarely negotiated." Id. at 1216. (2) "Given the large num-
ber of small interest-owning lessors, any suggestion that negotiation commonly occurs is
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Mittelstaedt highlights the importance of usage evidence. The majority
of the court clearly thought usage evidence would be useful in resolving
the issues before the court. Equally important is providing relevant usage
evidence in an effort to prevent the court from considering usage by an-
ecdote or argument, such as Justice Opala's use of ancient mining prac-
tices as an interpretive tool that would take precedence over contract
language which would otherwise "needlessly complicate royalty-clause
interpretation .... "182
2. Courts Declining to Follow Usage Evidence
The admission of usage evidence does not mean the court must adopt
the interpretive conclusions suggested by the evidence.183 Instead, the
court may find that other evidence, most notably the express terms of the
contract, may outweigh the usage interpretation. For example, various
forms of usage testimony have been accepted, and rejected, in the process
of defining the meaning of the terms "market value" and "market price"
in the royalty clause. In Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela,184 the court held
that the term "market price" referred to the current price of gas when
actually produced as opposed to the price when the lessee entered into a
good faith, long-term sales contract. In his dissent, Justice Hamilton
came to a contrary conclusion by stating:
absurd." Id. at 1216 n.59. Both of these issues could, in many cases, be refuted by direct
evidence to the contrary, or opinion evidence on local usages that reflect differing prac-
tices. Without conducting any sort of unconscionability analysis, Justice Opala would nev-
ertheless effectively nullify express language in the lease to achieve an outcome more in
line with his view of an equitable result that also happens to coincide with practices of the
ancient Greeks.
182. Id. at 1216. Even this observation by Justice Opala is based, in part, on an as-
sumed usage applicable to the case: "It is important to remember that oil and gas lease
contracts are printed by the lessee on standard forms and are rarely negotiated." Id. In
many instances this observation will simply be untrue; many oil and gas leases are in fact
negotiated and significant concessions made by the lessee to obtain the lessor's assent.
Frequently the lease will include an extensive "addendum" tendered by the lessor that
makes it more of a "lessor's" document instead of a "lessee's standard form." See, e.g.,
FoRms MANUAL, supra note 153, at 17 (form lease prepared by the Oklahoma Mineral
Owners Association), 21-25 (28-paragraph "Exhibit A" attachment used by an Oklahoma
attorney representing oil and gas lessors), 29-32 (37-paragraph "Addendum" used by a
Kansas attorney representing oil and gas lessors).
183. In many instances the issue will be determining which party's usage evidence
should be followed. For example, in Esplande Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Templeton Energy Income
Corp., No. CIV. A. No. 86-1362, 1988 WL 86856 (E.D. La. Aug. 16, 1988), the court consid-
ered the meaning of the phrase "adverse material change" that can trigger a buyer's refusal
to close on the purchase of producing oil and gas properties. One expert, Mr. Gibson,
testified that the phrase "does not refer to a change in the value of the properties, accord-
ing to his understanding of the customs and usages of the oil industry" and "it is the custom
within the industry that the risk of a decrease in the price of oil is usually on the buyer,
while the risk of any changes to the properties is on the seller." Another expert, Mr.
Sumerwell, testified "that a drop in the price of oil is clearly covered in the letter agree-
ment as an adverse material change" and "it is the custom for the seller to bear the risk of a
drop in the price of oil, not the buyer." The court concluded: "the testimony of Mr.
Sumerwell was more convincing than that of Mr. Gibson" and therefore "the seller should
bear the risk of a drop in the price of oil, not the buyer." Id. at *9.
184. 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968).
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Since it appears that the royalty provision fails to state as of what
time the "market price" is to be determined, I think, we must look to
common practices in the industry at the time the lease contract was
made in 1933 to ascertain what was the intention of the parties with
reference to this matter. All parties agree and this Court so holds
that at such time the only sales for gas from wells producing gas only
were made on long-term contracts or for the life of the lease. The
parties, when they entered into the lease contract, knew how such
gas had to be marketed; it had to be marketed under a contract simi-
lar to the one before us. Consequently, when the parties entered
into the lease contract, they all knew that the term "market price"
necessarily meant the price prevailing for gas on long-term contract
as of the time the sale contract should be made. 185
The court of appeals in Exxon Corp. v. Middleton18 6 commented on in-
dustry usage noting:
Throughout the history of the industry a "custom and usage" had
developed under which the royalty owners were compensated by
payment of a designated percentage of the "proceeds" of the sale of
gas. From these proceeds were deducted severance taxes and, where
applicable, the cost of compression or other processing of the gas
needed to bring it up to pipeline specifications and to obtain the liq-
uid content by-product. This so-called "custom and usage" largely
ignored the exact language of the oil and gas leases and their gas
royalty provisions. The attitude was exemplified by the unequivocal
testimony of one of the original lessors, who was a plaintiff in this
suit. The lessor testified that he knew that the gas produced under
his leases was being sold by Sun and that he understood that Sun was
to pay royalties based upon what it got for that gas. Specifically, the
following exchange took place during trial:
Q. They were supposed to base your royalty on what they got for the
gas?
A. Always. 187
However, this usage would not override what the Texas Supreme
Court holds is the plain meaning of the term "market price."'188
This was not the case in Butler v. Exxon Corp.189 where the court relies
upon usage evidence to expand the phrase "at the well" to include a sales
point off the leased premises. 90 Essentially the court held that the
"amount realized" clause, which contemplates a sale "at the well," did
not require the sale to be "on the premises."' 91 The court of appeals
relied upon the trial court's finding of fact #12 which stated:
185. Id. at 879 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
186. 571 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), rev'd, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981).
187. Id. at 353.
188. As the court of appeals noted: "The complacency of the lease operators was shat-
tered, however, by the holding of the Supreme Court of Texas in the case of Texas Oil &
Gas Corp. v. Vela .... " Id.
189. 559 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.).
190. Two of the leases provided for "market value at the well" for gas "sold or used off
the premises" and "amount realized" "on gas sold at the wells .... " Id. at 412.
191. Id. at 416.
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[T]he court further finds that the sale of gas from these leases was a
sale 'at the wells' within the meaning of those terms in the leases. It
is so understood in the industry. Specifically, this Court finds that the
term 'at the well' means gas delivery which occurs in the vicinity of
the field of production where the wells are located, rather than at
some remote location such as the other end of a transmission line. 192
Finding #12 was the product of opinion evidence offered by the consult-
ing petroleum engineers of each party who were tendered as expert
witnesses. 193
However, when this analysis was presented to the Texas Supreme
Court in the Middleton case, it noted:
The court [in Butler] relied primarily on expert testimony about what
constituted a "sale at the well" as understood in the oil and gas in-
dustry. To the extent the Court of Civil Appeals' interpretation of
the royalty clause in Butler, supra, conflicts with our interpretation of
this clause, it is disapproved. 194
The court in Middleton held the phrase sold "off the premises" was de-
fined by the boundaries of the leased land. 195 In Middleton, as in Vela,
the Texas Supreme Court was unwilling to depart from the express terms
of the oil and gas lease specifying a market value royalty when gas was
not sold on the leased premises. 196 Although the usage evidence may
have been accurate and reliable, the court found it did not dictate a de-
parture from what it considered to be the plain terms of the contract.
This is an important observation, particularly when considering the diffi-
culties courts have in admitting extrinsic evidence to interpret contracts.
Although courts may freely consider extrinsic evidence to interpret a con-
tract, the ultimate goal is for the court to consider all available evidence
and then conclude what the contract means. This often requires the mar-
shaling of evidence-evidence that suggests many conclusions-to arrive at
a single conclusion.
192. Id. at 414 (emphasis added).
193. Id. at 413 ("Each side used a consulting petroleum engineer to develop their the-
ory of the case."). Id. at 416 ("Certainly, both Mr. Powell and Mr. Gruy recognized this
['at the well' interpretation] in their testimony.").
194. Middleton, at 244.
195. The court held:
We conclude "off the premises" modifies both "sold" and "used." The
"premises" is the land described in the lease agreement. Therefore, sold "off
the premises" means gas which is sold outside the leased premises. Thus,
"sold at the wells" means sold at the wells within the lease, and not sold at
the wells within the fields.
Id. at 243.
196. The Texas Supreme Court again focused on the "plain terms of the lease" in
Yzaguirre v. KCS Res., Inc., 53 S.W.3d 368 (Tex. 2001):
[In Vela] ... we held that the plain terms of the lease required the lessee to
pay a market-value royalty even though the lessee received less than market
value under its long-term sales contract.... The same plain terms that fix the
lessee's duty to pay royalty also defines the benefit the lessor is entitled to
receive. Thus, under the leases, Yzaguirre and the other Royalty Owners are
entitled to a market value royalty, not an amount-realized royalty.
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3. Courts Guided by Usage Evidence
In Creson v. Amoco Production Co.,1 9 7 the court interpreted the mean-
ing of a royalty clause in a unit agreement providing for a share of the
"net proceeds derived from the sale of Carbon Dioxide Gas at the
well . . ."198 In the first step of its analysis, the trial court concluded that
the unit agreement was unambiguous. The court of appeals commented
on the evidence the trial court considered stating: "In determining
whether the Unit Agreement is ambiguous, the trial court could properly
consider the context of the agreement, including the circumstances sur-
rounding it, and any relevant usage of trade or course of dealing."'199 Once
the trial court determined the agreement was unambiguous, it turned to
the task of ascertaining the meaning of the agreement. Commenting on
the evidence used for this second step in the interpretive process, the
court of appeals observed: "Relying in part on expert testimony, the trial
court determined that the phrase "net proceeds ... at the well" had a
long standing and unambiguous meaning in the oil and gas industry in
computing royalty settlement or payment. ''20° This illustrates how usage
evidence can be employed to interpret a contract. Without opining on
what the agreement at issue means, the expert can offer testimony on
how the agreement compares to common forms of agreements used by
the industry containing similar or identical language. The judge or jury
can then use the evidence to arrive at its own conclusions regarding the
meaning of the contract at issue.
The court of appeals also relied upon treatise discussions20' and prece-
dents from other jurisdictions to support the proposition that to deter-
mine a value "free of the cost of production" calculated "at the well"
would require the deduction of value-enhancing costs incurred by the
lessee beyond the wellhead. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argu-
ment that a standard unit agreement clause providing that royalty would
be "free of cost," 20 2 limits the deduction of costs to calculate "net pro-
ceeds ...at the well." Again referring to treatise commentators as a
source of what is, and is not, "customary," the court quoted the following:
Inasmuch as gas royalty is ordinarily payable in money rather than in
kind and is measured by value or proceeds at the wellhead, it is not
197. 10 P.3d 853 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000).
198. Id. at 855. The plaintiffs were overriding royalty owners who were subject to the
terms of the unit agreement. Id.
199. Id. at 856 (emphasis added).
200. Id. at 857.
201. "Commentators have noted that royalty clauses in instruments creating overriding
royalty interests generally provide that proceeds will be delivered free of cost of produc-
tion.... The commentators and case law, however, generally distinguish between produc-
tion costs and costs incurred post-production." Id. at 857.
202. Article 14.3 of the Unit Agreement provided:
Royalty Owners Free of Cost. This Agreement is not intended to impose, and
shall not be construed to impose, upon any Royalty Owner any obligation to




customary, as in the case of oil royalty payable in kind, to specify that
the royalty is free of cost of production. Freedom from such costs of
production is implicit in the provision for payment of a share of the
proceeds or value at the wellhead. However an occasional lease
makes this specific even in the case of the gas royalty.20 3
The court relied upon this observation to conclude:
We interpret Section 14.3 as an explicit statement of what is implicit
in most leases providing for the payment of royalties based on "net
proceeds at the well." In other words, Section 14.3 specifies that the
royalties will be free from the costs of production. This section does
not permit royalty owners to reap the benefits of an enhanced value
of the gas sold downstream .... Free of cost provisions are not in-
consistent with allowing post-production, value-enhancing costs to
be used to calculate the value of the gas at the wellhead. 20 4
Therefore, the court used a mix of expert testimony, treatise commentary,
and judicial opinions to conclude that its interpretation of "net proceeds
at the well" was consistent with industry usage and the correct interpreta-
tion under the facts.
The interpretation of a nonparticipating royalty was at issue in Scott
Paper Co. v. Taslog, Inc.2 0 5 where the court relied on usage evidence to
define the substances subject to royalty20 6 and how such substances
should be valued to calculate the amount due.20 7 It appears that the us-
age regarding royalty calculation was supported by "evidence, undisputed
by appellants" 20 8 while the usage regarding the scope of the rights
granted was an unchallenged "assertion" of the "common industry prac-
tice. 209 In either event, the case illustrates the importance of addressing
any usage "assertion" or "evidence" with any available counter-assertion,
or evidence, if such exists.
203. Id. at 860 (quoting 3 PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS AND
MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW § 643.2, at 530.1 (1999)) (emphasis added).
204. Id. at 860-61.
205. 638 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1981).
206. "[A]ppellants ... have not challenged Taslog's assertion that the common industry
practice is to pay gas royalties and not sulphur royalties on hydrogen sulfide gas." Id. at
795.
207. The court noted:
The absence of an available market does not mean that the gas lacks value,
however. In such situations the fair value of the gas is extrapolated by de-
ducting from the sales revenue of the sulphur extracted from the gas the cost
of transmission, processing, and a reasonable return on investment. Taslog
introduced evidence, undisputed by appellants, that this method of valuation is
universally used in the oil and gas industry to determine the value of hydro-
gen sulfide gas "at all [sic] well." The district court did not err in adopting a
method of valuation that was agreed to by the parties and that is consistent
with both applicable legal principles and industry practice.
Id. at 799 (emphasis added).
208. Id. at 799.
209. Id. at 795.
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B. DISPROPORTIONATE TAKES AND GAS BALANCING ISSUES
The simple act of accounting for gas as it is produced from a well can
be a complex undertaking.21 0 Initially it would appear that all you need
to do is determine each party's proportionate ownership in the produced
gas. Each owner would then receive their share of the produced gas and
use that quantity for calculating any royalty and production taxes they
may owe. This is the typical process when the substance being produced
is a hydrocarbon in its liquid phase, such as oil and condensate. Sub-
stances produced in a liquid phase at or near the lease can be readily sold
without having to rely upon pipeline transportation. However, produc-
tion of substances in the gas phase are dependent upon three pipeline-
driven realities: (1) most gas requires access to some sort of pipeline to be
marketed-a "physical" reality; (2) the space available on a pipeline is al-
located by contract between the producer, or the producer's gas pur-
chaser, and the transporter-a "legal" reality; and (3) the ability to
produce and transport gas is limited by the gas purchaser's willingness or
ability to take the gas-a "legal" and "physical" reality.
If an owner of gas from a well is unable, or unwilling, to market their
share of the gas production, what happens? If all owners fail to market
their share of the gas, disproportionate gas take problems are avoided.211
However, if as is often the case, one or more owners market gas while
other owners fail to market, disproportionate takes occur. The rights and
obligations of the parties regarding these disproportionate takes are fre-
quently addressed as an issue of industry custom and usage.212 The issue
is typically addressed in two distinct parts: First, can one owner take more
than its proportionate share of the gas stream?213 Second, assuming the
disproportionate take is permissible, how must the parties be brought
back into "balance?" 214
210. The subject has even warranted its own "Law of' article: see David E. Pierce, The
Law of Disproportionate Gas Sales, 26 TULSA L. J. 135 (1990) [hereinafter Disproportion-
ate Gas Sales].
211. However, depending upon the terms of each party's underlying oil and gas lease,
there may be habendum clause problems and implied marketing covenant problems. For
example, in Kansas, the habendum clause problems are particularly vexing for the lessee
because the common form of shut-in royalty clause may not provide the marketing flexibil-
ity lessees enjoy in other states. Tucker v. Hugoton Energy Corp., 855 P.2d 929, 936 (Kan.
1993) ("Because, in this case, at the time of shut-in there was a limited market available to
defendant-lessees for the gas producible from the six wells at issue, the shut-in royalty
clauses could not be invoked to perpetuate the leases."). In Howerton v. Kansas Nat. Gas
Co., 81 Kan. 553, 106 P. 47 (1910), rev'd in part, 82 Kan. 367, 108 P. 813 (1910) (reversed as
to remedy for breach; damages were an adequate remedy), the court held the oil and gas
lease gave rise to an implied obligation to prudently produce and market oil and gas from a
well for the mutual benefit of the lessor and lessee.
212. E.g., Harrell v. Samson Res. Co., 980 P.2d 99, 105 (Okla. 1998) ("We have said that
gas balancing is incorporated into the JOA through industry custom and usage.").
213. This is usually phrased as the "conversion" issue. See, e.g., Anderson v. Dyco Pe-
troleum Corp., 782 P.2d 1367, 1371 (Okla. 1989) (rejecting conversion claims and applying
a cotenancy analysis).
214. This is usually phrased as the "balancing" issue. See, e.g., Doheny v. Wexpro Co.,
974 F.3d 130, 133 (10th Cir. 1992) ("In these appeals we are asked to determine, in the
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1. Express Contract Terms
Each issue requires a review of the express contract terms. For exam-
ple, both issues may be fully addressed in a "gas balancing agreement"
which expressly authorizes disproportionate takes and specifies how the
parties will be brought into balance.2 15 Absent a gas balancing agree-
ment, the relevant contract is typically the "operating agreement" which
most often consists of a version of the "A.A.P.L. Form 610 Model Form
Operating Agreement." 216 The relevant operating agreement terms con-
cerning disproportionate take issues include the "ownership" clause and
absence of a formal gas balancing agreement, the proper remedy to correct a gas produc-
tion imbalance.").
215. A drafting committee of the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation prepared
the "Form 6," April, 1990 entitled "Gas Balancing Agreement" which has met with limited
use in the industry to address disproportionate take and gas balancing issues. Copies of the
Form 6 can be obtained from the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, 7039 East
18th Avenue, Denver, Colorado 80220, (303) 321-8100, http://www.rmmlf.org. The form is
reproduced in FORMS MANUAL, supra note 153, at 157-159. The Form 6 authorizes dispro-
portionate takes as follows:
(a) Any time a party, or such party's purchaser, is not taking or marketing its
full share of gas produced from a particular formation in a well ("non-mar-
keting" party), the remaining parties ("marketing" parties) shall have the
right, but not the obligation, to produce, take, sell and deliver for such mar-
keting parties' accounts, in addition to the full share of gas to which the mar-
keting parties are otherwise entitled, all or any portion of the gas attributable
to a non-marketing party. (Gas attributable to a non-marketing party, taken
by a marketing party, is referred to in this Agreement as "overproduction").
If there is more than one marketing party taking gas attributable to a non-
marketing party, each marketing party shall be entitled to take a non-mar-
keting party's gas in the ratio that such marketing party's interest in produc-
tion bears to the total interest in production of all marketing parties.
Form 6 2 .(a), lines 25-33. The balancing issue is addressed in part by the Form 6 as
follows:
(b) A party that has not taken its proportionate share of gas produced from
any formation in a well ("Underproduced Party") shall be credited with gas
in storage equal to its share of gas produced but not taken, less its share of
gas used in lease operations, vented or lost ("underproduction"). Such Un-
derproduced Party, upon giving timely written notice to Operator, shall be
entitled, on a monthly basis beginning the month following receipt of notice,
to produce, take, sell and deliver, in addition to the full share of gas to which
such party is otherwise entitled, a quantity of gas ("make-up gas") equal to
fifty percent (50%) of the total share of gas attributable to all parties having
cumulative overproduction (individually called "Overproduced Party").
Such make-up gas shall be credited against such Underproduced Party's ac-
crued underproduction in order of accrual. Notwithstanding the foregoing
and subject to subsection (e) below: (i) an Overproduced Party shall never
be obligated to reduce its takes to less than fifty percent (50%) of the quan-
tity to which such party is otherwise entitled and (ii) an Underproduced
Party shall never be allowed to make up underproduction during the months
of December, January, February and March.
Form 6 2.(b), lines 34-45.
216. Since 1956, the American Association of Professional Landmen ("AAPL") has
made available four versions of the Model Form Operating Agreement (1956, 1977, 1982,
and 1989), which have been widely used in the oil and gas industry to coordinate develop-
ment when a leased area is owned by more than one developer. Copies of the forms may
be obtained from Kraftbilt Products, Box 800, Thlsa, Oklahoma 74101, 1-800-331-7290,
http://www.kraftbilt.com. The 1989 version of the form is reproduced in FORMS MANUAL,
supra note 1533, at 121-42.
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the "take-in-kind" clause. For example, the "ownership"' clause of the
1989 version of the Model Form Operating Agreement provides:
Unless changed by other provisions, all costs and liabilities incurred
in operations under this agreement shall be borne and paid, and all
equipment and materials acquired in operations on the Contract
Area shall be owned, by the parties as their interests are set forth in
Exhibit "A. '217 In the same manner, the parties shall also own all
production of Oil and Gas from the Contract Area .... 218
The Model Form's "take-in-kind" clause provides:
Each party shall take in kind or separately dispose of its proportionate
share of all Oil and Gas produced from the Contract Area, exclusive
of production which may be used in development and producing op-
erations and in preparing and treating Oil and Gas for marketing
purposes and production unavoidably lost.2 19
The express terms of the operating agreement do not address whether
one owner in the well can take more than their proportionate share of the
production when another owner fails to take their share of the gas. All it
states is that "each party shall take in kind or separately dispose of its
proportionate share of all Oil and Gas produced from the Contract
Area .... ,,220 What if they do not? What can the taking parties do? The
operating agreement indicates that "the parties shall also own all produc-
tion of Oil and Gas from the Contract Area .... ",221 Must the taking and
non-taking parties' rights be determined under the law of cotenancy?
Are there conversion problems if X takes the full gas stream when Y and
Z fail to take their shares of the gas? 2 22 Once we get past the take issues,
what does the operating agreement say about getting the parties back
into balance? The operating agreements in use simply fail to address
these issues and, although they are expressly addressed in gas balancing
agreements, most multi-party development activities are governed by an
217. The "Exhibit A" will list each leasehold owner and their percentage ownership in
the "Contract Area." The "Contract Area" typically coincides with the acreage area nec-
essary to complete the contemplated well. For example, if X has an oil and gas lease cover-
ing the North Half of section 30, Y has a lease covering the Southeast Quarter of section
30, and Z has a lease covering the Southwest Quarter of section 30, if the Contract Area
consists of section 30 the Exhibit A would indicate the following Contract Area "owner-
ship": X 50%; Y 25%; Z 25%.
218. A.A.P.L. Form 610-1989 Model Form Operating Agreement, Article III, § B., p. 2,
lines 10-13 (emphasis added).
219. A.A.P.L. Form 610-1989 Model Form Operating Agreement, Article VI, § G., Op-
tion No. 2: No Gas Balancing Agreement, p. 11, lines 28-29 (emphasis added).
220. Id. In Questar Pipeline Co. v. Grynberg, 201 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2000), the court
indicated in dicta that a party's failure to take was a breach of contract under a Unit Oper-
ating Agreement provision directing that: "Each Party shall currently as produced take in
kind or separately dispose of its share of Production .... Id. at 1285 ("By providing a
remedy for underproduction [operator right to sell gas in the event a party fails to take] the
Unit Operating Agreement is not authorizing it, but merely supplying a contractual re-
sponse in case of a breach.").
221. A.A.P.L. Form 610-1989 Model Form Operating Agreement, Article III, § B., p. 2,
lines 10-13.
222. See generally Disproportionate Gas Sales, supra note 210.
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operating agreement without a gas balancing agreement.223 This means
courts must often consider evidence that goes beyond the "four-corners"
of the operating agreement to ascertain the parties' rights and obligations
regarding disproportionate takes; evidence that is "extrinsic" to the oper-
ating agreement.
2. Potential Sources of Extrinsic Evidence
Sometimes parties to an operating agreement may have addressed dis-
proportionate take issues while negotiating over whether to include, as an
exhibit to the operating agreement, some form of gas balancing agree-
ment. Although they failed to agree on a gas balancing agreement, they
may have discussed the disproportionate take issue. This situation impli-
cates the parol evidence rule, which regulates when and how such prior
negotiations can be used to define the content of the parties' contractual
relationship. 224
However, if the parties did not focus on the issue prior to signing an
operating agreement, there will be no prior negotiation evidence to con-
sider.225 This means that in many cases the only extrinsic evidence at
issue relates to: (1) the "surrounding circumstances" that provide the con-
text for understanding the transaction; and (2) industry usage, which may
also be viewed as a special category of surrounding circumstances. 226
a. Surrounding Circumstances Evidence
Surrounding circumstances encompass a broader base of information
than merely industry usage. For example, a common item of surrounding
circumstances evidence in oil and gas litigation is the "regulatory con-
text" of the gas market. 227 The premise is that a court or jury cannot
properly consider the contract issues without being aware of the regula-
tory climate in which the parties to the contract had to operate. For ex-
ample, when addressing the disproportionate take issues, counsel may
want to educate the judge and jury on the Federal Energy Regulatory
223. Id. at 165-68.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 25-31.
225. It is also possible that the prior negotiation evidence merely indicates the parties
decided not to define their rights using a gas balancing agreement.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
227. In Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. New Ulm Gas, LTD, 940 S.W.2d 587 (Tex.
1996), the court considered the regulatory context as part of "the circumstances surround-
ing the formation of the contract;" a gas purchase agreement. The evidence at trial
revealed:
When this contract was signed in 1980, it is undisputed that the parties knew
that a huge volume of gas would be deregulated on January 1, 1985. The
effect this deregulation would have on the price of gas was not known, how-
ever. It is therefore not surprising that the parties incorporated a market-out
provision (section 3.1.3) that established a complex procedure to adjust the
section 3.1.1 price to the market price of gas. The interpretation of 3.1.3
proffered by New Ulm would frustrate the intent of this provision.
Id. at 591. In this case the surrounding circumstances evidence was used to support a
finding that the contract was not ambiguous. Id. at 591-92.
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Commission's ("FERC") administrative initiatives to deregulate the mid-
dle-man merchant role of the interstate pipeline.228 The process resulted
in pipeline companies, as traditional gas purchasers, often refusing to buy
gas from producers that had dedicated gas supplies to the pipeline com-
panies. This resulted in disproportionate takes as some producers mar-
keted gas while others were gripped in litigation with their gas purchasers
and were unable to market. As the gas contract litigation subsided, and
the new regulatory regime took hold, producers found that marketing
under the new regime would be much more complex. No longer would
they negotiate long-term package deals for sale to a pipeline purchaser at
or near the field where the gas was produced. Instead, negotiation would
become an on-going process, often on a 30-day cycle as producers scram-
ble to find a purchaser for their gas-and a way to move the gas from the
wellhead to the designated sales point. 229 Today disproportionate takes
can occur anytime there is a failure to make a sale, failure of a purchaser
to take the gas they have contracted to take, or failure of a link in the
transportation network from wellhead to the sales point.230 Dispropor-
tionate takes can also occur by design when a producer voluntarily de-
cides not to produce-typically planning to overproduce at some later date
to take advantage of what they hope will be higher prices231 or lower
transportation rates.232
These surrounding circumstances become particularly important as
courts evaluate the "equities" of the situation to fashion remedies. The
other source of extrinsic evidence, which all parties will attempt to use to
press their case, is usage evidence.
b. Usage Evidence
The disproportionate take cases offer an opportunity to study usage
jurisprudence. At one level, what some courts define as "industry usage"
may be better described as an acknowledgment of past "judicial usage" in
dealing with a particular problem. For example, in Harrell v. Samson Re-
228. This regulatory context can often play a major role in resolving royalty and other
oil and gas disputes. For example, in Smith v. Amoco Prod. Co., 31 P.3d 255 (Kan. 2001),
the regulatory developments leading up to and including the promulgation of FERC Order
451 played a major role in determining whether Amoco breached an implied covenant to
market gas. The court described the trial court's task on remand as follows: "The task for
the finder of fact is balancing any conflict of interest that may follow invoking Order 451
and embarking on good-faith negotiating provisions, tempered by the regulatory back-
ground and national policy reflected under the NGPA and the purpose of FERC's order
451." Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
229. See generally Peter W. Goodwin, Gas Sales Transactions after FERC Order No.
436, 44 INST. ON OIL & GAS LAW AND TAX'N 9-1 (1993).
230. Disproportionate Gas Sales, supra note 210, at 135 n.1.
231. E.g., Teel v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Oklahoma, 767 P.2d 391, 394 (Okla. 1985) (operator
and other working interest owners entered into twenty-year gas sales contract which Teel
believed was "unfair and discriminatory").
232. E.g., Doheny v. Wexpro Co., 974 F.2d 130, 132 (10th Cir. 1992) ("Plaintiffs consist-
ently have maintained that it is not economically feasible to sell their gas to a third party
because of the costs involved in transporting gas in Questar's pipeline.").
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sources Co.,2 3 3 the Oklahoma Supreme Court observed: "Oklahoma case
law makes clear, however, that three methods of balancing are incorpo-
rated into the common law by industry custom and usage. '234 This state-
ment is followed by a string of citations where the courts addressed
disproportionate take issues by considering the various ways industry re-
sponded to the situation.2 35 The court's reference to usage as "the com-
mon law" appears to be a throwback to the demanding traditional
definition of "custom" and usage as being a practice so long-standing that
it has become common law.236 For example, in Heiman v. Atlantic Rich-
field Co.,237 the court discussed various approaches to gas balancing that
can be incorporated into the joint operating agreement through "industry
custom and usage. ' 238 The citations the court relied upon were used to
describe this "industry custom and usage" as "part of the common law,"
"part of the applicable law," and "custom and usage incorporated into
the common law."'239 The court then relied upon the custom-as-law anal-
ysis to support the proposition that: "Silence on an issue of applicable law
[here supplied by "industry custom and usage"] in an agreement will not
negate that law; rather a contractual adjustment of rights contrary to law
must be clearly expressed in the agreement before applicable law will not
apply. '240 It is not possible to reconcile these statements with modern
usage analysis.
If these same references were "usage" as defined in this article, once
established as a matter of fact they would become an integral part of the
contract. 241 It therefore appears what the Oklahoma Supreme Court re-
ferred to in Harrell and Heiman is more a matter of evaluating and apply-
ing past judicial analysis instead of an industry usage. An examination of
the cases relied upon by the Harrell and Heiman opinions242 illustrates
how easily usage can be misdefined, and thereby misused, by the courts.
In the first of the cases, Beren v. Harper Oil Co.,243 Beren owned a
partnership interest in 25% of the working interest in a well subject to an
operating agreement. 244 Harper and other working interest owners, com-
prising 50% of the working interest, marketed their gas to Arkla while
233. 980 P.2d 99 (Okla. 1998).
234. Id. at 105. See also Heiman v. Atl. Richfield Co., 891 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Okla. 1995)
("In Anderson, we described the three methods of balancing as industry practices recog-
nized by the courts, including periodic cash-balancing.").
235. Harrell, 980 P.2d at 105 (citing Anderson, 782 P.2d 1367 (Okla. 1989); Beren v.
Harper Oil Co., 546 P.2d 1356 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975); United Petroleum Exploration, Inc.
v. Premier Res., Ltd., 511 F. Supp. 127 (W.D. Okla. 1980)).
236. See supra text accompanying notes 6-12.
237. Heiman, 891 P.2d 1252.
238. Id. at 1257.
239. Id. at n.4.
240. Id. at 1258 n.5.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 18-22. However, they would have no force of
"law" and would be applicable only to the contract at issue and only to the extent estab-
lished as a matter of fact during the trial in which the contract is being interpreted.
242. Anderson, 782 P.2d 1367; Beren, 546 P.2d 1356; United Pet., 511 F. Supp. 127.
243. Beren, 546 P.2d 1356.
244. Id. at 1356-57.
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Beren marketed its gas to ONG. 24 5 High line pressures on ONG's pipe-
line prevented it from receiving gas from Beren during the term of their
contract, resulting in the gas being taken by the other working interest
owners who were selling to Arkla. This caused the disproportionate gas
takes and the resulting imbalance between Beren and the Harper work-
ing interests.246 In 1971 Beren began selling to Arkla and the dispropor-
tionate takes ceased. 247 The issue before the court was how to bring
Beren and Harper into balance because of the pre-1971 disproportionate
takes.
The court first examined the operating agreement and acknowledged
each parties' ownership in production and the right to take their share of
production in kind.248 However, with regard to the balancing issue, the
court noted:
The parties entered into no arrangement to 'balance' among them-
selves any inequalities which might result from gas deliveries to the
respective purchasers that were not proportionate to the ownership
of the sellers in the well and the gas produced therefrom. The ques-
tion of 'balancing' was left open.249
The court follows this statement with a quotation from Wolfe v. Texas Co.
which states:
(1) Parties to a contract are presumed to know a well-defined trade
usage generally adopted by those engaged in the business to which
the contract relates.
(2) Persons, who enter into a contract in the ordinary course of busi-
ness, unless the terms of the contract indicate a contrary intention,
are presumed to have incorporated therein any applicable, existing
general trade usage relating to such business.250
During trial the following testimony was provided by Harper's expert
witness:
It is the custom to permit, if at all possible, the underproduced party
to take his increased share of gas production in kind and dispose of it
as he sees fit. Now then, once a well depletes and production can no
longer be obtained, then again it is the custom in the industry for
there to be a cash balancing between the parties.251
Harper offered this evidence to try to establish that Beren's sole remedy
under the operating agreement was to balance in kind unless the well was
depleted, in which case cash balancing could take place. Beren was seek-
ing a present cash balancing while the well was still producing. 252
245. Id. at 1357.
246. Id. at 1358.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1357.
249. Id. at 1358.
250. Id. (quoting Wolfe v. Texas Co., 83 F.2d 425, 429 (10th Cir. 1936)).
251. Id. at 1359.
252. The underlying dispute in almost all balancing cases is which party will get the time
value of the money represented by the disproportionate takes. For example, Beren was
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If the usage is established as a matter of fact, it can become part of the
parties' contract as though it were expressly stated in the contract. This
would limit the court's ability to order a remedy that is inconsistent with
the contract. In addition to the expert testimony offered by Harper, the
court also noted articles in which commentators identify three ap-
proaches to balancing disproportionate takes: balancing in kind, periodic
cash balancing, and cash balancing upon reservoir depletion.2 53 The
court also observed: "Throughout the history of the oil and gas industry
there have been situations of balance and imbalance in the taking of gas.
These inequities are customarily settled 'inkind' between the co-owners,
or by the Corporation Commission of Oklahoma. ' 25 4 In spite of these
observations, the court held:
While balancing in kind, based on custom and usage, may be apropos
in many instances where imbalance exists, under the particular facts
of this case which establish that the well is depleting; that this cause
of imbalance, i.e., the split connection, has been eliminated and there
is no immediately foreseeable continued imbalancing in production
because there is but one purchaser of gas from the well; the equities
dictate an immediate accounting and cash balancing between the
owners of interest in the well. 255
If the court concluded that balancing in kind, as opposed to current cash
balancing, is an industry usage incorporated into the parties' contract, the
court could not disregard the provision 256 any more than it could disre-
gard an express term of the contract.
It is submitted that the court's opinion is consistent with the usage evi-
dence it considered. The problem, for Harper, was that the usage evi-
dence did not dictate a rejection of current cash balancing as an
acceptable option under the contract. Harper's expert accurately de-
scribed how gas imbalances are resolved-when the parties are able to
agree.257 Typically they will agree upon a balancing program where the
underproduced by 163,702 MCF. If Beren was required to make up the imbalance by in-
kind balancing, it might take years to accomplish, depending upon the current productivity
of the well, Beren's gas contract, and the willingness of the other working interest owners
to reduce their current takes to allow for a timely make-up. If Beren were required to wait
until depletion to complete a make-up, this could be decades. The rate of make-up is
critical because of the time value of money. Whenever an over-produced party is able to
delay the ultimate day of reckoning, they have the free use of the underproduced party's
money. The value of the right to receive a dollar in the future is less than the value of the
same dollar received today. For example, assuming 10% could be earned on a dollar in-
hand today, the same dollar received in 20 years would be worth less than 15€. GRANT S.
NELSON ET AL., CONTEMPORARY PROPERTY 292 (1996) (Table of Present and Future
Values).
253. Beren, 546 P.2d at 1359.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1360.
256. Unless it was found to be unconscionable or otherwise against public policy; there
is no hint in the court's opinion that the parties were not free to agree to in-kind balancing
as the underproduced party's sole remedy.
257. Stating that the parties will balance in-kind does not solve the problem. Even if
the parties agreed that balancing in-kind was their sole remedy, what does that mean? Will
the under produced party be able to take all of the overproduced parties' gas until brought
[Vol. 57
Defining the Role
underproduced party can take more than its percentage share of the pro-
duction until it is brought into balance. Often this post-imbalance agree-
ment looks a lot like a gas balancing agreement the parties could have
entered into prior to the imbalance. However, the disputes that reach the
courts concern instances where the parties have not entered into a gas
balancing agreement and are unable to arrive at a voluntary post-imbal-
ance agreement. Often the parties actually negotiated the gas balancing
issue when entering their operating agreement contract and consciously
refused to accept gas balancing terms that are frequently similar to those
put forth as "industry custom and usage. '2 58 It would be improper for a
court to impose a balancing obligation relying upon usage when the par-
ties expressly refused to adopt an approach required by the usage. The
court took note of the usage but apparently concluded it did not define
the parties' rights when a dispute over balancing equities required judicial
intervention-i.e., the parties could not agree.
The second case to address these issues is United Petroleum Explora-
tion, Inc. v. Premier Resources, Ltd.259 where United, the underproduced
party, was seeking balancing in kind and the overproduced party, Pre-
mier, was offering current cash balancing to eliminate the imbalance. 260
Although the court acknowledged "the general custom of the industry to
balance in kind, if possible, '' 26' it noted the basic teaching of Beren as
requiring "an examination of the particular circumstances of each
case" 262 and that "the method of balancing chosen should reflect an in-
tention by the court to restore the underproduced party to the position
into balance? Or, will the underproduced party be limited to a certain percentage of the
overproduced parties' gas until brought into balance? If so, who determines the percent-
age? Can the underproduced party seek makeup gas during the high-demand heating sea-
son months? These are the sort of issues addressed in a gas balancing agreement. Absent
a gas balancing agreement, the only way to resolve these issues, and thereby facilitate bal-
ancing in-kind, is if the parties are able to agree. If they cannot agree, they will often seek
an equitable remedy from the court.
258. Often the operating agreement itself will reflect that rejection of a gas balancing
agreement was a conscious election by the parties. For example, see the 1989 Model Form
Operating Agreement, under Article VI., section G. "Taking Production in Kind" pro-
vides two mutually exclusive options for the parties: "Q Option No. 1: Gas Balancing
Agreement Attached" and "Q Option No. 2: No Gas Balancing Agreement." FORMS
MANUAL, supra note 153, at 133-34.
259. United Petroleum, 511 F. Supp. 127.
260. Apparently it was not the time value of money driving the dispute but the benefit
of 20/20 hindsight as to the value of the overproduced gas. Gas prices were apparently
escalating such that making up the imbalance by taking the overproduced party's share of
the gas was a better deal for the underproduced party. Id. at 132 ("While there is evidence
that the fair market value of the gas was greater than the contractual value being paid,
there is nothing in the record to indicate a factual dispute that the price received by Pre-
mier for the gas produced was less than the fair market value of the gas at the time Premier
entered into its contract with Northern.") (emphasis added).
261. Id. at 131. Which I would interpret to mean: if the parties can agree on balancing
in kind as the remedy plus the details of how balancing in kind will be accomplished.
262. Id. at 130 ("Thus, it is apparent from the language of the Beren court that an
examination of the particular circumstances of each case must be considered in determin-
ing the method of balancing to be used.").
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which he would have occupied if the imbalance had not occurred. '263
Analysis of the Beren and United cases reveals that the so-called indus-
try preference for balancing in kind plays no role when the parties are
unable to agree upon balancing in kind as a remedy. Instead, the court
should examine the equities of each case and arrive at a solution that is
fair under the circumstances. In Beren, cash balancing was ordered to
prevent the overproduced party from capitalizing on the time value of the
overproduced gas; in United, cash balancing was ordered to prevent the
underproduced party from capitalizing on a rising gas market and perfect
knowledge of how it compared with the overproduced party's actual
sales. These precise holdings in Beren and United nevertheless begin to
mutate into something different as courts and commentators focus on us-
age and in-kind balancing.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Anderson v. Dyco Petroleum
Corp.,264 noted that "certain practices of the industry have been acknowl-
edged by the courts"2 65 but observes it was not being asked to resolve the
balancing issue.266 When the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ex-
amined the balancing issue in Doheny v. Wexpro Co.,267 it characterized
the Beren and United cases as follows:
The district court held balancing in kind is the preferred method for
balancing in the industry .... The few cases to address the issue are
in accord, as are the authors who have addressed the subject ....
These authorities do not espouse requiring in kind balancing in every
instance. Rather, they reflect prevailing sentiment to use in kind bal-
ancing unless the equities dictate otherwise.268
The court in Doheny elevates in-kind balancing to a preferred status. The
court appears to be making a ruling as a matter of law as opposed to any
sort of usage analysis: at least in Wyoming when a balancing dispute
arises the presumption will be that it should be resolved by allowing the
underproduced party to make up the imbalance by using in-kind balanc-
ing.269 In Pogo Production Co. v. Shell Offshore, Inc.,270 the trial court
held "that in the absence of an agreement the custom and usage of the
263. Id. at 131.
264. Anderson, 782 P.2d 1367.
265. Id. at 1373 ("These practices involve balancing in kind the production from the
well by allowing cotenants, like Appellants, the opportunity to market gas from the well
(i.e. taking a certain percentage of an overproduced party's gas until any imbalance in the
cotenant's takes from the well are made up), by periodic cash balancing whereby under-
produced cotenants receive cash from producing cotenants in proportion to their respec-
tive interests and cash balancing upon any particular gas reservoir's depletion.").
266. Id. at n.18 ("On the instant record we have no reason to and do not express any
view as to which method of balancing might be appropriate in this case.").
267. Doheny, 974 F.2d 130 (applying Wyoming law).
268. Id. at 133.
269. The details of how this in-kind balancing is to be accomplished are not addressed.
Presumably, the trial court will order the "designated percentage" of the overproduced
parties' gas that can be taken by the underproduced party until they are in balance.
270. 898 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying Louisiana law).
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industry required balancing in kind. '271 The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit mitigated this statement somewhat noting: "In short, balanc-
ing in kind is the preferred method of remedying underproduction. ' 272
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Heiman, relied upon Beren, United,
and Anderson to equate the preference for "pre-depletion cash-balanc-
ing" with balancing in kind concluding: "Pre-depletion cash-balancing as
industry custom and usage is incorporated into the joint operating agree-
ment. ' 273 Chief Justice Alma Wilson observed in his dissenting opin-
ion 274 in Heiman:
Although ARCO presented no evidence of industry custom and usage
before the trial court, on rehearing ARCO explains that industry cus-
tom declared that ARCO, the operator, was the owner of 100 per-
cent of the gas which it produced and sold and that Heiman, working
interest owners who failed to take in kind or separately dispose of
their share of the gas, were not entitled to receive any production
proceeds until depletion of the well.275
Apparently ARCO was seeking to establish usage through "argument."
The court adopted a contrary usage either by accepting the counter-argu-
ments of Heiman, by anecdote from the court's own experience, or as a
matter of law emanating from prior precedent. It appears, however, no
balancing "usage" was established as a matter of fact in the case.
When the Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed the issue in Harrell, it
described the Beren, United, Anderson rule as follows: "Oklahoma case
law makes clear, however, that three methods of balancing are incorpo-
rated into the common law by industry custom and usage .... We have
said that gas balancing is incorporated into the JOA through industry cus-
tom and usage. '276 This is not "usage" under a particular operating
agreement, but rather a judicial observation made throughout the cases
that when parties get out of balance, there are common techniques that
can be used to correct the imbalance. The "common law" analyzed in
this section reveals that no single method of balancing actually takes pre-
cedence over the other. Instead, courts will consider the circumstances of
271. Id. at 1066 (emphasis added). The operating agreement expressly acknowledged
that the parties were not addressing the balancing issue at that time stating:
Any party's failure to timely take or sell its share of gas production shall not
prohibit the other party or parties from producing their share of production,
provided that non-producing party or parties may recoup or recover their
share from future production and/or in cash by suitable agreement.
Id. at 1065. Depending upon whether "suitable agreement" modifies both "future produc-
tion" and "cash," it appears the parties intentionally left the issue of balancing open. The
trial court, in effect, creates a default rule that if the parties cannot agree otherwise, bal-
ancing in kind will be the underproduced party's sole remedy.
272. Id. at 1067.
273. Heiman, 891 P.2d at 1257 (emphasis added).
274. Justice Wilson's dissent focused on the rate of interest that should be awarded
Heiman and the application of subsequently enacted payment statutes. He believed the
interest issue was governed by Okla. Stat. tit. 52, section 540. Heiman, 891 P.2d at 1259
(Wilson, J., dissenting).
275. Id. at 1260 (emphasis added).
276. Harrell, 980 P.2d at 105 (emphasis added).
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each situation and fashion a remedy that is equitable to all parties; in
some situations this will result in balancing in-kind, pre-depletion cash
balancing, cash balancing upon depletion, or any other appropriate rem-
edy that fairly addresses the situation. 277 As noted previously, the so-
called "usage" regarding a preference for balancing in-kind would not be
applicable to situations where the parties are unable to agree.
The balancing cases illustrate several interesting points regarding usage
jurisprudence. First, what courts and commentators label as "usage" may
not be a usage that relates to a particular contract established as fact at
trial. Instead, it may be a judicial recognition of a practice that has,
through citation and lore, assumed the status of a rule of law. 278 Second,
usages must be defined with precision. For example, it is true that on an
industry-wide basis-when parties come to an agreement regarding bal-
ancing-the preferred method for maintaining balance is through in-kind
balancing. However, this preference has nothing to do with the situation
where the parties are unable to agree on balancing. If the preferred
agreed-upon form of balancing is in-kind, and the parties have not been
able to agree, the implication is that at least one party affirmatively re-
jected in-kind balancing. Third, usage is properly used to interpret a par-
ticular contract. A usage identified in one case, concerning a particular
contract, may not apply in a different case, with a different contract or
different parties. Therefore, counsel must be prepared to counter usages
that are the product of prior cases or different contracts, by exposing
their weaknesses, or inapplicability, through the presentation of fact.
Fourth, the existence and content of a usage must be established as a fact
at trial.279 This means that commentary and prior judicial opinions re-
garding usage will be of little value-unless the usage is being established
by argument or anecdote. 280 The requirement that usage be established
277. The party proposing a remedy not previously recognized would have the burden of
demonstrating why it is superior to one of the three "practices of the industry... acknowl-
edged by the courts to remedy situations ... where only certain working interest owners
have sold production." Id. However, since these issues typically arise in an "accounting"
proceeding, the burden should not be too demanding. Id. (Plaintiffs sued for "the com-
mon law remedy of equitable accounting and cash balancing.").
278. However, this is one of those areas where counsel can fight "law" with "fact." The
legal effect of such judicial usages can be overcome because they operate as default rules
that apply when the facts do not dictate otherwise.
279. For example, in Questar Pipeline Co. v. Grynberg, 201 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2000),
the plaintiff established that it is industry custom and usage for all parties to currently take
their gas if possible instead of allowing parties to deliberately withhold their gas from mar-
ket. The plaintiff established this usage through cross-examination of the defendant's ex-
pert: "Questar's senior attorney, an expert on industry practice, admitted that industry
custom dictates that as long as an owner has a market for its gas it should not be allowed to
make the strategic decision not to sell its gas and to make someone else take more than
their share." Id. at 1285. With regard to a marketing working interest owner's obligation
to take a share of an underproduced party's gas, the court noted: "Even Questar's own
expert witness admitted that if Terra did not take its share of production, industry standard
and practice dictated that Grynberg had the right, but not the obligation, to take that addi-
tional share." Id. at 1286.
280. There is always a risk that a court may refuse to consider usage arguments not
preserved at the trial court level. In Kincaid v. W. Operating Co., 890 P.2d 249 (Colo. Ct.
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as a fact recognizes why the inquiry is being made in the first place: to
determine the meaning of a particular contract before the court. As the
focus drifts away from this task, courts become more inclined to accept
usages established through argument and anecdote. The following sec-
tion addresses the process by which usage by argument and anecdote are
fought with usage evidence as fact.
VI. PRESENTING USAGE EVIDENCE AS FACT
The evidentiary considerations addressed in this section are "rele-
vancy" and "reliability." The parol evidence rule, and other non-eviden-
tiary exclusionary rules, have been examined in previous sections.281 The
focus of this section is to identify the analysis courts use to determine
when offered usage evidence will be admitted. Generally, evidence will
be admitted when it is "relevant" to the matters at issue and is found to
be "reliable."
A. MUST BE RELEVANT: WILL IT HELP THE FACT-FINDER?
The general rule is that all "relevant" evidence is admissible.282 "Rele-
vant evidence" is defined as evidence having "any tendency" to make the
existence of a fact "that is of consequence to the determination of the
action" either "more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence. '2 83 For usage evidence the "of consequence to the determi-
nation of the action" requirement will often be the determinative issue
and creates a bridge between procedural evidentiary rules and substan-
tive exclusionary rules such as the parol evidence rule. For example, if
the usage evidence is excluded because it would violate the parol evi-
dence rule, then it would not be "relevant" because the offered evidence
would not impact-be "of consequence"-to the "determination of the
App. 1994), the defendant, on appeal, sought to rely upon two law review articles as sup-
porting its contention that a joint operating agreement did not give rise to an area of mu-
tual interest. Refusing to consider the articles, the court held:
Here, while the articles cited by defendant may indeed represent the industry
custom, because they were not cited to the trial court, defendant cannot now
assert that they definitively identify the custom of the oil and gas industry. It
is improper for us to consider the articles on appeal, as we are without au-
thority to make factual findings.
Id. at 252. The Kincaid case highlights a technique for trying to battle the other party's
attempts at establishing usage by anecdote or argument at the appellate level. By demand-
ing that usage be established as a matter of fact, this will shift the focus away from appel-
late arguments to the evidence offered at trial.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 25-44.
282. FED. R. EVID. 402; TEX. R. EVID. 402 (parallel provisions to the Federal Rules of
Evidence are found in the Texas Rules of Evidence that were adopted October 27, 1997 to
take effect in all proceedings on or after March 1, 1998). Order in Misc. Docket No. 97-
9184, dated October 20, 1997, 60 Tex. B. J. 1129 (Dec. 1997).
283. FED. R. EVID. 401; TEX. R. EVID. 401. The "fact," to be relevant, need not be
determinative of the matter at issue, it just needs to be "of consequence" to the issues. It
must add something to the mix of information that will assist in resolving an issue but it
need not resolve the issue, nor must it make it more-likely-than-not that the issue should
be resolved in a particular way.
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action." As a practical matter this means all potential exclusionary rules
should be applied to the facts before considering relevancy issues.
Other substantive rules of law can also make evidence irrelevant. For
example, in Exxon Pipeline Co. v. Zwahr,284 expert testimony was admit-
ted concerning the value of the land taken by Exxon in condemning a
pipeline easement. The Texas Supreme Court held the testimony was im-
properly admitted because it sought to establish the value of the con-
demned land by considering the value of the easement to Exxon.285 The
testimony was improper because it was "irrelevant to determining the
value of the land taken from the Zwahrs and therefore inadmissible
under Texas Rule of Evidence 702. ' ' 286 The Zwahr case demonstrates the
importance of carefully defining the substantive parameters of an expert's
testimony to ensure their methodology is consistent with existing law.287
If the usage evidence being offered passes the substantive rule gaunt-
let, the next test will be to determine whether the evidence will help to
establish a proposition that is of legal significance to the lawsuit. This
requires an examination of the pleadings and pretrial orders to ascertain
the matters at issue in the litigation. For example, if the cause of action is
for breach of a gas purchase contract, and the defense is that a contract
was never formed, usage evidence concerning the procedure for entering
into and formalizing gas purchase contracts would be "of consequence to
the determination of the action" 288 to the extent it makes it "more proba-
ble or less probable" 289 that a contract was formed.290 In addition to con-
sidering the pleadings and pretrial orders, the legally-significant
proposition may arise out of examination of statutes and case law con-
cerning the potential role of usage evidence. For example, in Oklahoma a
statute provides: "A contract is to be interpreted according to the law and
usage of the place where it is to be performed, or, if it does not indicate a
place of performance, according to the law and usage of the place where
it is made."' 291 Case law can also establish the relevancy of the offered
evidence. For example, in Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc.,292 the
Oklahoma Supreme Court suggested that industry custom and usage evi-
284. 88 S.W.3d 623 (Tex. 2002).
285. Id. at 629 ("Kangieser's testimony as a whole reveals that he premised his valua-
tion on the fact of Exxon's condemnation, thus improperly including project enhancement
in that valuation.").
286. Id. at 631.
287. However, if counsel is planning to challenge the existing rule, they will want to
ensure evidence is offered applying the existing rule, while proffering evidence supporting
their challenge to the rule. In Zwahr, the plaintiff was attempting to avoid the rule by
focusing on the assignment value of an existing easement on the land owned by another
company.
288. FED. R. EVID. 401; TEX. R. EVID. 401.
289. Id.
290. Manchester Pipeline Corp. v. Peoples Nat. Gas Co., 862 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1988)
(noting that to determine whether parties had entered into a contract, the court could
consider custom and usage regarding the procedure for formalizing a gas purchase
contract.).
291. OKLA. STAT. ANN. TrT. 15, § 162 (West 1993).
292. Mittelstaedt, 954 P.2d 1203.
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dence on deducting costs to calculate royalty would have been relevant to
interpret the oil and gas leases at issue. 2
93
Although the evidence may be relevant, the trial judge can neverthe-
less exclude the evidence when it could cause unfair prejudice, confuse
the issue, mislead the jury, or cause undue delay or be needlessly cumula-
tive. 294 The "probative value" must be "substantially outweighed" by the
"danger" of "unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless pres-
entation of cumulative evidence. '295 Some earlier cases impose special
pleading requirements to alert the other party that usage evidence will be
offered. 296 The U.C.C. addresses the issue as one of "unfair surprise" by
providing: "Evidence of a relevant usage of trade offered by one party is
not admissible unless and until he has given the other party such notice as
the court finds sufficient to prevent unfair surprise to the latter. ' 297 To-
day, with requirements for the exchange of expert reports and disclo-
sures, it would be difficult to claim "unfair surprise" unless the issue is
not disclosed in the report, deposition, or other discovery or pleading
documents. 298 Presumably this rule would prevent raising usage asser-
tions for the first time at the appellate level by brief or argument.2 99 If
the evidence survives these objections, and is found to be relevant, the
next evidentiary hurdle, when being offered through an "expert," is
whether the usage evidence is "reliable."
293. The court in Mittelstaedt observed:
Generally, custom and usage in the industry are used in determining the
scope of duties created by the lease .... Neither the facts given us nor the
legal argument on the certified question identify custom and usage with re-
spect to the individual costs at issue when the leases were executed.
The parties have not shown that the actual costs at issue are, or are not,
treated by the industry as production costs or post-production costs for our
purpose.
Generally, costs have been construed as either production costs which are
never allocated, or post-production costs, which may or may not be allocated,
based upon the nature of the cost as it relates to the duties of the lessee
created by the express language of the lease, the implied covenants, and cus-
tom and usage in the industry. ...
Id. at 1208, 1209. See supra note 2.
294. FED. R. EvID. 403; TEX. R. EVID. 403.
295. Id.
296. E.g., Grube v. Donnell Exploration Co., 286 S.W.2d 179, 180-81 (Tex. Civ. App.-
El Paso 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("such custom was not pleaded by appellant and it seems to
be well settled that if a custom is relied on to establish liability or defeat liability, such
custom must be pleaded.").
297. U.C.C. § 1-205(6) (1977); U.C.C. § 1-303(g) (2003).
298. FED. R. Civ. P. 26; TEX. R. Civ. P. 195.
299. However, it would seem to offer no protection against usage by judicial anecdote.
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B. MUST BE RELIABLE: USAGE EVIDENCE THROUGH THE
EXPERT WITNESS
Usage evidence is frequently offered through an expert witness.300
Often if you are able to exclude the expert's testimony you will be able to
eliminate the lawsuit, or a defense to the lawsuit. This can result in the
critical trial-before-the-trial to determine whether expert testimony es-
sential to the case will be admissible. 301 The focus of the inquiry is
300. For example, in Texas E. Transmission Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., No. CIV. A. 96-
4079, 1997 WL 539675, (E.D. La., Aug. 28, 1997) (not reported in F. Supp.), the court
considers competing interpretations of the following clause in a gas purchase agreement:
5. Seller shall have the right at its election during the term of this contact to
substitute other gas for all or a portion of the gas hereunder and the right to
deliver such substitute gas to Buyer at mutually agreeable points in the area
of or downstream of the delivery points set forth in this Agreement, provided
the substituted gas contains reserves and deliverability equal to or in excess
of the reserves under the leases originally committed to this contract.
Id. at *3. Marathon sought to substitute additional acreage that would replace the deplet-
ing acreage dedicated to the contract. Texas Eastern objected because the effect of the
change would be to increase the volume of gas it would be obligated to purchase under
what had become an unfavorable gas contract. In reaching its decision to deny Marathon's
motion for summary judgment, and grant Texas Eastern's cross-motion for summary judg-
ment, the court relied heavily upon the affidavit testimony of three professors tendered by
Texas Eastern. The court described the testimony of one of the professors as follows:
Texas Eastern has submitted the affidavits of Dr. Saul Litvinoff, Professor
Shael Herman, and Professor L. Linton Morgan in support of its cross-mo-
tion for summary judgment....
Professor Morgan stated that "[f]or a long term gas sales contract to provide
either the buyer or seller with the sole and unlimited option to change the
leases and reserves affected by the contract would be completely inconsistent
with the custom and usage of the oil and gas industry." ....
Id. at *9 (emphasis added). The impact of the professors' testimony is reflected in the
court's final statement in the opinion: "[T]he Court agrees with Dr. Saul Litvinoff, Profes-
sor Shael Herman, and Professor L. Linton Morgan that the contract restricts the quantity
of gas to the amount of gas produced from the lands and leaseholds covered by the SP 89
Contract, namely, the SP 89 Lease." Id. at *17. Similar expert testimony, regarding a
similar issue under a Texas Eastern contract with Amerada Hess Corporation, resulted in a
similar ruling in Texas E. Transmission Corp. v. Amerada Hess Corp., Nos. CIV. A. 97-0518
& CIV. A. 97-1742, 1997 WL 613125, (E. D. La. Sept. 25, 1997).
301. In Texas, these matters may be determined before trial in a Texas Rules of Evi-
dence, Rule 104(a) hearing or a Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 166a(i) no evidence
motion. Texas Rules of Evidence, Rule 104(a) provides:
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a wit-
ness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be
determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In
making its determination the court is not bound by the rules of evidence
except those with respect to privileges.
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 166a(i) provides:
After adequate time for discovery, a party without presenting summary judg-
ment evidence may move for summary judgment on the ground that there is
no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which
an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial. The motion must
state the elements as to which there is no evidence. The court must grant the
motion unless the respondent produces summary judgment evidence raising
a genuine issue of material fact.
See generally E. R. Norwood, Expert Witnesses in Oil and Gas Litigation: Robinson/
Daubert Challenges, 28th ANNUAL ERNEST E. SMITH OIL, GAS & MINERAL LAW INSTI-
TUTE, Paper 8, The University of Texas School of Law (March 22, 2002) [hereinafter Nor-
wood]. If efforts to exclude the testimony at these pre-trial stages fail, the objection must
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whether the testimony being offered by the expert is "reliable" as defined
by the applicable rules of evidence. 30 2 For example, Texas Rules of Evi-
dence, Rule 702 states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise. 303
The federal counterpart is Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702, which
states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise, if
(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testi-
mony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of
the case.304
The italicized language reflects the amendment to Rule 702 incorporating
the United States Supreme Court's analyses in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.30 5 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.30 6 Although
the Texas rule does not contain the italicized language, the same require-
ments have been imposed by Texas courts interpreting the Texas Rule of
Evidence 702.307
The Texas Supreme Court has refined the reliability analysis by focus-
ing on: (1) the expert; and (2) the expert's methodology. Although the
expert witness must possess expertise from their "knowledge, skill, expe-
rience, training, or education, '30 8 they must also have expertise relating
to the specific matter on which they will testify. This is step one of the
be renewed at trial to preserve the issue on appeal. Id. at 30 ("If the trial court rules pre-
trial to deny a party's Robinson/Daubert challenge to an expert's testimony, the opposing
party should, at trial, object to the challenged expert's testimony, adopting as the grounds
for such objection those grounds set out in the Rule 104(a) hearing. Further, the objecting
party should seek an agreement, on the record, from the offering party that the objection
to the challenged expert's testimony will be considered a running objection as to each of
the challenged opinions so as to avoid any risk of waiving the objection.").
302. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
303. TEX. R. EVID. 702.
304. FED. R. EvID. 702 (emphasis added).
305. Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (experts relying upon scientific principles, knowledge, and
technique must connect their conclusions, with supporting analysis, applying supporting
data that is collected through a supporting methodology).
306. 526 U.S.137 (1999) (Daubert analysis applies to "technical" knowledge and "spe-
cialized" knowledge, based upon observation and experience, as opposed to scientific
principles).
307. See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995)
(Texas' counterpart to Daubert); Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, 972 S.W.2d 713 (Tex.
1998) (Texas' counterpart to Kumho Tire).
308. TEX. R. EvID. 702.
2004]
SMU LAW REVIEW
reliability inquiry: is this person the proper expert for the issues in this
case? The Texas Supreme Court, in Borders v. Heise,309 focused on the
suitable expert stating: "What is required is that the offering party estab-
lish that the expert has 'knowledge, skill, expertise, training, or educa-
tion,' regarding the specific issue before the court which would qualify the
expert to give an opinion on that particular subject. ' 310 For example, in
Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet,311 a mechanical engineer familiar
with aircraft design did not qualify as an expert concerning automobile
design.312 This means when counsel evaluates the need for expert testi-
mony they must: (1) carefully define the issues that necessitate expert
testimony; (2) identify the general and specific areas of knowledge associ-
ated with the issues; (3) identify specific areas of expertise required to
effectively address the issues; and (4) seek out persons with the specific
expertise.313
Step two of the process focuses on the expert's methodology used to
arrive at an opinion. The expert's opinion must be based upon some sort
of information obtained or possessed by the expert. The major compo-
nent of a court's reliability analysis will be considering how this informa-
tion was collected, why it was collected, how it was used by the expert,
and how the expert's conclusions relate to the expert's analysis of the
information. These are the "good grounds" for the expert's testimony the
United States Supreme Court refers to in its Daubert opinion.314 Testi-
mony by even the most highly credentialed and qualified expert must be
excluded if the methodology they employ to arrive at their opinions is
unreliable. For example, in Kumho Tire,315 the admittedly qualified ex-
pert's testimony was properly excluded because of: "the methodology
employed by the expert in analyzing the data obtained in the visual in-
spection, and the scientific basis, if any, for such an analysis. '316
The burden again falls on counsel seeking expert assistance to ensure
the expert has the opportunity to properly: (1) identify the information
they need to address their assigned issues; (2) collect the information in a
309. 924 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. 1996).
310. Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
311. Gammill, 972 S.W.2d 713.
312. Id. at 726.
313. E. R. Norwood offers the following advice:
The practitioner should thoroughly examine a perspective expert's experi-
ence with the matter in dispute. Specifically, the attorney should request that
the expert provide the dates, times, places, specific jobs, or assignments, in-
volving the same, or similar, fact issues as the ones in litigation .... Con-
versely, the opponent to such expert testimony should devote sufficient time
and energy, in discovery, to determine the specific experience the putative
expert has in the subject matter at issue.
Norwood, supra note 301, at 5-6.
314. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 ("Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate
validation-i.e., 'good grounds,' based on what is known.").
315. Kuhmo Tire, 526 U.S. 137.
316. Id. at 153. The Supreme Court noted: "The relevant issue was whether the expert
[or any expert employing the visual inspection methodology] could reliably determine the
cause of this tire's separation. Id. at 154.
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defensible manner; (3) analyze the collected information in a defensible
manner; and (4) arrive at conclusions-opinions-that are supported by
their expert analysis of the collected information. The key to a sound
methodology begins with good lawyering. In each case counsel must con-
sider the legal context of the litigation and identify those issues that pre-
sent an opportunity for the effective use of expert testimony. Counsel
must consider what facts would be necessary to allow an expert witness to
opine on an issue and then determine how the necessary facts can be
identified. The expert's analysis of the collected facts provides the final
element of the methodology. These tasks will normally be evaluated
once the appropriate person having the specific expertise to address the
issues has been identified. The expert will provide the input necessary to
identify what they will need to obtain reliable information to determine
whether favorable facts exist. The expert will then proceed to collect the
information and develop the methodology required to effectively evalu-
ate the information and distill the facts. At this stage, if the facts are not
favorable to the party's position commissioning their collection, they can
be used by counsel for settlement purposes.317 The goal is to ensure that
any opinion, "good or bad," is based upon reliable information and that
the expert's conclusions from the information are based upon a reliable
analysis of the information.318
C. FIGHTING ANECDOTE AND ARGUMENT WITH FACT:
HYPOTHETICAL ILLUSTRATION
In this section the anecdote/argument/fact problem, discussed in prior
sections, will be examined in the context of assembling relevant and relia-
ble facts for presentation at trial through expert testimony regarding
when natural gas becomes a "marketable product" in Oklahoma.319 As-
sume that in 1990 an oil and gas lease was entered into between Acme
317. If the expert is unable to agree with the essential elements of a litigant's theory,
they run the risk of becoming an expert for the other side through the process of cross-
examination. In Goodwin v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 290 F. 92 (8th Cir. 1923), the expert
was tendered by the plaintiff to establish that a custom existed in the oil and gas industry
for a lessee "to drill protection wells as soon as wells were drilled near the boundary line
on adjoining land .... " Id. at 96. However, further probing into the expert's opinion
revealed that "the time of drilling protection wells in territory such as here disclosed, was
almost entirely a matter of judgment." Id. This was the precise point the defendant
wanted to make: drilling a protection well is not automatic, but depends upon many cir-
cumstances the operator must weigh.
318. See Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 499 (Tex. 2001) ("If an expert
relies upon unreliable foundational data, any opinion drawn from that data is likewise
unreliable.... Further, an expert's testimony is unreliable even when the underlying data
is sound if the expert's methodology is flawed."). Norwood offers the following advice:
The challenged expert must systematically, step-by-step, demonstrate how
each opinion is supported by the data, or facts, and how the expert's method-
ology applied to the data, or facts, yields the expert's opinion. The expert
should also show that he has considered other possible explanations of the
data, or facts, and how and why he has ruled out such other explanations.
Norwood, supra note 301, at 20.




Oil Company, lessee, and John Landowner, lessor, providing for payment
of a royalty as follows:
The lessee shall pay as royalty free of cost on the lease for gas of
whatsoever nature or kind (with all of its constituents) produced and
sold, 3/16 of the gross proceeds received for the gas sold, or, if such
gas is used by lessee off the leased premises or used by lessee for the
manufacture of casinghead gasoline or other products, lessee shall pay
lessor 3/16 of the prevailing market price at the wellhead for the gas so
used; payments to be made monthly.320
Acme drilled a well on the lease and began producing natural gas in 1991.
The gas was "used" by Acme to "manufacture" products through
processing, which Acme sold as natural gas liquids and residue gas as they
emerged from a gas processing plant located several miles from the
leased land.
Acme currently sells the natural gas liquids and residue gas and nets
the equivalent of $4.00/MMBtu. However, Acme is paying John royalty
based upon a wellhead value of $2.00/MMBtu. 321 John believes his roy-
alty should be 3/16ths of $4.00, not $2.00. Although John does not dis-
pute that the "prevailing market price at the wellhead for the gas so
used" portion of the royalty clause applies, he contends a "marketable
product" does not arise until the gas is processed.
The major issue in this dispute concerns the "location" where John's
royalty should be calculated. Should it be the value of the gas as pro-
duced "at the wellhead" or the value of gas in general at a downstream
location, in this case the outlet of a processing plant? In Texas the court
would focus on the express terms of the oil and gas lease and find that the
proper location is "at the wellhead. ''322 The analysis in Oklahoma appar-
ently 323 requires the court to find that the gas, at the point of valuation,
320. This language is taken from a lease form "Prepared by Oklahoma Mineral Owners
Association" for use "primarily from the perspective of the landowner." FORMS MANUAL,
supra note 153, at 17, 2, and at 19, Note 1 (emphasis added).
321. The difference between the $2.00 wellhead value and the $4.00 downstream,
processed value, can be attributed to a number of factors. First, the gas has been subjected
to a substantial capital investment in processing equipment to provide the facilities neces-
sary to separate and then fractionate the natural gas liquids. Second, the gas has been
combined with larger volumes of gas for marketing (aggregated value) and the party sell-
ing the gas has most likely provided new "obligation value" to the gas in the form of a
promise to have, for example, a certain volume of gas available for sale at certain times
(packaged value). Third, the gas has been moved to a downstream marketing point that
reflects the value of the commodity at a more centralized location following the additional
capital investment to gather, compress, and treat the gas to get it to the point of sale at the
processing plant. Fourth, new risk has been incurred by the producer to engage in the
gathering, processing, and contracting to try and create new value for the gas beyond the
point where it is produced at the wellhead. See Royalty Value Theorem, supra note 97, at
154, nn. 5-7.
322. E.g., Judice v. Mewbourne Oil Co., 939 S.W.2d 133, 135 (Tex. 1996) (lease requir-
ing royalty based on "the market value at the well" is not ambiguous and "means value at
the well .... ).
323. I qualify this statement with the word "apparently" because in the relevant cases,
the issues were presented to the court as whether certain costs can be deducted to calculate
royalty. E.g., Mittelstaedt, 954 P.2d at 1204-05 (Okla. 1998) (certified question inquired
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was a "marketable product. '324 Therefore, the first critical issue will be
whether gas produced from John's land was a "marketable product"
when produced "at the well." If it was, the next issue will be determining
the value of this "marketable product" at the location where produced,
and presumably in the condition and volumes produced. Often resolving
the first issue eliminates the need to consider the second issue.325
Each party will therefore focus on evidence as to whether the gas at
issue is a "marketable product" as produced "at the well." Although it
appears the "marketable product" analysis has been grafted onto the oil
and gas lease as a matter of law,326 the "marketable product" analysis is
being conducted, ostensibly, to determine the meaning of the lease con-
tract. 327 As noted previously, usage evidence can play an important role
in this area.32 8
The sort of usage evidence a lessor may want to offer concerns the
practice of lessees dictating the terms of oil and gas leases. To the extent
the oil and gas lease can be portrayed as an adhesion contract, the lessor
may be able to convince a court to apply favorable rules of construction,
such as interpreting the lease strictly against the lessee and in favor of the
lessor.329 However, if the jurisdiction has already made such a finding in
whether lessee was "entitled to deduct a proportional share of transportation, compres-
sion, dehydration, and blending costs from the royalty interest ...."). The issue posed by
my hypothetical does not appear to have anything to do with the deduction of costs, but
instead relates to the value of the gas produced "at the wellhead." If it is $2.00/MMBtu or
less, the lessor loses; if it is more than $2.00, the lessor wins. The deduction of costs would
only be considered as evidence of value if a downstream price is adjusted to try to approxi-
mate a wellhead value. This is "evidence" as opposed to a contractual "entitlement" for
either party. See Royalty Value Theorem, supra note 97, at 155-56.
324. The precise ruling in Mittelstaedt states:
[A] royalty interest may bear post-production costs of transporting, blending,
compression, and dehydration, when the costs are reasonable, when actual
royalty revenues increase in proportion to the costs assessed against the roy-
alty interest, when the costs are associated with transforming an already mar-
ketable product into an enhanced product, and when the lessee meets its
burden of showing these facts.
Mittelstaedt, 954 P.2d at 1210 (emphasis added).
325. The parties may be able to stipulate to the value of gas at the wellhead, with the
only issue being whether it is a "marketable product" at the wellhead.
326. It appears the "marketable product" analysis is the result of asking the wrong
question. Instead of ascertaining the "market value" at the well, courts, counsel, and com-
mentators have posed the issue as whether costs can be deducted from downstream values
to calculate royalty. This prompted courts to consider the issue as "what must the lessee
do to prepare the gas for market" as opposed to ascertaining the value of the gas stream at
a particular location. Royalty Value Theorem, supra note 97, at 151, 155-62 (§ 6.02. Are
Courts Addressing the Right Question?).
327. At least this is the case in states that treat the implied covenant to market as a
covenant implied "in fact" as opposed to implied "in law." Jurisprudential Underpinnings,
supra note 154, at 10-16 to 10-20 and 10-23 to 10-28 (comparing implied in law approach of
the Colorado Supreme Court in Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001)
with the implied in fact approach of the Kansas Supreme Court in Smith v. Amoco Prod.
Co., 31 P.3d 255 (Kan. 2001) and the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Mittelstaedt, 954 P.2d
1203).
328. See supra text accompanying notes 150-82; 197-209.




prior cases by anecdote or argument,330 the lessor may not want to ad-
dress the issue as a matter of fact, because the facts may not be in accor-
dance with the anecdotal presumption. 331
For the lessee, in every case they will want to determine whether the
facts support such an anecdotal presumption.332 This can be done by
fashioning a study that examines the actual oil and gas leases, and related
documents and circumstances, to answer the question: are they the prod-
uct of an adhesion contract in which the terms were dictated by the
lessee? Although these facts will not answer what the market value of
the gas is at the wellhead, it will be "relevant" in combating anecdotal
rules of construction that can impact the inquiry.333 Because the study
will be performed by a person qualified to testify as an expert, the pri-
mary concern will be "reliability. '334
The underlying reliability issue is the "so what" analysis. If the study is
conducted, will an analysis of the results yield information that logically
supports the expert's opinion? For example, if the expert examines the
oil and gas leases at issue and finds that the lease forms had been altered
by changing the primary term from 10 years to 2 years, and the royalty
fraction from 1/8th to 3/16ths, does this provide reliable information from
which the expert can conclude the leases were the product of negotia-
tion?335 If a study of all leases in the county reveals that multiple oil
Construction of oil and gas leases containing ambiguities shall be in favor of
the lessor and against the lessee. . . . It is puzzling to understand why the
above textwriter had such difficulty with this rule for the reason that the
lessee of an oil and gas lease usually provides the lease form or dictates the
terms thereof ....
Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co., 388 P.2d 602, 605 (Kan. 1964). More recently, the Colorado
Supreme Court uses the same justification to apply a particularly harsh version of the mar-
ketable product rule stating:
Finally, in interpreting leases like those in this case, we are mindful of the
generally accepted rule that oil and gas leases are strictly construed against
the lessee in favor of the lessor.... This rule is generally based on the recog-
nition that the bargaining power between a lessor and lessee is similar to that
historically found between an insurance company and its customers. ...
Thus, the parties are in similar unequal positions. For example, lessors are
not usually familiar with the law related to oil and gas leases, while lessees,
through experience drafting and litigating leases, generally are.
Rogers, 29 P.3d ay 901-02.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 112-123.
331. This would particularly be a concern when the lessor is a class representative be-
cause it is highly unlikely that the level of knowledge and experience among class mem-
bers, and the details of how each lease was negotiated, will be the same. If the class
representative is a sophisticated lessor that actually negotiated the lease, their position may
harm other members of the class lacking sophistication. If the class representative is not
sophisticated, applying their situation to all class members will be unfair to the defendant
in those situations where there are lessors with a high level of sophistication, or who relied
upon counsel or other knowledgeable people to negotiate the lease.
332. Or any other anecdotal information that may be adverse to the lessee's position.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 112-123.
334. See supra text accompanying notes 300-318.
335. This is perhaps some of the best objective evidence that negotiation of some sort
took place. Often there will be a mix of leases where some lessors gave a lease providing
for a 1/8th royalty and 10-year primary term while other lessors obtained considerably
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companies were competing for leases at the same time, does this tend to
dispel the notion of an adhesion contract? 336 What if certain mineral
owners in the area refused to lease their land?337 Sometimes lease altera-
tions in an area may reveal a pattern of changes that can be attributed to
a particular attorney representing landowners in the area. In the hands of
a qualified expert this information can be used to arrive at real, as op-
posed to assumed or anecdotal, conclusions regarding how the leases
were assembled.
Once the parties have explored the collateral issues, the governing is-
sue remains: is the gas a "marketable product" as produced at the well?
As with the adhesion contract issue, the goal is to identify relevant facts
that address whether the gas is a "marketable product" at the well, and if
not, at what point in the downstream marketing chain does it become a
"marketable product." One obvious approach to this issue is to fashion a
study that examines the actual gas marketing patterns in the area. The
relevant information would be evidence of gas sales from the lease at
issue and the surrounding area. This would also be supplemented with
evidence of the regulatory environment that may have caused marketing
patterns to shift from time-to-time. Changes in ownership of gathering
systems and processing plants could also affect marketing patterns. The
facts would be collected from various contracts supplemented with expert
knowledge of the relevant regulatory regimes.
To the extent the study reflects past or present marketing of gas at the
wellhead, the lessor will be forced to pursue a "legal" as opposed to a
"factual" definition of "marketable product." This was done successfully
in Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co.,338 where the Colorado Supreme Court,
following several anecdotal conclusions regarding lease relationships, 339
better terms. This would tend to indicate that those lessors who sought a better deal re-
ceived it, and that those who didn't seek a better deal, received the offered deal.
336. The "adhesion" nature of the contract suggests there is no competition for a lease
on their land. However, just because a contract is labeled an "adhesion contract" does not
mean it is any less enforceable as written. Absent a finding of unconscionability, the con-
tract should be fully enforceable. See Jurisprudential Underpinnings, supra note 154, at 10-
6 to 10-9.
337. This goes to the heart of the adhesion contract assertion. It is actually the mineral
owner that has the take-it-or-leave-it power over lessees. As a general rule, a lessee must
obtain a lease from the mineral owner to develop their land. Therefore, it is the mineral
owner who, in the first instance, has the power to determine whether development will
take place-and who will conduct that development. I have observed previously:
Although the bargaining process has some of the elements of an adhesion
contract, the landowner is actually the party in the position to demand a
bargain on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The landowner does not have to lease
his or her land. At some point in time there will likely be multiple develop-
ers seeking to lease the land. If properly informed, the landowner will be
able to respond to any developer proposal. In these situations the key is
knowledge that: (1) there is absolutely no obligation to lease, (2) waiting to
lease generally favors the lessor, and (3) as the speculative value of the land
increases, the landowner's bargaining power increases.
Jurisprudential Underpinnings, supra note 154, at 10-8.
338. Rogers, 29 P.3d 887.
339. Id. at 901-02. See supra text accompanying notes 112-123.
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held: "Gas is marketable when it is in the physical condition such that it is
acceptable to be bought and sold in a commercial marketplace, 340 and in
the location of a commercial marketplace, such that it is commercially
saleable in the oil and gas marketplace. ' 341 Because the Acme Oil/John
Landowner dispute is governed by Oklahoma law, a detailed factual in-
quiry into the first location where gas can be sold following extraction
would be relevant to determining its marketability.
The lessor's goal in these cases will be to steer the court away from the
language of the lease and focus on general concepts of "marketable prod-
uct"-a term not to be found in any oil and gas lease. The lessee's goal
will be to keep the court focused on the underlying task: what does the oil
and gas lease mean? The lessee will pose the question as whether the
lease suggests that gas is a marketable product when extracted. This is
where usage evidence can play a major role. For example, the lessee may
be able to present usage evidence that oil and gas leases used in the area,
at the time the lease at issue was granted, routinely provided for a deter-
mination of royalty at the time and place where the gas is extracted from
the ground. The usage is represented by express language used in hun-
dreds of oil and gas leases that provide for a royalty based upon the value
of gas "at the well" when it is produced. The final step is to connect the
usage to the lease at issue. This is typically done with the expert witness
comparing the usage lease language with the lease at issue.
This comparative technique for presenting usage evidence in contract
cases allows the expert witness to compare the contract at issue with what
is commonly encountered in the industry. The technique is illustrated by
the court in Nordell International Resources, LTD v. Triton Indonesia,
Inc.,342 where the witness noted: "Under the typical Joint Operating
Agreement in the oil and gas industry, the operator has the right to re-
ceive payment in advance of each non-operator's share of the costs upon
demand, but the operator itself does not have to make the payments until
the bills come due. '343 This establishes the expert's understanding of
how advance payment requests are administered under common forms of
operating agreements that employ language similar to the contract at is-
sue. The expert's knowledge and study of existing operating agreements
provides the baseline for concluding they take a consistent approach to a
problem and represent an industry "usage;" the way things are done in
340. If you stop with this requirement, you have a basic factual inquiry regarding mar-
ketable product. This first step comprises the basic marketable product analysis used by
the Supreme Courts of Kansas and Oklahoma. Sternberger v. Marathon Oil Co., 894 P.2d
788, 799 (Kan. 1995) ("Contrary to SKROA's argument, however, there is no evidence in
this case that the gas produced by Marathon was not marketable at the mouth of the well
other than the lack of a purchaser at that location."); Mittelstaedt, 954 P.2d at 1206 ("Mak-
ing the gas available to market at the leased premises means that the lessee must produce
the gas in a marketable form at the leased premises.").
341. Rogers, 29 P.3d at 906.
342. Nordell Int'l Res., LTD V. Triton Indonesia, Inc., Nos. 92-55058, 92-55433, 92-
55434, 1993 WL 280169 (9th Cir. July 23, 1993) (unpublished opinion).
343. Id. at *3. The non-operator argued the operator violated their agreement by fail-
ing to "issue cash calls to itself."
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the industry concerning advance payments by non-operators to operators.
The expert then makes the connection with the contract at issue by indi-
cating the interpretation offered by the party sponsoring the expert, in
this case Triton, is consistent with industry usage.344 In Nordell, the court
concluded: "The custom and practice in the oil and gas industry was con-
sistent with Triton's understanding of the contract. '345
When the case is tried to a jury, the process is completed with a jury
instruction regarding the usage. For example, in E.P. Operating Co. v.
Sonora Exploration Corp.,346 the court reviews the following instruction:
If you find that a custom or usage existed in the oil and gas industry
that where a party places its gas in the transmission pipeline owned
by another, that the party placing the gas in the pipeline agrees to
pay for its transmission, then that custom and usage may be consid-
ered in determining the contractual intent of the parties.347
The jury will then determine, as a matter of fact, whether such a usage
exists and if so, its impact on the issues it must decide.
VII. A PRINCIPLED ANALYSIS FOR EVALUATING
USAGE EVIDENCE
Custom and usage jurisprudence is difficult to apply because there are
many steps in analyzing usage evidence that can be manipulated to sup-
port a desired outcome. Courts often treat the subject similar to a group
of canons of construction where they select canons that support its inter-
pretation while ignoring those that do not fit the desired interpreta-
tion.348 The goal of this section is to provide a principled analysis, based
upon the "law of usage," that courts can employ to evaluate usage evi-
dence. The first task is to address substantive exclusionary principles,
such as the parol evidence rule.
A. KEEP THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE IN ITS PROPER CONTEXT
When presented with usage evidence, courts should first consider the
purpose for which the evidence is being offered. If offered to identify
terms of the contract not referenced in the parties' written agreement,
limitations imposed by the parol evidence rule will need to be consid-
ered.349 However, the parol evidence rule should impose no limitation if
the usage evidence is being offered to define the meaning of the written
344. Depending on the position of the party, evidence may be offered to show that a
proffered interpretation is inconsistent with industry usage.
345. Id.
346. 862 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied)).
347. Id. at 153.
348. See generally Bruce M. Kramer, The Sisyphean Task of Interpreting Mineral Deeds
and Leases: An Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction, 24 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 1 (1993).
349. This does not necessarily mean the evidence will be excluded; it means the court
must consider whether the writing is integrated, and if so whether it is a full or partial
integration. Next, the court must determine whether the evidence is, nevertheless, admissi-
ble in light of the full or partial integration. See supra text accompanying notes 25-44.
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agreement. 350 When usage is properly viewed as part of the written
agreement itself, the parol evidence rule is not implicated. This means
the usage, being a component of the writing, can be established through
extrinsic evidence without running afoul of the parol evidence rule.
For example, assume a contract provides that party A will sell all its
"equipment" on a lease to party B, and the issue is whether the term
"equipment" includes a pipeline on the lease owned by party A. Party A
seeks to offer testimony that in the oil and gas industry the use of the
term "equipment" would not include the pipeline. Party B asserts that
the offered evidence violates the parol evidence rule because it seeks to
add the following new terms to the fully integrated written agreement:
"not including pipelines." Party A will respond that nothing is being ad-
ded because the term "equipment," when properly defined, means "not
including pipelines." The "writing" contains the word "equipment" and
the evidence is being offered to determine what the writing means. The
party did not go outside of the written agreement to find the term "equip-
ment" so the parol evidence rule is not triggered. 351
Surrounding circumstances evidence would be subject to a similar anal-
ysis. Relevant evidence of the situation of the parties and the state of the
world at the time the written agreement was entered into provides a con-
text for interpreting the writing.352 For example, building on the "equip-
ment" example, party A may be able to show that when A acquired its
leasehold interest, the pipeline had been installed and owned by a third
party, and treated as an investment separate from the "equipment" on
the lease. Party B may be able to show that the pipeline was installed by
the original lessee, and transferred to successive lessees as part of the
leasehold rights. In addition to this context evidence, Party B may be
able to prove that all lessees in this area routinely install and operate a
"pipeline" as part of their individual leasehold development. This evi-
350. "The general function of usage and custom is definition, explanation, elucidation."
Peoples Ice & Fuel Co. v. Dickey Oil Co., 65 P.2d 319, 326 (Kan. 1937).
351. In Jeanes v. Henderson, 703 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1983), the court, applying Texas law,
considers a similar issue:
Jeanes argued that the phrase "equipment costs on each well sufficient to
attach the same into existing lines" found in the 1971 contract supplied him
with this interest in the pipelines. Henderson disagreed and offered an ex-
pert's testimony on the meaning of the term "equipment" in the oil and gas
industry. The expert testified that equipment means casing, tubing, wellhead
equipment, and gathering lines, but not the major transporting lines. The
court admitted this testimony over Jeanes' objection and the jury found that
the 1971 contract did not provide Jeanes with an ownership interest in the
new pipeline.
Id. at 861. Noting the district court has "wide discretion to admit or exclude expert testi-
mony" the Court of Appeals affirms finding no abuse of discretion. Id. at 861-62.
352. For example, in Intratex Gas Co. v. Puckett, 886 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1994, no writ), the lessee offered the expert testimony of Dr. Diana Olien, "an oil and gas
industry historian," focusing on the situation immediately before enactment of the Natural
Gas Policy Act of 1978. She testified: "that during the years surrounding this contract's
execution, the energy industry anticipated federal regulation of the intrastate gas market."
Id. at 278. This and other expert testimony focused on the meaning of an area rate clause
in the parties' gas purchase contract.
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dence could also establish a usage in the area that a sale of lease "equip-
ment" includes this sort of pipeline.353
Recognized exceptions to the parol evidence rule will allow usage evi-
dence to establish even the terms of the contract. For example, if the
issue concerns whether a contract was formed, the parol evidence rule
does not apply.354 One of the basic requirements of contract formation is
an agreement that is definite enough for a court to enforce. 355 In Lynx
Exploration and Production Co. v. 4-Sight Operating Co.,356 the parties
entered into a letter agreement conditioned upon Lynx's acceptance of a
purchase agreement that would contain a list of items typically addressed
in a purchase and sale of oil and gas properties.357 The parties never
came to an agreement on many of the listed items but Lynx contended an
enforceable agreement nevertheless existed between the parties. Lynx
presented usage evidence that the "supplemental terms were consistent
with the standards of the oil and gas industry at the time and place in
question .... "358 Although this was accurate, it did not solve the basic
problem of determining the specific content of the terms necessary to
make the contract definite enough to enforce.359
353. Some courts carve out types of parol evidence when describing admissible sur-
rounding circumstances evidence. For example, in KMI Cont'l Offshore Prod. Co. v. ACF
Petroleum Co., 746 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ denied), the
court states the rule as follows:
Evidence of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract
should be considered, but the circumstances are merely an aid in the con-
struction of the contract's language. Moreover, the circumstances to be con-
sidered are not the parties' statements of what they intended the contract to
mean, but circumstances known to the parties at the time they entered into
the contract, such as what the industry considered to be the norm or reasona-
ble and prudent.
Id. at 241 (emphasis added).
354. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214(d) (1981) ("Agreements and nego-
tiations prior to or contemporaneous with the adoption of a writing are admissible in evi-
dence to establish ... (d) illegality, fraud, duress, mistake, lack of consideration, or other
invalidating cause .... "
355. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1981); U.C.C. § 2-204(2) (1977);
U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2003).
356. 891 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, writ denied).
357. Among the listed items to agree upon were:
1. Performance deposit ($150,000.00) to be delivered to mutually agreeable escrow agent
upon complete execution of Purchase and Sale Agreement),
2. Title, including acceptance of form and terms of existing contractual agreements relating
to the properties,
3. Liabilities and responsibilities associated with or arising from ownership and/or opera-
tions prior to closing date,
4. Environmental conditions,
5. Designation of successor operator,
6. Over/under produced gas wells,




358. Id. at 789.
359. Id. ("[Lynx] never offered any summary judgment proof showing a usage of the




In Peoples Ice & Fuel Co. v. Dickey Oil Co. ,360 the usage evidence pro-
vided the certainty necessary to support a binding agreement. The oil
and gas lessee argued that its gas sales agreement with the gas purchaser
was too indefinite to enforce because the purchaser did not commit to
take a specified quantity of gas.361 The lessee's main complaint was that
the purchaser acquired the exclusive right to purchase the lessee's gas
without committing to buy a specified quantity. The purchaser submitted
usage evidence which established its practice of purchasing from several
lessees in the area and then prorating the gas it took from each based
upon the production capacity of each lease and the status of the gas as
casinghead or dry. The court expressly found that the parties contracted
with knowledge of this usage, which adequately defined the volumes the
purchaser was obligated to take. 362 Whether a letter of intent can consti-
tute an offer creating a power of acceptance was answered with usage
evidence in Drilling Well Control, Inc. v. Smith Industries, Inc. ,363 where
the court relies upon "custom and usage in the oil field fabricating busi-
ness" that "a 'letter of intent' such as the June 7, 1965 letter, is construed
as a firm order and contract if accepted. '364
In most cases the parol evidence rule should not be an impediment to
considering usage evidence. This means that usage evidence will be
filtered applying relevancy and reliability standards, instead of substan-
tive parol evidence limitations. However, courts sometimes employ us-
age-specific rules to limit the impact of usage evidence, often reaching
back into the history of "custom" to thwart modem-day usages.
B. AVOID HISTORICAL "CUSTOM" ANALYSES WHEN EVALUATING
"USAGE" EVIDENCE
When a court is not inclined to recognize a usage, it may attempt to
bolster its position by applying a more rigorous historical "custom" anal-
ysis instead of a modern usage analysis. For example, in Grube v. Don-
nell Exploration Co.,365 the court upheld the trial court's exclusion of
offered usage evidence regarding whether a driller must give notice when
360. People's Ice, 65 P.2d 319.
361. Id. at 320.
362. Id. at 328. This provided the required certainty regarding the purchaser's obliga-
tions and also avoided the lessee's mutuality argument. The trial court found that the
purchaser engaged in the following usages:
In this case ... the petition alleged and the proof showed that certain cus-
toms and usages prevailed in the McPherson field. Starting with the proposi-
tion that plaintiff or its predecessors had furnished the only market for gas in
the field, it was shown... that what may be called a standard form of con-
tract was used; that the price for gas was the same in all instances; that when
gas was purchased the leasehold was the unit and not the individual wells
thereon; that negotiations were orally concluded and subsequently confirmed
by written agreement.
Id. at 326.
363. 459 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
364. Id. at 464.
365. Grube, 286 S.W.2d 179.
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it shifts from a footage charge to day work compensation. 366 The court
rejected the usage evidence listing several requirements associated with
"custom" evidence, to include that the custom was not: (1) "established
for a sufficient length of time to have become generally known;" (2) "cer-
tain and uniform;" (3) "notorious;" and (4) "known to the parties to the
contract, or that the parties contracted with reference to it.''367 Under a
modern usage analysis, there is no minimum length of time the usage
must exist, nor must it be "certain and uniform" or "notorious," and a
party can be subject to a usage which they should have known about
under the facts.368
Usage evidence should be tested applying the same requirements im-
posed on other types of evidence, 369 without resorting to maxims that
create additional hurdles to admissibility. This forces the parties, judges,
and juries to consider, weigh, and evaluate the evidence and accept or
reject the usage based upon the evidence presented.370 When historical
"custom" concepts creep into the analysis, they corrupt the analysis by
preventing the trier of fact from considering relevant facts.
C. USAGE IS A FACTUAL INQUIRY UNDERTAKEN ON A CASE-BY-
CASE BASIS
There is no "precedent" that establishes a usage in one case that will
necessarily be applicable to another case. As noted previously,371 "us-
age" is an issue of fact, to be established as a fact, in each case.372 Simi-
larly, the function of usage evidence is to provide context to interpret a
particular agreement, between specific parties. From the evidence
presented, the court will determine whether a usage exists and its con-
tent. For example, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Buster,373 the lessor
366. Id. at 180.
367. Id. at 181.
368. See supra text accompanying notes 6-18.
369. The evidence must be "relevant" and "reliable." See supra text accompanying
notes 282-318.
370. Courts should not impose any sort of heightened evidentiary standard to establish
a usage. Among the special requirements imposed on a party trying to establish a tradi-
tional "custom" was that the "requisites of a good custom must all be established by evi-
dence which is clear and convincing." Jarecki Mfg. Co. v. Merriam, 180 P. 224, 225 (Kan.
1919). As the court explains, a mere preponderance of the evidence will not be enough:
The very nature of the subject is such it is not enough that the evidence on
the side of the existence of the custom merely preponderate-merely over-
balance in some degree the weight of evidence on the other side. It must be
of such cogency as to satisfy the mind and generate full belief.
Id. This special evidentiary requirement, along with the other custom maxims, perhaps
played a legitimate role when "custom" was equated with "law." See supra text accompa-
nying note 7. Today, usage is a matter of "fact" not "law."
371. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
372. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222(2) (1981) ("The existence and
scope of a usage of trade are to be determined as questions of fact."); U.C.C. § 1-205(2)
(1977) ("The existence and scope of such a usage [of trade] are to be proved as facts.");
U.C.C. § 1-303(c) (2003) ("The existence and scope of such a usage [of trade] must be
proved as facts.").
373. 241 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1957).
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sought to establish a usage obligating lessee's to sell gas to farmers for so
long as the farmer operates an irrigation well. Evaluating the evidence,
the court concluded that there was no usage to furnish gas and that the
practice was to enter into negotiated agreements when the lessee elected
to sell irrigation gas. 3 74
Frequently the evidence offered to establish the usage will, when put in
proper context, negate the usage it purports to recognize. In Texas Gas
Exploration Corp. v. Broughton Offshore Ltd. II,375 the trial court re-
fused to instruct the jury on a trade usage Texas Gas sought to establish
regarding drilling contracts. Upholding the trial judge's ruling, the court
focused on evidence offered through Texas Gas' expert that belied the
existence of the usage. 376 Although the court in Texas Gas was poised to
rely upon an overly-broad application of the parol evidence rule377 and
custom-era maxims 378 to affirm the trial court, it instead evaluated the
evidence offered and found it lacking.
Establishing a usage as a matter of fact in each case is not only an
obligation, but also a sort of "right" to not be subjected to usages that
have not been so established. Counsel must be prepared to identify situa-
tions where a court has, perhaps inadvertently, elevated a usage to "law"
status.379 The proper response to such situations is to focus on the "law
of usage" which requires that a usage be established as a matter of fact in
any case where it is offered to interpret an agreement. 380 This will also be
the major deterrent to usage by argument or anecdote. 381
D. USAGE HAS A TEMPORAL CONTEXT
The temporal context of usage evidence highlights its interpretive func-
tion. The interpretive goal is to ascertain the intent of the parties-at the
time they entered into their agreement. Therefore, the relevant usages
374. Id. at 184-85.
375. 790 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ).
376. Id. at 786 ("Its own expert testified on direct examination that it was not custom-
ary for an operator to change rigs during the drilling of a well, and that it had not occurred
in his experience.").
377. Id. at 785 ("Custom and usage of trade are not relevant where the contract lan-
guage is, like the language before this court, clear and unambiguous.").
378. Id. ("[T]here must be evidence that the custom was generally known, or had been
established for a sufficient length of time to become generally known, and that it was
known to all parties to the contract or that the parties had contracted with reference to
it.").
379. See supra text accompanying notes 267-280.
380. This also means that most usage issues will not be resolved through summary judg-
ment. For example, in Carter Baron Drilling v. Badger Oil Corp., 581 F. Supp. 592 (D.
Colo. 1984), the court found that usage evidence can be considered to interpret a drilling
contract. However, each side presented affidavits which asserted a usage that supported
their conflicting interpretations of the drilling contract. After finding a plausible basis for
each assertion, the court denied summary judgment stating: "Summary judgment should
not be awarded when an issue turns on credibility." Id. at 600. See also First Nat'l Bank of
Jackson v. Pursue Energy Corp., 784 F.2d 659, 664 (5th Cir. 1986) (denying summary judg-
ment to consider the "practice of the industry regarding the proper payment of royalties"
on sulphur recovered after processing natural gas).
381. See supra text accompanying notes 94-123.
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will be those at the time the contract was entered into, not when the dis-
pute arises. The temporal context also identifies the relevant parties to
the contract as being those parties at the time the contract was made.
Because leasehold interests are frequently assigned, and mineral interest
ownership will change by conveyance and succession, the parties at the
time of the dispute will frequently be different from those at the time the
contract was made.
For example, in Garman v. Conoco, Inc.,382 the ownership of the over-
riding royalty at the time of the dispute was Conoco, James Garman,
Robert Garman, and Mark Garman.383 However, at the time the assign-
ment creating the overriding royalty was entered into, the parties were
Monarch Oil & Uranium Co., the lessee/assignor that created the over-
riding royalty,384 and Lee A. Adams, the assignee of the lease burdened
by the overriding royalty. Conoco obtained Adams' interest in a subse-
quent assignment. 385 Therefore, the appropriate temporal surrounding
circumstances would be those that existed at the time the contract was
entered into; in this case when Monarch assigned its interest to Adams.
In addition to defining the appropriate time-frame, the rights of the
Garmans and Conoco are defined by the rights their assignors had in the
property: Monarch, as the predecessor in interest to the Garmans, and
Adams as Conoco's predecessor in interest. In addition to focusing on
usages and circumstances as of the date of the original assignment, the
"parties," for purposes of applying usage rules, are the assignor oil com-
pany, Monarch, and an individual assignee, Lee Adams. This is abso-
lutely critical to evaluating usage issues because the court evaluated 386
Conoco's usage argument by considering the industry knowledge of Co-
noco and the Garmans.387 Instead of inquiring about the industry knowl-
edge of the Garmans, the court should have focused on the industry
382. Garman, 886 P.2d 652.
383. Id. at 655, n.5.
384. Monarch had obtained its leasehold interest from M.B. and B.K. Garman who
obtained eight oil and gas leases from the federal government covering 10,742 acres. Id. at
654-55 n.5.
385. Id. at 655.
386. The court really does not "evaluate" anything, but instead, relies upon anecdotal
statements to resolve usage arguments against Conoco. See supra text accompanying notes
112-123.
387. The court stated:
We find Conoco's argument that industry practice allows proportionate allo-
cation of post-production costs unpersuasive. Before one can be bound by
industry custom "he must know of it or it must be so universal and well-
established that he is presumed to have knowledge of its existence."... Fur-
ther, the parties must have contracted with reference to the custom.... Cus-
tom and industry practice may be an appropriate consideration when Conoco
deals with other oil exploration companies.... Often, however, executing an
oil and gas lease, or assigning a federal lease won under the previously ex-
isting federal lottery system is the extent of a party's contact with the oil
industry.... Conoco cannot invoke industry custom to limit the rights of
royalty and overriding royalty owners unsophisticated in the intricacies of
mineral development.
Garman, 886 P.2d at 660.
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knowledge of the Garmans' predecessor in interest: Monarch Oil and
Uranium Co. It was the Monarch "oil" company that created the over-
riding royalty.388 Therefore, Monarch apparently was a member of the
industry and would have been subject to its usages at the time the over-
riding royalty was created. 389
The importance of the temporal context of usage evidence is the focus
of the court's review in Energen Resources MAQ, Inc. v. Dalbosco,390
where the court identified the issue by stating:
Energen contends that the trial court should not have submitted a
jury question on custom and usage in the industry requiring notice
before plugging and abandoning the McDuffie well because there
was no evidence presented at trial of such a custom and usage in the
industry in 1981. Jury question number one asked the following:
Did the custom and usage in the oil and gas industry in 1981 im-
pose a contractual duty on Defendant to provide notice to Don
Dalbosco of its intent to abandon and plug the McDuffie No. 1
well before the expiration of the McDuffie lease?
The jury answered, "Yes." Energen objected to the submission of
this question on the ground that there was no evidence to support
the issue.391
Energen was not challenging the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the
usage, instead it argued that Dalbosco failed to establish the usage ex-
isted in 1981.392 In response, the court carefully combed the usage evi-
dence offered at trial and held there was evidence from which the jury
could reasonably infer the usage was in existence in 1981. 393 Any party
offering usage evidence should avoid this problem by clearly establishing
the temporal context of their usage at trial.
Surrounding circumstances evidence also has a temporal reference.
388. The facts indicate the Garmans obtained their overriding royalty interest before
Conoco even had an interest in the property. Id. at 662 (Erickson, J., specially concurring)
("An assignment of an overriding royalty interest was made to the Garmans prior to the
time Conoco obtained its working interest.").
389. It is doubtful the court really wanted to know about the parties or their usages.
The phrasing of the certified question assumes a generic legal answer is possible: "Under
Colorado law, is the owner of an overriding royalty interest in gas production required to
bear a proportionate share of post-production costs, such as processing, transportation, and
compression, when the assignment creating the overriding royalty interest is silent as to
how post-production costs are to be borne?" Id. at 653. The court provides a generic
answer without interpreting the contract that would otherwise define each party's rights.
None of the justices consider the issue presented by the express terms of the overriding
royalty assignment: does the amount paid equal, or exceed, the "market price for ... gas
prevailing in the field where produced . I..." d. at 664 (Erickson, J., specially concurring)
(quoting language of the assignment). Therefore, the issue is not the deduction of costs,
but rather ascertaining the "market price" for gas in the "field where produced." Once this
number is known, it can be compared to what was paid to ascertain if the contract has been
breached. See Royalty Value Theorem, supra note 97, at 155-62.
390. Evergen Resources, 23 S.W.3d 551.
391. Id. at 554 (emphasis added).
392. Id.
393. Id. at 554-56.
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For example, in Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co.,3 9 4 the
court considered the state of the law at the time Shell entered into oil and
gas leases providing for a "market value" royalty.395 The historical con-
text of the transaction should always be established. For example, the
existence, or non-existence, of commentary, problems, cases, statutes,
regulations, other agreements, and theories can all have an impact on
why the parties pursued a particular course of action. To accurately por-
tray the situation of the parties, counsel must set the stage as it was when
the agreement at issue was created.
When considering usage evidence, or evidence of surrounding circum-
stances, judges, counsel, and witnesses must be careful to place them-
selves in the proper time-frame to ensure the evidence is relevant to the
matters at issue. Equally important, the proper parties must be identified
to ensure issues regarding industry knowledge are evaluated focusing on
the correct parties.
E. THE KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT-FACT NOT FICTION
Courts frequently comment on whether a party to an agreement had
knowledge of a usage sought to be employed to interpret or supplement
their agreement. 396 This appears to be a sort of "swing" issue which
courts either scrutinize or ignore depending upon whether the usage evi-
dence supports the court's resolution of the dispute. Regardless of the
court's approach, the issue is often resolved by anecdotal judicial conclu-
sions instead of fact. 397
The substantive knowledge requirement is stated by the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts as whether the parties "knew or had reason to
know of the usage .... ",398 The party seeking to rely upon a usage has
394. 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984).
395. The court noted:
Moreover, Shell and those from whom it received leases by assignment were
or should have been aware that "market value" had been held to mean value
at the time of production both in old cases like Wall and in new cases like
Foster and Vela. Foster was decided in 1964. Vela was decided by the Texas
Court of Civil Appeals in 1966 and affirmed by the Texas Supreme Court in
1968. From the record it appears that no lease at issue here predates Foster
and only a few predate Vela. Though not binding on Mississippi lessees,
these decisions were widely discussed in the industry and should have alerted
the lessees to the potential legal effect of the royalty clause. Shell certainly
had ample opportunity to change the language if in fact it intended a "pro-
ceeds" lease.
Id. at 235 (emphasis added). Apparently no evidence was offered at trial regarding what
"Shell" knew about the law at the time it entered into the leases. However, this is certainly
something that could be pursued at trial-by both parties-without leaving it to argument,
anecdote, and resulting judicial whim.
396. E.g., Garman, 886 P.2d at 660 ("Conoco cannot invoke industry custom to limit the
rights of royalty and overriding royalty owners unsophisticated in the intricacies of mineral
development.").
397. Frequently the anecdotal conclusion may be inconsistent with the facts. See, e.g.,
supra text accompanying notes 381-388.
398. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 220(1) (1981).
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the burden of proving the other party's knowledge. 399 The Restatement
divides usage into two categories: usage "Relevant to Interpretation" 400
and usage "Supplementing an Agreement."' 401 Comment a to section 221
explains the separate section on "Supplementing an Agreement" as
follows:
This Section extends the same principle [stated in section 2201 to
cases where the parties did not advert to the problem with which the
usage deals, or where one or each separately foresaw the problem
but failed to manifest any intention with respect to it. In such cases,
in the absence of usage, the court would supply a reasonable term
.... But, if there is a reasonable usage which supplies an omitted
term and the parties know or have reason to know of the usage, it is
a surer guide than the court's own judgment of what is reasonable.40 2
The Restatement, and the U.C.C., each provide a special rule for "usage of
trade" by imputing knowledge to all parties who are engaged in the rele-
vant trade.40 3 Therefore, a party to an agreement will have "knowledge"
of a usage of trade if they have actual knowledge of the usage, under the
circumstances they should of had knowledge of the usage, or they are
engaged in the trade.404 When evaluating a party's knowledge, their use
of a knowledgeable agent, such as an oil and gas attorney, can also be
considered.40 5
The knowledge requirement is addressed by the court in Jeanes v. Hen-
derson406 where one of the parties, Jeanes, objected to the admission of
expert testimony offered by Henderson concerning "the meaning of the
term 'equipment' in the oil and gas industry. '40 7 Jeanes argued the testi-
mony was inadmissible "because both parties to the contract were not
members of the oil and gas industry. '40 8 In distinguishing a case put forth
by Jeanes, 40 9 the court stated:
399. "Hence a party who asserts a meaning based on usage must show either that the
other party knew of the usage or that the other party had reason to know of it." Id. at cmt.
b.
400. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 220 (1981).
401. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 221 (1981).
402. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 221 cmt. a (1981). The Restatement
also provides:
The more general and well-established a usage is, the stronger is the infer-
ence that a party knew or had reason to know of it. Similarly, the fact that a
usage is reasonable may tend to show that the parties contracted with refer-
ence to it or that a particular party knew or had reason to know of it.
Id. at cmt. b.
403. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222(3) (1981); U.C.C. §1-205(3) (1977);
U.C.C. § 1-303(d) (2003).
404. Id.
405. The Restatement notes: "it may be reasonable to hold a nonmerchant to mercan-
tile standards if he is represented by a mercantile agent." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 221 cmt. b (1981). See also U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (1977) (defining "merchant");
U.C.C. § 2-104 (1) (2003) (non-substantive modifications to "merchant" definition).
406. Jeanes, 703 F.2d 855.
407. Id. at 861.
408. Id.
409. Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 355 F.3d 705 (6th Cir. 1966).
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[I]t held only that evidence of trade usage is inadmissible when
neither party to the contract was a member of the trade. . . . At the
same time, the court recognized cases allowing evidence of trade us-
age in which the party claiming the benefit of the usage was a mem-
ber of the trade .... Here, Henderson was actively involved in the
oil and gas industry. 410
Although the court does not discuss how the usage became binding on
Jeanes,411 it must be on the basis that Jeanes, by participating in the oil
and gas trade, became subject to its usages.412
The knowledge issue is another area frequently dominated by anecdote
instead of fact. The court in Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell
Oil Co. 413 used the lessee's industry status to impose a heightened level
of knowledge regarding the meaning of "market value," while refusing to
impute any knowledge of the industry on the royalty owner.414 In each
situation the conclusion is based upon argument 415 or anecdote,416 not
fact. If the lessee desires to attack the court's assumptions, or the lessor
desires to ensure they are not revised, it should be done through the pres-
entation of fact at trial.
410. Jeanes, 703 F.2d at 861.
411. Jeanes invested money with Henderson to finance Henderson's development of oil
and gas leases. In return, Jeanes was assigned a working interest in several wells. Id. at
856-57.
412. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 222(3) (1981) ("Unless otherwise
agreed, a usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which the parties are engaged or a usage
of trade of which they know or have reason to know gives meaning to or supplements or
qualifies their agreement.") (emphasis added). See supra text accompanying notes 13-20.
413. Piney Woods, 726 F.2d 225.
414. Id. at 236.
415. For example, the court noted: "Shell asserts that 'royalty payments based upon
good faith contract prices have always been the custom in Mississippi."' Id. at 236 (empha-
sis added). Shell's argument apparently was not supported by usage evidence entered at
trial. The court also states: "This allegation of 'custom' is of course self-serving." Id. (em-
phasis added). The court replies to Shell's custom-by-argument with its own custom-by-
anecdote: "The payment of royalties is controlled by lessees, and lessors have no ready
means of ascertaining current market value other than to take the lessees' word for it." Id.
416. Regarding the lessee's knowledge, the court stated:
But our decision that market value means value rather than proceeds is not
simply an instance of interpretation against the lessee.... It is rather a hold-
ing that, although the royalty clauses might have been less than lucid to lay-
men, they were quite readily understandable to those in the industry. Shell
knew what a "market value" lease was and what a "proceeds" lease was.
Id. Regarding the lessor's lack of knowledge the court states:
For a practice to be legally relevant custom, both parties to the contract must
have actual or presumed knowledge of the practice .... Those not engaged
in an industry will not be presumed to know that words which have common
meanings outside the industry have a different meaning inside it.... Market
value in these leases is most easily understood to mean current value: the
lessors cannot be presumed to know that Shell and other producers made a
practice of basing their royalty payments on a different criterion. We will not
find "custom" binding on lessors from a practice within the control and un-
derstanding only of the lessees.
Id. This apparently creates the baseline rule the lessee must overcome, by offering, if avail-
able, facts to the contrary.
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If the court finds that the usage should apply, they typically give the
knowledge issue little attention in their opinion. Contrast, for example,
the Piney Woods analysis with the court's approach in Wolfe v. Texas
Co.,417 where a usage between lessees and oil purchasers is held to be
binding on a lessor. The court first described the usage by stating:
The proof established and the trial court found there was a well-de-
fined usage generally adopted by those engaged in the business of
producing, marketing or purchasing crude petroleum oil in
Oklahoma, giving the producer of oil under a lease, where the lessor
fails either to provide storage for the royalty oil or to sell the same,
authority as agent of the lessor, to sell the royalty oil along with the
working interest oil, at the posted price and on the customary terms,
and giving the purchaser, where the title of the lessor is not mer-
chantable, the right to withhold payment without liability for interest
until an abstract has been furnished showing merchantable title in
the lessor and a division order has been executed and delivered by
the lessor.418
The issue was whether the oil purchaser was obligated to pay interest
on money held in suspense for five years pending the outcome of litiga-
tion over the lessor's title. After describing the usage, the court noted the
following rule: "Parties to a contract are presumed to know a well-de-
fined trade usage generally adopted by those engaged in the business to
which the contract relates. '4 19 However, at no place in the opinion did
the court attempt to ascertain whether the lessor had any knowledge, ac-
tual or presumed, of the usages practiced by its lessee in dealing with oil
purchasers. The court instead relied upon two alternative theories to sup-
port its holding: first, the lessee was acting as the lessor's agent with au-
thority to dispose of the lessor's oil on terms consistent with the usage; or
second, the lessee had implied contractual authority to dispose of the les-
sor's oil "on the customary terms .... "420 Although the agency theory
may avoid having to evaluate the lessor's knowledge regarding the us-
age, 421 the implied contract theory would require the court to evaluate
whether the lessor fell within the rule that: "Persons, who enter into a
contract in the ordinary course of business, unless the terms of the con-
tract indicate a contrary intention, are presumed to have incorporated
therein any applicable, existing general trade usage relating to such busi-
ness. ' 422 The court did not engage in this analysis; instead the usage was
applied without inquiry into whether the lessor "knew or had reason to
know of the usage .... 423
417. 83 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1936).
418. Id. at 429.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 430.
421. The issue being whether the lessee's agreement to such terms was within the scope
of its authority.
422. Wolfe, 83 F.2d at 429.
423. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 220(1) (1981).
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Although the jurisprudence on this issue may at times reflect more of
an exercise in judicial equity instead of principled analysis, litigants must
always be prepared to address whether the relevant party "knew or had
reason to know of the usage." In the oil and gas lease setting the issue
will typically be whether the "lessor" was aware of the usage. Actual
knowledge will often be difficult to establish since oil and gas leases may
have been entered into decades past with the original parties long since
dead or defunct. Therefore, in most cases the focus will not be on what
the lessor actually knew, a subjective inquiry, but rather on what they
"had reason to know," an objective inquiry; or whether the facts indicate
they were "engaged" in the oil and gas industry.
When determining whether both parties must be aware of a usage,424
the function of the usage must be identified. For example, if the usage is
being offered to interpret the basic rights and obligations of the parties to
a contract, courts will evaluate the situation to determine if knowledge of
the usage should be imputed to all parties. However, once the basic con-
tours of the contract are defined, if the usage is offered to define a party's
performance under the contract, the usage is being offered to establish
the baseline for conduct regardless of either party's knowledge of the us-
age. Although it may be difficult to conceptually distinguish interpreta-
tion, which establishes the obligation from performance that discharges
the obligation, in practice courts have been able to make the distinction.
For example, if the usage evidence is offered to show compliance with a
specific requirement or standard, the focus will not be on any particular
party's knowledge of the usage. This was the case in Nygaard v. Conti-
nental Resources, Inc.,425 where the lessee sought to exercise an option to
extend an oil and gas lease using a sight draft. The critical option date
was January 4, 1998; the lessee sent the lessor a "five-day sight draft" on
December 12, 1997.426 The lessor delayed responding until January 8
when the lessor's attorney asserted the option had lapsed stating: "The
sight draft is unacceptable as it does not represent payment. '427 The re-
quirement or standard at issue in Nygaard was established by the court's
adoption of Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 249 that states:
Where the payment or offer of payment of money is made a condi-
tion of an obligor's duty, payment or offer of payment in any manner
current in the ordinary course of business satisfies the requirement
unless the obligee demands payment in legal tender and gives any
extension of time reasonably necessary to procure it.428
424. "Awareness" here means that the usage will be imputed to both parties because:
(1) they are a member of the trade, and it is a trade usage; (2) they have actual knowledge
of the usage; or (3) under the facts, they should have been aware of the usage. See supra
text accompanying notes 397-403.
425. 598 N.W.2d 851 (N.D. 1999).
426. Id. at 852.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 853 (emphasis added).
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Since the lease did not expressly require payment in legal tender, the
court focused on whether sight drafts are used "in the ordinary course of
business . .." The court did not have to address the knowledge of the
parties because the lessor, in its court briefs, acknowledged that "sight
drafts are commonly used in the oil and gas leasing business in North
Dakota. '429 In this situation, it should not matter whether either party is
a member of the "trade" or has notice of the "usage." Instead, the court
is looking for facts that trigger the application of an established principle.
If they exist, the principle will apply; if they do not exist, it will not apply.
In United States v. Stanolind Crude Oil Purchasing Co.,43° the crude oil
purchaser's use of division orders requiring a 3% deduction of oil
volumes for dirt, sediment, and transportation losses, was established as a
usage of trade.431 The court relied upon this usage evidence to refute the
government's fraud claim that the division orders misrepresented the
facts because the oil in fact did not contain 3% dirt and sediment.432 The
court recognized that a trade usage existed in the area for purchasers to
use a flat 3% deduction to cover impurities and shrinkage or loss that
might occur during transportation.433 The division order did not make
any sort of representations, it merely reflected the formula purchasers use
to account for impurities and transportation losses.434
Usage evidence has also been admitted to establish that a party was
familiar with the terms commonly used for a particular transaction. For
example, in Kinkead v. Western Atlas Int'l, Inc.,435 the issue was whether
a "service order" signed by Kinkead at the drillsite created a contract
429. Id. at 854.
430. 113 F.2d 194 (10th Cir. 1940).
431. The division orders provided:
Third: The Stanolind Crude Oil Purchasing Company shall deduct three per-
cent from all oil received from wells into the pipe lines for its account on
account of dirt and sediment, and, in addition, shall deduct one-twentieth of
one percent, for each degree of heat above normal temperature, and oil shall
be steamed when necessary to render it merchantable.
Id. at 197.
432. Id.
433. The court relied upon several treatises and agency findings to conclude:
In the marketing of crude oil, it is the practice to run the production from the
well into settling tanks and permit the heavier ingredients, constituting impu-
rities, to settle to the bottom. The part that is not thus settled off is run into
the pipe line. This practice removes a part, but not all, of the impurities and
pipe line losses, provision is made in the division orders for deduction of a
stipulated percentage.
This practice or usage of deducting three percent on account of dirt and sedi-
ment and transportation losses had its inception in Pennsylvania. During the
time that oil has been produced in Oklahoma and in its neighboring state of
Kansas, it has been the uniform practice and usage to incorporate in division
orders a provision for the deduction of three per cent of the oil received into
the pipe lines on account of dirt and sediment. This deduction is to cover not
only impurities in the oil, but also shrinkage or loss during transportation.
Like deductions are made in other areas.
Id. at 199 (footnotes omitted).
434. Id. at 200-01.
435. Kinkead, 894 P.2d 1123.
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which included a "hold harmless" clause on the back of the form.436 Up-
holding the hold harmless provision, the court relied upon evidence that
"it was customary and common usage in the industry that the risk of loss
or damage to certain property for services performed by a wireline ser-
vice company is typically borne by the customer .... ,,437 In this situation,
the evidence is not being used to establish the terms, 438 or to interpret
them, but rather that such terms are commonly encountered and would
not be unexpected by someone in Kinkead's position.
When usage evidence is offered to establish the general industry back-
drop under which the parties dealt,439 or the manner in which an industry
participant typically responds to a situation, there appears to be no
knowledge requirement. With regard to the meaning of a technical term,
the knowledge requirement appears to be quite limited. For example, the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts instructs that "technical terms and
word of art" are to be "given their technical meaning" if they are being
used "in a transaction within their technical field."'440 Once it is estab-
lished that the term was used in an industry transaction, then technical
meaning will be ascribed to a technical term. This appears to coincide
with the Restatement's "Usage of Trade" proyisions which imputes the
requisite knowledge when "the parties are engaged" in the trade.441 This
is just one example of the special treatment accorded usage evidence re-
garding technical terms.
F. USAGE HAS A SPECIAL ROLE REGARDING TECHNICAL TERMS
Technical terms and terms of art are treated as a special form of usage,
apparently with a less demanding knowledge requirement by parties to
contracts employing such terms. 442 Section 202 of Restatement (Second)
of Contracts, under the heading "Rules in Aid of Interpretation,"
provides:
(3) Unless a different intention is manifested,
(a) where language has a generally prevailing meaning, it is inter-
preted in accordance with that meaning;
436. The drill string became stuck while Kinkead was drilling a well. Kinkead hired
Western to address the problem and in the process the drill string parted and fell within the
casing. Although Western was hired orally, Kinkead subsequently signed Western's service
order that contained a hold harmless clause absolving Western from any liability for its
own negligence. Kinkead argued the exculpatory provisions were not explicit enough and
Kinkead had not read the back of the form where the clause was located. Id.
437. Id. at 1127.
438. However, the court stated "that such custom is implied in the oral contract" but
the express language was also contained in the "service order" the court describes as "a
formalization of the prior [oral] agreement." Id.
439. This would include evidence to establish the "surrounding circumstances."
440. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(3) (1981).
441. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222(3) (1981). See supra text accompa-
nying notes 402-404.
442. The primary requirement seems to be that the technical meaning will apply "when




(b) technical terms and words of art are given their technical
meaning when used in a transaction within their technical field.443
Many states have general statutory provisions that adopt a similar rule of
interpretation. 444 The oil and gas industry is replete with its own unique
terminology with meanings foreign to "generally prevailing meaning."'445
For example, the clause in an operating agreement authorizing recovery
of multiples of a non-consenting party's share of development costs446 is
typically described as a non-consent "penalty." This common usage of
the term has been seized upon to try and characterize the clause as an
unenforceable "penalty" instead of an enforceable liquidated damages
provision.447  The court in Nearburg v. Yates Petroleum Corp.448
observed:
We note preliminarily that, although we follow custom by referring
to the operating agreement provisions at issue as a "penalty," they
do not meet the definition of a penalty as set forth in the Restate-
ment and Corbin on Contracts. . . . The parties to the operating
agreement are not obligated to participate in all proposed opera-
tions, and a non-consent election cannot convincingly be character-
ized as a breach.... Therefore, we do not regard the non-consent
penalty provision as involving liquidated damages or an unenforce-
able penalty. 449
The context of the term "penalty," regarding operating agreements in the
oil and gas industry, describes a contractual obligation that is unrelated to
the legal context of an unenforceable penalty associated with the enforce-
ment of a liquidated damages clause.
The interpretation of technical terms is viewed as an independent basis
for considering usage evidence. In Musser Davis Land Co. v. Union Pa-
cific Res.,45° the court interpreted the granting clause of an oil and gas
lease to determine if seismic operations are encompassed by the term
"exploration. '451 The court noted that "the usages, words of art, and
443. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(3) (1981).
444. E.g., LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2047 (West 1987) ("Words of art and technical terms
must be given their technical meaning when the contract involves a technical matter.");
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 160 (West 1993) ("The words of a contract are to be under-
stood in their ordinary and popular sense, rather than according to their strict legal mean-
ing, unless used by the parties in a technical sense, or unless a special meaning is given to
them by usage, in which case the latter must be followed.").
445. The industry's unique terminology is part of the "surrounding circumstances"
courts should consider when interpreting agreements. See supra text accompanying notes
81-91.
446. E.g., A.A.P.L. Form 610-1989 Model Form Operating Agreement, Article VI,
§ B.2.(b), p. 7, lines 7-26. This form is reproduced in FORMS MANUAL, supra note 153, at
121-42.
447. See Hamilton v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 648 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (rejecting the penalty argument, but evaluating the clause as an
enforceable liquidated damages clause).
448. 943 P.2d 560 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
449. Id. at 565-66.
450. 201 F.3d 561 (5th Cir. 2000).
451. Id. at 565.
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technical terms of the oil and gas industry should be taken into considera-
tion in interpreting the lease exploration clause. '452 The court then pro-
ceeded to examine several oil and gas law treatises453 to support its
holding that seismic operations are included in the grant to engage in
"exploration" of the leased land.45 4
Even technical terms used by an industry may be used in different tech-
nical contexts. For example, in McAffee v. City of Garnett,45 5 the techni-
cal term was contained in a gas contract where the seller agreed to deliver
to the buyer "gas of merchantable quality. '456 The buyer contended the
seller had to add an odorant to the gas before delivery for the gas to be
"gas of merchantable quality. 457 The seller contended "gas of merchant-
able quality" referred only to the quality and heating value of the gas.
458
The court found: "that the test of 'gas of merchantable quality' in this
case must be determined within the context of its meaning, use and ac-
ceptance in the natural gas trade or business. '459 It then proceeded to
examine evidence from "Mr. Hofsess, a graduate engineer with long ex-
perience and now an executive of the defendant company," who testified
as follows:
[I]t is and has always been the practice in the industry that odoriza-
tion is the responsibility of the retail distributor; that interstate pipe-
line companies operating in Kansas have never odorized natural gas
supplied to retail distributors for resale to consumers; that the provi-
sions as to quality found in the City's contract are those contained in
their Federal Power Commission Gas T[a]riff and are incorporated
in every contract under which they company sells gas for resale.
460
The opposing expert did not refute Mr. Hofsess' testimony, but merely
noted that introducing gas into a retail distribution system, without
odorant, is unsafe and therefore would not be "merchantable. '461 How-
ever, only Mr. Hofsess' testimony addressed "who" had the obligation to
add the odorant so the gas could be distributed to consumers. The court
accepted Mr. Hofsess' usage testimony and concluded the gas, as ten-
dered by the seller, was "of a merchantable quality" as the term was used
in the contract. 462
The McAfee case highlights the use of expert witnesses to define tech-
452. Id.
453. The court also relied upon a Texas case noting: "the opinion is instructive in the
instant matter because it sheds light upon industry practice and custom." Id. at 567.
454. Id. at 565-66 ("Thus the industry usages and practices indicate that in Louisiana
and elsewhere an exclusive right of exploration lease clause generally is understood to
include the right to conduct seismic operations.").
455. 469 P.2d 295 (Kan. 1970).
456. Id. at 297.
457. Id. at 300.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 299.
460. Id. at 298.
461. Id. at 299.
462. Id. at 300.
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nical terms. In Phillips Oil Co. v. OKC Corp.,463 the court noted: "What
better way is there to discover the technical meaning than through the
use of Federal Rule of Evidence 702." In Phillips, the court considered
expert petroleum accounting testimony to interpret "net profits account-
ing provisions" in a farmout agreement. 464 The court in Sidwell Oil &
Gas Co., Inc. v. Loyd,465 considered the expert testimony of E. R. Sidwell
regarding payment of delay rental on oil and gas leases in the Ness
County area. The court found his "[t]wenty-five years in the oil business
should be sufficient to qualify him to testify as to custom and usage of
that business with regard to terminology and meaning of words used in
written leases. '466
Regardless of how "expert" the expert is, their testimony must still be
relevant and reliable, 467 and the usage of the term at issue must be estab-
lished, as fact, in each case.468 This becomes particularly important with
regard to one of the most frequently cited oil and gas industry dictiona-
ries: Williams & Meyers Manual of Oil and Gas Terms.469 The Manual is
published as a separate paper-bound volume with the most current ver-
sion maintained as Volume 8 to Williams & Meyers on Oil and Gas
Law. 470 It is, without a doubt, an excellent work and one that has been
relied upon by lawyers and judges for years. For example, in Sandefer Oil
& Gas, Inc. v. Duhon,471 the court, interpreting a "horizontal Pugh
clause," uses the Manual to support its view of the applicable usage re-
garding the term "horizon. '472 However, before relying upon the Manual
as a source for defining industry terms, its limitations should be consid-
ered. As the authors of the Manual note in their Foreword: "a considera-
ble number of oil and gas terms lack a standardized meaning: usage varies
from place to place, or the same word conveys several meanings, not al-
ways consistent. '473
More important is an understanding about how many of the terms end
up in the Manual. The process is best illustrated by the court's opinion in
463. Phillips, 8'12 F.2d 265.
464. Id. at 281.
465. 630 P.2d 1107 (Kan. 1981).
466. Id. at 1115.
467. See supra text accompanying notes 282-318.
468. See supra text accompanying notes 371-381.
469. Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, WILLIAMS & MEYERS MANUAL OF OIL
AND GAS TERMS (10th ed. 1997) [hereinafter MANUAL OF TERMS].
470. 8 PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS ON OIL &
GAS LAW (2002) [hereinafter MARTIN & KRAMER].
471. 961 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1992).
472. Id. at 1211. The court concluded:
We agree with this definition [of the term horizon] which we find consistent
with the usage of the term in the oil and gas industry. See Williams & Mey-
ers, Manual of Oil & Gas Terms, 566 (1991) (defining horizon as "a zone of a
particular formation . . .of sufficient porosity and permeability to form a
petroleum reservoir"). Thus, the horizontal lease boundary under the Loun-
sberry tract is 100 feet below the bottom of the Middle Miogyp, at whatever
depth it is found throughout the leased tract.
Id.
473. MANUAL OF TERMS, supra note 469, at v.
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Mescalero Energy, Inc. v. Underwriters Gen. Agency, Inc. 474 In Mes-
calero, one expert relied upon a definition of the term "formation" found
in the Manual.475 The insurance company sponsoring the Manual defini-
tion of "formation" objected to evidence being offered by the insured's
expert.476 Ultimately, the court held that these are both forms of extrin-
sic evidence designed to define an industry term; one happens to come
from a book, the other comes from the expert's understanding of the
industry. 477
The expert for the insurance company sponsored the Manual definition
of formation as "the one most generally accepted in the industry. '478
However, cross-examination of the expert revealed the following:
Counsel: You gave a definition of formation in your affidavit, correct?
Riseden: Yes.
Counsel: Have you ever used that definition in defining formation
before?
Riseden: No.479
As the court noted: "Although Riseden [the insurer's expert] testified
that Davenport's [the insured's expert] definition of a formation was not
generally accepted and that Williams & Meyers' definition was the term's
generally understood meaning, he conceded that he had never used the
Williams & Meyers definition before his expert affidavit .... "480 Riseden
was a petroleum engineer. His first encounter with the Williams & Mey-
474. Mescalero, 56 S.W.3d 313.
475. Id. at 320.
476. The objection was the insured's expert's affidavit, containing an alternative defini-
tion of the term "formation," "should be excluded as impermissible parol evidence." Id. at
322.
477. The court noted: "The question for us is: 'Can a reasonable definition of an indus-
try term be established through expert testimony?' We hold that it can." Id. at 323. The
court also answered the more basic question of whether any extrinsic evidence, from a
dictionary, expert, or otherwise, can be considered in this case. First, the court stated the
maxim: "Courts may not look to extrinsic evidence to prove the existence of an ambigu-
ity." Id. at 320. Second, it states:
Nevertheless, extrinsic evidence may "be admissible to give words of a con-
tract a meaning consistent with that to which they are reasonably susceptible,
i.e., to 'interpret' contractual terms."... Texas courts often resort to the use
of external reference such as dictionaries to determine an insurance policy
term's plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meaning....
In particular, a specialized industry or trade term may require extrinsic evi-
dence of the commonly understood meaning of the term within a particular
industry....
Id. This takes on even more importance when an insurance policy is involved; once an
ambiguity is found to exist the interpretive maxim applies that requires a court to "con-
strue the policy against the insurer when ambiguous policy terms permit more than one
interpretation, especially when the policy terms exclude or limit coverage." Id. at 319. In
this case the dispute is over a policy exclusion of blowout coverage that involves only a
single formation as opposed to blowouts "between two or more separate formations ......
Id. at 316. The insured argued the Austin Chalk constituted "two or more separate forma-
tions;" the insurer contended it was a single formation. Therefore, the dispute centered on
what is a "formation." Id. at 316-17.
478. Id. at 318.




ers' definition was likely when it was brought to his attention by counsel
for the insurer.
What about the inherent authority of the definition itself? What
weight does its presence in the Manual command? 481 In Mescalero, the
dispute focused on whether the "'Austin Chalk" consisted of a single for-
mation or multiple formations.482 The superficial appeal of the Manual's
definition of "formation" is obvious:
A succession of sedimentary beds that were deposited continuously
and under the same general conditions. It may consist of one type of
rock or of alternations of types. An individual bed or group of beds
distinct in character from the rest of the formation and persisting
over a large area is called a "member" of the formation. Formations
are usually named for the town or area in which they were first rec-
ognized and described, often at a place where the formation out-
crops. For example, the Austin Chalk formation outcrops at Austin,
Texas.483
The insurers tendered this as "the" definition for "formation" and noted
the Texas Supreme Court, in another case, had quoted the definition in
discussing the term "stratum. ' 484 The court found that the evidence
presented by the insured established that the Manual's definition was not
the only reasonable definition,485 and that the Texas Supreme Court had
not "adopted" the definition "as the only and unambiguous meaning of
the term ["formation"]. '486 At a more basic level, the court could have
simply noted that establishing a usage 487 is a matter of fact to be proven
in each case. 488 Therefore, the unique circumstances of this case will de-
termine the appropriate usage by identifying and evaluating the pertinent
facts. The use of a definition in another case, or the existence of a defini-
tion in the Manual, standing alone are of little substantive value. Their
significance should be evaluated, as the Court of Appeals did in Mes-
calero, to ascertain their relevance to the matter currently at issue.
Whenever a party is faced with an unfavorable Manual definition,48 9
they should inquire about the inner workings of how something becomes
481. It is revealing that in another portion of the court's opinion the court uses the
Manual to define the word "kick" to distinguish it from a "blowout." Id. at 316, n.4.
482. Mescalero, 56 S.W.3d at 315-16. The insurance policy being interpreted provided
coverage for a blowout "between two or more separate formations" but not for a blowout
within a single formation. The insured was drilling in the "Austin Chalk" at the time of the
blowout. Id. at 316.
483. Id. at 318 (quoting HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF
OIL AND GAS TERMS 559 (9th ed. 1994)). This definition appeared in the first edition of
the Manual. HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL & GAS
TERMS 100 (1957).
484. Mescalero, 56 S.W.3d at 318 (citing Amarillo Oil Co. v. Energy-Agri Prods., Inc.,
794 S.W.2d 20, 23 n.3 (Tex. 1990)).
485. Mescalero, 56 S.W.3d at 322.
486. Id. at 323.
487. To include the usage of technical terms and terms of art.
488. See supra text accompanying notes 371-381.
489. Or you want to ascertain the relative strength of a favorable definition.
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a definition in the Manual.490 Often the source of the definition is sup-
plied by a court case. For example, the Mescalero case itself is now the
source of another definition of "formation" which reads: "[a]ny map-
pable, separate, self contained pressure unit within a geological inter-
val. '491 The 9th edition of the Manual added the following definition of
"formation:" "A mappable unit composed of the same kind of rock or a
distinctive combination of rock types. '492 Therefore, the presence of a
definition in the Manual may mean nothing more than it was mentioned
in a court opinion, or a government document or other commentary, and
selected by the editors for inclusion in the Manual. This offers little in-
sight into ascertaining the intent of the parties to a particular agreement
under a particular set of circumstances. In most situations the parties to
the agreement at issue will be unaware of the Manual; it will usually be
the counsel involved, after a dispute has arisen, who first discover the
Manual definitions. Although the Manual may provide some evidence of
a term's usage, it will merely be a preliminary step in establishing the
usage as a matter of fact.
G. JURISPRUDENTIAL CHOICES EXCLUDING USAGE EVIDENCE
SHOULD BE CAREFULLY IDENTIFIED
Often it is difficult to distinguish an anecdotal conclusion from a deci-
sion. Perhaps the best test is to simply ask: did the court arrive at a con-
clusion relying upon some assumed state of affairs or did it simply make a
decision on how the world ought to be? Appellate courts are in the busi-
ness of deciding how the world ought to be, but more often they are try-
ing to ascertain, under a given set of facts, how a situation fits within the
world as previously defined. The amorphous jurisprudential line between
property law and contract law493 offers an analytical reference for when
courts may be inclined to favor generic decisions over individualized con-
clusions. Although property law, like contract law, seeks to give effect to
the intent of the parties, property law often has competing public inter-
490. One approach would be to obtain the testimony of the persons who compile and
maintain the Manual; currently they are Professors Bruce M. Kramer and Patrick H.
Martin.
491. Mescalero, 56 S.W.3d at 318. MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 470, at 412.1 to
412.2 adding discussion of the Mescalero analysis to commentary under the term
"formation").
492. HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS
425 (9th ed. 1994). The indicated source of this definition is from an appendix to an off-
shore resource management program administered by a government agency.
493. For example, depending upon the state in which an oil and gas lease is taken it may
be viewed as a conveyance or a contract. However, regardless of whether the oil and gas
leasehold interest is a corporeal or incorporeal hereditament, courts purport to apply con-
tract interpretation rules even though they all create interests affecting real property. E.g.,
McNally v. Guevara, 989 S.W.2d 380, 387 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet.) ("These rules
of deed interpretation are virtually identical to those for construing contracts. In fact,




ests that sometimes elevate certainty and administration above individu-
alized intentions.
This property vs. contract policy is illustrated in the Colorado Supreme
Court's decision in McCormick v. Union Pacific Res. Co.,4 9 4 where the
court held that a deed reservation of "other minerals" reserves oil and
gas.495 The decision drew a concurring opinion from Justice Rice chastis-
ing the court for its conclusion that:
Although the term "minerals" is not inherently unambiguous and ex-
trinsic evidence may be required to ascertain the parties' intent in
certain circumstances, our study of Colorado legal precedent, cus-
tom, and usage convinces us that Colorado adheres to the majority
rule that deed reservation language reserving "other minerals"
reserves oil and gas.496
In considering the effect of reservations in land grants to railroads, the
court discussed commentary and factual evidence which tended to define
conveyancing custom and usage. 497 Justice Rice objected to considera-
tion of such evidence stating:
Without regard to whether the language in the deed reservation in
this case completely addresses whether oil and gas are included as
minerals, the majority determines that the term minerals has a well-
settled meaning that includes oil and gas.... In doing so, the major-
ity relies on historical information concerning custom and usage to
determine both the ambiguity of the term minerals and its meaning.
Furthermore, by relying on such information to ascertain the mean-
ing of the term minerals, the majority determines an issue of fact
properly determined by a trial court. . . . Indeed, the custom and
usage information relied upon by the majority is precisely the type of
evidence the trial court barred by its grant of summary judgment.
Thus, the majority opinion has the effect of denying the landowners
the opportunity to present their evidence concerning custom and us-
age, while at the same time relying on its own descriptions of custom
and usage.498
Justice Rice is essentially telling the court to make a decision, as a matter
of law, that will apply regardless of the circumstances extrinsic to the
deed language. It appears that is what the court in fact did,499 and the
reference to commentators and usage were merely information used to
bolster the court's decision.5°
494. McCormick, 14 P.3d 346.
495. Id. at 348 ("We hold that Colorado adheres to the majority rule that the deed
reservation language 'other minerals' reserves oil and gas.").
496. Id. at 349 (emphasis added).
497. Id. at 349-54. The court concluded: "Based on our study of Colorado precedent,
custom, usage, and learned commentary thereon, we hold that a deed reservation for
'other minerals' reserves oil and gas." Id. at 354.
498. Id. at 355 (Rice, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
499. The court made it clear that "[t]his case presents a legal question" which the court
resolves as a matter of "property law." Id. at 354.
500. It also appears that the court's statement that "the term 'minerals' is not inherently
unambiguous" is referencing minerals other than oil and gas. This is reflected in the court's
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In defending against the offering of usage evidence, counsel should be
attuned to whether the area has been, or should be, preempted by the
court's property-based decisions. Usage evidence in such situations is not
relevant because it would not establish a fact "that is of consequence to
the determination of the action. ' 50 1 If the matter has already been deter-
mined as a matter of property law, there will be no room for interpreta-
tion because the meaning has already been established by the court. The
problem, however, is that such "property law" decisions are rarely clearly
articulated; the McCormick decision is one of those rare exceptions.50 2 If
courts are not willing to entertain the interpretation of documents, they
should clearly state the policy basis for their decision and refuse to en-
gage in construction games and evidentiary maneuvers50 3 to arrive at de-
sired outcomes.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Usage evidence is often essential to the proper interpretation of agree-
ments. Unfortunately, the interpretive process has been dominated more
by maxims to support outcomes instead of principled analysis to ascertain
meaning. This has resulted in case law that sometimes treats usage evi-
dence restrictively as simply another form of "extrinsic" evidence. How-
ever, the modern trend, no doubt driven by the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts and the U.C.C., is to recognize usages as an inherent part of
agreements associated with an industry. Once this is done, the focus can
be upon the quality of the evidence offered to establish and define a us-
age. Instead of the parol evidence rule, courts should be focusing on rele-
vance and reliability to decide what the trier of fact can, and cannot,
consider. Courts, and counsel, should be careful to ensure that usages are
established as fact and not left to argument or anecdote. Trial counsel
will need to identify the areas where usage evidence may be of assistance,
and set about structuring a plan by which the facts can be ascertained,
and if necessary, presented at trial. Failure to present relevant usage evi-
dence can mean the difference between winning and losing a case.
discussion of minerals "other than oil and gas" under the heading "Other Minerals." Id. at
351. It appears the court has clearly decided that "oil and gas" are encompassed by the
reference to "other minerals" as a matter of Colorado property law.
501. See supra text accompanying notes 282-293.
502. Even though Justice Rice thought it could have been even clearer, the court's hold-
ing-regardless of whether you agree or disagree with the outcome-is a refreshing exam-
ple of jurisprudential honesty.
503. Most of the "gaming" here concerns the parol evidence rule.
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